Building Relationships: Possible Futures Between the Successors to the Soviet Union and the United States

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Rival gangs wage a treacherous and prolonged tug-of-war from the rooftops of adjacent warehouses. Beyond the danger of being pulled over the edge, both gangs risk falling through their own structurally unsound and neglected roofs. But fixed on defeating its archenemy, each side ignores its own weakening footing. A few in both gangs begin to see the futility and peril their group faces, and they shout for both groups to step forward to get some slack on the rope. Filled with mistrust, but responding to the initiatives of one leader, each gang takes cautious steps toward the other. Suddenly one gang’s members begin quarreling among themselves. They drop their end of the rope. The other side’s shouts of victory quickly subside as they, like their former adversaries, scramble for safety.

Though not a likely account of gang warfare, this story might offer an instructive metaphor of the relationship between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The protracted hostile relationship absorbed much of the effort of both countries. During the Gorbachev era, steps were under way on both sides to moderate the continuing confrontation, to transform the relationship. These attempts stopped abruptly with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The hostile relationship that was beginning to undergo change was not transformed; it ended. The current task for the United States primarily concerns constructing new relationships with a different set of political entities.

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The metaphor of the rival gangs suggests two hypotheses that have direct bearing on the development of new relationships between the United States and the successors to the Soviet Union. The first states that when an adversarial relationship dissolves, the former antagonists direct their attention and energy to other relationships that pose serious threats to them. In other words, when you are no longer concentrating on winning a tug-of-war, you worry about your perilous footing. This basic idea is captured in Figure 10.1. The second proposition concerns the future relationship directly between the former contestants. When one of the parties in an intensely hostile relationship is internally transformed so as to pose substantially less threat to the other party, the subsequent relationship of the continuing actor with its former opponent’s successors is likely to be tentative and slow to develop. As the metaphor would suggest, once your gang’s rival group has split up, you are unlikely to rush into commitments with its former members.

Taken together, these two hypotheses, if true and applicable, suggest a difficult problem. The relationship between the United States and the successors to the Soviet Union are likely to be weak and subject to considerable drift. Saunders (1992) has described an enormous opportunity that exists to create relationships with the successor countries that not only offer great benefits to the participants but could contribute to the transformation of world politics. The two propositions indicate this chance may well be missed. In the terms of more traditional international politics, if, as this essay contends, the United States has vital interests affected by the development and actions of the successor countries, we may also fail to interact in ways that might protect our interests from serious damage.

Before examining the argument for these hypotheses more closely, we need to clarify the concept of relationship. Relationship is basic in the study of international affairs. It is often treated as a core undefined term. Most scholarship, however, has been focused on how to change relationships: how arms races escalate and how to reduce them; how to move from confrontation to detente and how detente can be reversed; how armed conflicts expand or shift from a state of war
to a state of peace; how reciprocal cooperative actions occur or fail to develop. The challenge facing the United States is the creation of new relationships, although with a legacy of hostility toward the immediate predecessors. More accurately, we might describe the situation as a transformed relationship, with some old properties and history together with other, totally new elements.

As an analytic concept in international affairs, relationship can be understood first as the continuing linkage of two or more actors in terms of affective disposition, interdependence, and relative capabilities. On the basis of experience and other cues, governments and private actors assess the likelihood that those on the other side are disposed to be supportive or obstructive, and they tend to behavior toward the other based on these affective feelings. Interdependence, a second element of relationship, entails the extent to which each party depends on the other for the realization of some of its important goals and values. Of course, dependency need not be symmetrical. One side may be far more dependent on the other than is true in reverse; that inequality provides the less dependent party with influence or power. Power or influence in a relationship has many sources, but it is grounded in the third element of relationship—the relative capabilities of the two sides.

Certainly the United States and the Soviet Union were quite interdependent in that each challenged the basic ideology of the other as well as the other’s very existence and ability to exercise influence elsewhere in the world. Although varying in degree at different points in the Cold War, the relationship was predominantly antagonistic. At least in terms of relative military capabilities, the two superpowers gradually approached parity.

As the dropping of the rope in the gang example terminated the immediate interdependence of the two rival groups, so the diminution of the direct threat of war and of the numerous regional confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States dramatically reduced our immediate sense of interdependence with the inheritors of the Soviet republics. At the same time, with the perceived substantial reduction in threat, American hostile affect toward the successor countries dropped greatly—as, presumably, theirs did toward the United States. The collapsing economies of the new countries also dramatically changed their relative capabilities.

Not only have the basic elements of the relationship been changed; the parties with whom relationships must be established are different. In the new post-Soviet environment, we are concerned not with one, but with multiple relationships with the varying successor countries. Despite the temptation to simplify things by seeking to substitute a single new relationship for the old one, no singular entity dominates the new environment or captures all of the major interests of the United States. Certainly the Commonwealth of Independent States offers no replacement—it lacks the power, legitimacy, and institutions. Although the largest successor—the Russian Federation—requires special consideration, it too cannot be advanced as the sole partner for new relationships to the neglect of the 14 other former republics without serious damage to American interests.

Having elaborated the basic concept of relationship as it pertains to the United States and the post-Soviet interaction, consider again the hypotheses that suggest the conditions exist for considerable drift. The arguments for the hypothe-
ses as they apply to U.S. relations with the successor countries are multiple. First, other critical problems in each country demand attention and are likely to consume most political energy and available resources. Like the rival gangs in the metaphor, all parties have inadequately attended to the foundations on which they stand. In the wake of the Cold War, the United States faces an array of domestic problems from education to health care, from unemployment to difficulties in private savings and banking institutions. International issues also press for attention, including those dealing with major trading partners, civil wars, aggressive regimes gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, and global environmental challenges. For the countries that have arisen from Soviet lands, the requirements for political and economic reform and survival are monumental.

Second, the continuing domestic upheavals in each of the successor countries create enormous uncertainty about the nature and stability of the partners with whom the United States might construct relationships. This same instability breeds grave questions about whether any regime could fulfill commitments it might make. The lack of rules and institutions generates the same sense of uncertainty and high risk for potential private initiatives as well.

Third, there is considerable uncertainty about the leadership role of the United States in the international system at present. Some Americans—like the columnist Charles Krauthammer—see the next decade or more as a unipolar moment during which the United States alone can play a central international leadership role. Other Americans view the United States as a declining hegemon with very limited ability to mobilize the resources necessary to exercise leadership. During this period of self-doubt about America’s role, there is a corresponding uncertainty about the structure of the international system. The structure of the international system can bound and shape relationships, but given the present ambiguity, its effects are likely to be unclear. So both America’s own doubts and the related systemic uncertainty contribute to the likelihood of drift in these potential relationships.

Fourth, we must take into account the nature of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast to World War II, no occupation by victorious powers marked the termination of the Cold War confrontation. The occupation at the end of World War II created a sense of direct responsibility for the plight of the defeated society. No unavoidable obligation is imposed on the United States or any other foreign country with the fall of the Soviet Union.

**AMERICAN INTERESTS**

Does it matter that the U.S. relationship with Russia, or that with Lithuania, or Ukraine, or Kyrgyzstan, drifts? Most Americans would surely agree that it is not in our interest to have some or all of these countries and the other successors of the Soviet Union fall back into a communist empire. Many would also agree that we should encourage peaceful market-oriented democracies.

Beyond such vague stipulations, efforts to recognize and assess American interests have been fitful and slow. It can be argued that the interests of the United States toward each of the successor countries are evolving and therefore cannot
be clearly formulated at present. Furthermore, it is unlikely that we will have the
same concerns with each former Soviet country, so the task is complicated and
ambiguous. Finally, it is by no means clear that the current political units and
their boundaries will endure, as the conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh or the struggles in Georgia illustrate. The set of actors
with whom interests can be explored remains uncertain in a number of cases.

Nevertheless, it is essential to assess what American interests in these coun-
tries might be in order to make some judgments about the implications of rela-
tionship drift. The following eight candidate interests are offered:

1. Controlling nuclear weapons and their reduction
2. Minimizing the risk of weapons and expert transfers to third parties
3. Avoiding military alignments with potential adversaries
4. Preventing conventional military conflicts
5. Promoting political stability and avoiding escalating civil wars
6. Encouraging democratic political systems and respect for domestic mi-
norities
7. Developing market economies engaged in international transactions
8. Promoting openness to transnational exchanges and collaborations

1. **Controlling nuclear weapons and their reduction.** If the end of the Cold
War is to yield real dividends in reduced risk of nuclear war, it must lead to a signif-
icient reduction in the vast stockpiles of tactical and strategic weapons. The
arms control treaties negotiated by Presidents Gorbachev and Bush and the
deeper cuts in strategic nuclear weapons agreed upon by President Bush and
Russian President Yeltsin at their summits in June, 1992, and January, 1993, are
yet to be implemented. To do so will be a costly, multiyear project. It involves the
participation of the four republics where nuclear weapons are deployed—Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The United States has a fundamental secu-
rity interest in seeing this effort to substantially reduce the total number of nu-
clear warheads and their delivery systems go forward in a responsible, verifiable
manner.

2. **Minimizing the risk of weapons and expert transfers to third parties.** A
basic security concern of the United States and other countries that assumes in-
creasing urgency in the post–Cold War era is the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; their delivery systems; the associated technologies; and the human
expertise in how these weapons are produced, maintained, and used. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union and its rapid economic decline, Western observers
quickly appreciated the danger that deprived groups in the domestic nuclear
weapons complex might sell warheads or related technology to eager buyers from
countries with a strong desire to become nuclear powers. It is becoming clearer
that the difficult task of preventing diversion of complete weapons or their com-
ponents and technologies is only part of the problem. Scientists, engineers, and
specialized technicians in the former Soviet nuclear complex can be hired and
leave their current residence with much less chance of detection than exotic hard-
ware. Use of displaced experts can accelerate the ability of other countries with adequate resources to develop their own sophisticated weapons industry. Iraq has provided a vivid demonstration. These prospects for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and accurate delivery systems pose a severe security problem for the United States and many other countries and again directs our attention to those former republics that made up the advanced technology system of the Soviet military.

3. Avoiding military alignments with potential adversaries. For the foreseeable future an arc of crisis from the Middle East (from North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean) to North Asia represents potential areas of aggressive regional conflict with substantial security concerns for the United States (e.g., the two Koreas; the uncertain future evolution of China; India and its neighbors; Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf; the Arab-Israeli confrontation; the potential of an aggressively expansionist Islamic fundamentalism). The military alignment of any country from the former Soviet Union with one of these border states could complicate the threat inherent in regional conflicts—some in a critical way. Nowhere is the potential greater than in the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—and their neighbors Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia on the west side of the Caspian Sea. Each of these former Soviet republics faces severe internal divisions and economic crises for which they naturally seek support. They are surrounded by states with substantial interests in their political development and alignment. Turkey and Iran compete for the favor of the over 50 million Muslims in the region. Pakistan and India recognize the potential that alliances with several of these new countries will affect their own dispute. China fears spillover of rebellion into its own territory, and Russia's stake is dramatically evidenced by the 9 million Russians living in these countries. Potential alignments that could enlarge or exacerbate regional conflicts in the arc of crisis must be of concern to the United States.6

4. Preventing conventional military conflicts. One of the most dangerous possibilities facing the successor countries and their neighbors is large-scale interstate warfare. A number of the issues that frequently have lead to interstate wars in the past exist in an acute form among the former republics. These include contested political boundaries, protection of expatriates, resource distribution disputes, and fear of another republic's (or group of republics') military development. Avoiding such violent conflicts across political boundaries is in the vital interest of the United States for a number of reasons:

a. War between several of the major countries—for example, Russia and Ukraine—could severely damage the possibilities for democratic and market reforms not only for the countries directly involved but for the entire region.

b. A significant risk of escalation among former republics of the Soviet Union would exist as states sided with one combatant or the other out of loyalty; for their own protection; or, particularly in the case of Russia, to protect fellow nationals living in one of the warring states.
c. The war could "leak out" of the region to involve countries outside the former Soviet Union, including border states whose own stability could be greatly affected.

d. Such a war would likely cause large numbers of refugees, and a massive influx of displaced persons fleeing the conflict could overwhelm other countries.

e. The danger always exists that even if the combatants lack nuclear weapons at the outset (presumably only Russia among the ex-Soviet countries will have nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future if the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks agreements are implemented), they could acquire them from supporting third parties. Although a major conventional war would not pose a direct threat to the American homeland, it could be devastating to American global interests and to the prospects for world stability.7

5. **Promoting political stability and avoiding escalating civil wars.** The danger of political instability and civil war is not hypothetical but a current problem. The 1992 crisis in Moldova, where the eastern half of the country sought to establish an independent Dniester Republic and caused a military confrontation, is only one illustration. Equally foreboding are the coup and resulting military actions in Georgia and the deadly struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan and Armenia. These cases in which political conflicts escalated into internal military conflicts could be dwarfed by other prospects. The Russian Federation, with its numerous regional nationalisms and homelands involving more than 50 nationality groups and 31 ethnic administrative areas, poses one of the most troubling potential cases. Within Russia, Tatarstan, Checheno-Ingushetia, Mordovia, Mari El, Chuvashia, and Komi-Permyak have all declared their independence, although the implications of these actions remain unclear. A weakened central political authority abetted by "regional semi-autarky" pursued for economic survival could set the stage for nearly complete political collapse, declarations of independence by various national groups, and possible civil war.8 Even without the emergence of internal war, the breakdown of central authority in any of the former republics creates all the difficulties for the international community in general, and the United States in particular, of failed states. Such chaos would produce many of the effects of interstate war with respect to American interests and would presage a potentially grimmer future.

6. **Encouraging democratic political systems and respect for domestic minorities.** It is in the interest of the United States to encourage movement toward democratic forms of government and, as a basic feature of such political systems, to include tolerance for social, political, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. Political stability can be secured with various forms of government, but growing evidence suggests that democratic governments are less likely to lead their countries into war with other democratic countries (e.g., see Bremer, 1992). Thus, if this finding is correct and applicable, the security interest of the United States is enhanced by promoting democratic regimes. Beyond the security benefit, the tolerance of minorities that is more likely to emerge in democratic societies addresses a fundamental human right that the United States periodically has sought to
champion. The task of integrating minorities as full, protected participants into a political system with which they can comfortably identify poses a continuing hurdle for many well-established democratic societies. The challenge for most of the former Soviet republics would appear of enormous proportions. Yet protection of nationalities and other minorities is likely to be vital for the political stability of these countries. It also is critical if one major source of both internal and interstate violent conflict is to be limited. Thus, encouragement of democratic systems appears of major importance to the United States for multiple reasons.

7. Developing market economies engaged in international transactions. The uncertain link between democratic political systems and market economies has been investigated by scholars (e.g., Lindblom, 1977) and revealed in contemporary world affairs. It is evident from the post–World War II era that market systems can operate successfully with severe restraints on political democracy. It is unclear whether democracies in general are likely to survive for long without some form of economic prosperity, which increasingly appears to require some latitude for market operations. Certainly market systems cannot be advocated as a means of ensuring more pacifist-oriented democracies. No such roundabout argument is necessary, because it is in the direct interest of the United States to promote internationally oriented market systems. Gaining access to more markets around the world and importing the goods and services they produce has a tangible benefit for the American economy. The opportunities posed by involvement with a number of the successor countries could be economically significant for both them and the United States. Furthermore, successful market systems in the successor countries are essential if the needed multilateral investments in the post-Soviet countries are to continue. The economic collapse of the new post-Soviet countries could lead to a definitive default on externally owed debt, which by 1992 exceeded $80 billion for Russia and Ukraine alone (Colton and Legvold, 1992:190).

8. Promoting openness to transnational exchanges and collaborations. One of the least specific interests of the United States toward the successor countries is also one of the most essential for building stable, positive relationships between countries. If one represents bilateral relationships—as in Figure 10.2—on a continuum, from supportive to harmful, then a hallmark of most hostile relations is that they are largely confined to government interactions: one opposing government actively restrains its citizens from participation with sectors of the other country. United States–Cuban relations illustrate that pattern today, as did Soviet-American relations for most of the Cold War. These stand in sharp contrast to the diverse interactions of the United States and Britain or Sweden and Norway. Countries that have the strongest supportive bonds are connected by numerous linkages outside of direct government channels. Not only business transactions but exchanges of all kinds between educational, religious, scientific, cultural, and artistic enterprises establish a web of interrelationships. These interactions enrich both countries; develop institutions for problem solving; and provide complex interests in each country supporting peaceful, open relations.
While a strong case can be made for promoting such openness with any country, the potential complementary capabilities and the recent history of a belligerent relationship make this development of open, diverse interactions of particular importance between the United States and the successor countries. In sum, to avoid reversion to the old belligerency, the conditions for broad and deep transactions must be actively encouraged.

An enumeration of possible national interests can be, at best, only a partial guide—a qualified approximation (see Table 10.1). Of course, this list actually refers to the possible interests of the United States with regard to 15 separate countries that have been aggregated together. Which American interests apply, and with what priority, can be expected to vary from one former Soviet republic to another. The nuclear weapons reduction interest, for example, applies only to those states that currently hold these weapons. The danger of provocative outside alliances may be of greatest concern with regard to the republics in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. It may make most sense to press for democratic polities in those countries that appear closest to that objective and assume that they can serve as models for the others. The set of possible interests does not completely change from one successor country to another. Rather, their priority might vary.

These possible American interests represent the interpretation of only one observer, although many parallel those mentioned frequently by former President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker. Still, a list of possible interests is very different from a consensus in the American government that provides the basis for policy. Beyond these caveats is an even more fundamental point. We have been treating national interests as if they were the exclusive domain of the United States government. If we are to understand nonadversarial relationships as existing between entire societies (e.g., Alger, 1990; Saunders, 1992), then we must be sensitive to interests as they are defined and developed by other engaged actors,
Table 10.1  EFFECTS ON POSSIBLE U.S. INTERESTS OF SCENARIOS FOR SUCCESSOR COUNTRIES

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<th>Political and economic decline and stagnation</th>
<th>Political divisions and civil war</th>
<th>Authoritarian consolidation</th>
<th>Authoritarian expansion</th>
<th>Market and democratic advances</th>
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Key: + = beneficial, - = harmful to American interests

such as state and local governments, business and industry, religious groups, educational and scientific bodies, and committed immigrants from the other country and their descendants. When the sustained preferences of various private and civic actors converge, it is difficult not to regard them as national interests regardless of the position of the government. Yet even acknowledging that a list such as the one presented here provides a useful approximation, the question remains how well these interests will fare in the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union. To explore this point it is essential to speculate about alternative futures that could face the successor countries.

SCENARIOS FOR SUCCESSOR COUNTRIES

The situation in any of the successor republics could have changed dramatically since this chapter was written. The rate of change, the extraordinary nature of the present circumstances, and the number of competing forces operating on all the major actors make it impossible to forecast the path that any of these countries
will follow. The proposed scenarios are not attempts to project the future for any of the 15 former Soviet republics. Instead, they sketch some of the major alternative routes that one or more could take. No claim is made that these scenarios capture all the possible alternatives, but they do provide enough variation to reveal how much the realization of American interests varies with the path taken. None of the scenarios will appear as a surprise to those who have listened to various conjectures about the future of the former Soviet lands.

Institutional Decline and Fragmentation

Future developments in many of the republics could represent a continuation and acceleration of existing trends toward decline. Because modern industrialized countries need strong, societywide political and economic institutions that enjoy a substantial degree of legitimacy, institutional breakdown and collapse is the cornerstone of this scenario. Neither the remnants of institutions left over from the Soviet Union nor those that the new successor governments attempt to establish in their place command sufficient respect in a timely fashion to structure how things are done. The new governments lack coercive power to insist upon compliance, and in sector after sector a nationwide breakdown occurs. Government leaders are unable to win and maintain broad support for their programs. Political parties fail to develop a mass constituency. The military remains fragmented and withdrawn. State industries gradually grid to a halt. For economic survival and a degree of political order, people shift their loyalty and energies to more regional or local entities. Some of these form along ethnic lines, but others may coalesce around several connected industries in neighboring communities or around agricultural production in a region. They tend to be anarcho-capitalist and they practice protectionism and barter in their interaction with others. Residents accept these semifeudal structures because their local leaders demonstrate an ability to provide a degree of order and create the basic conditions necessary for daily life.

These weak systems have neither the resources or organization to be a threat to anyone other than their immediate geographical neighbors. They pose neither a nuclear nor a conventional threat and are too withdrawn to become part of a major military alliance. If they can sell military stock under their jurisdiction, produce a military item, or provide military expertise, they will seek to do so. They are not candidates for market economies, democratic politics, or international transactions.

Authoritarian Consolidation

Either by popular election or a coup d'état, an authoritarian political regime establishes itself in response to widespread distress about the breakdown of society. It draws on many of the elite and institutions that were present in the Soviet Union but likely avoids identifying itself as the Communist party or fully embracing party ideology. As opportunities arise, the regime moves to suppress political opposition and curtails meaningful democratic institutions or practices that might challenge its continuance. Despite such actions, the regime wins a considerable
degree of popular legitimation—or at least acceptance—for establishing order, reducing visible crime, and investing in rebuilding public works and infrastructure. It provides widespread employment. Drawing upon the old elite, the government nonetheless permits some modest forms of private enterprise limited to small service businesses and other selected economic sectors while retaining state ownership of major industries and infrastructure. The regime establishes a militia loyal to it and encourages a modest military subject to its strict control.

Concerned with consolidation and internal development, the successor country seeks accommodation with its neighbors. Despite some small experiments, such a regime cashes a market system and restricts the interaction of its citizens with outsiders. In an effort to improve its economic condition, the regime may seek to establish an export arms industry, but in the absence of a substantial domestic military requirement, it is uncertain how successful such ventures can be.

Authoritarian Expansion

With the active involvement of the military, this authoritarian regime establishes itself with strong appeals to protect the nation against external threats—real or imagined. The leadership comes to power on the basis of its ability to make a convincing case that external dangers threaten the nation or threaten a significant portion of its population living in another country. It justifies its restrictions on individual freedoms and political opposition on the grounds of national security. It makes strong appeals to patriotism, the need for sacrifice, and the restoration of national dignity. A military-industrial elite emerge as strong supporters and beneficiaries of the regime. Like the authoritarian consolidation system, this one stresses the establishment of domestic order and the need to rebuild industrial capability.

To achieve its goals, the country is eager to form alliances with similarly oriented societies against common enemies. Within the bounds of its resources and technological capability, it pursues a nuclear program as well as conventional military strength.

Acute Political Divisions and Civil War

The circumstances that can lead to a civil war are numerous. Sharp and bitter disagreements can arise among competing claimants for control of the government, each backed by a large, armed movement convinced of its correctness and its ability to win. Regions or homelands within a country that claim a unique heritage may declare independence and demand with arms the right to self-determination. Alternatively, major groups within the country may define their national identity and self-worth in terms that exclude and abuse substantial minorities within the country who have some ability to resist forcefully. Arguably, one or more of these conditions exists, or could soon exist, in most of the republics. Furthermore, these circumstances are abetted by several other factors commonly found in many parts of the former Soviet Union. Among these are an extremely weak central government with limited legitimacy and uncertain ability to engage in large-scale
coercion; widespread and deepening deprivation among the population, making citizens more susceptible to appeals that blame their misery on visible scapegoats (e.g., ethnic minorities); and the broad distribution of armaments and military experience among various parts of the population.

The prevalence of these elements can lead to this scenario when a flash point triggers violent internal war. The energies of significant portions of the society become engaged in supporting their partisans. Noncombatants are at severe risk from the warring sides and because of a lack of food, health care, shelter, and basic safety. Bordering states could be overrun with refugees. If the opposing sides are relatively weak but have defendable strongholds, the conflict could be protracted. All parties would appeal to outside countries to align and provide the conditions for victory; this could lead to escalation.

Such a scenario poses obvious and traumatic problems for American interests. If the combatants had access to tactical nuclear weapons, their possible use could not be excluded. Although weapons transfers out of the country seem unlikely, it is probable that all parties would seek to import weapons. Conventional conflict and the potential for destabilizing military alignments are present. A democratic society, a market economy, and free-flowing international transactions would all be casualties if this trend continued.

**Market and Democratic Advances**

In this scenario the society turns a critical corner and demonstrates visible and steady movement toward a market economy and a democratic form of government. It likely depends upon the interaction of multiple developments that enable the government and major portions of the society to engage in a sustainable series of reforms during the transition period following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Possible key developments include a widely shared set of beliefs that the personal sacrifice and hardship are manageable and will lead before long to a better life. The connection between the necessity and survivability of current hardships and future personal gain appears essential. These attitudes give the government some time and support for implementing reforms and putting new laws and structures in place. The effect of public attitudes can be reinforced by the support of critical elites (some combination of those who enjoyed elite status in the old regime and alternative new elites) who increasingly recognize that they can maintain or achieve a degree of success under the rules of the emerging system. In short, they become stakeholders in the new system and shift from opponents to possible supporters or at least politically neutral parties in the transition. In addition, strong governmental leadership is required that is committed to moving to a market economy and democratic system and understands some necessary steps.

Under such a compact between the transitional government and the public, the basic scenario would unfold. The difficult initiatives to move from the remnants of a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one would begin—the conversion (or abandonment) of many state-owned production facilities to private ownership, the control of inflation and the creation of an exchangeable
currency, the establishment of a judicial system that protects private property and the rights of ownership, and the establishment of a banking system and other market institutions.

There would also need to be movement on the political front to establish some form of democratic governance involving direct or indirect election of key executives and an elected parliament with some effective ability to check executive power. The political franchise would be broadly extended among the adult population. Accompanying the right to choose among competing candidates in free and open elections would be a definition of citizenship that was inclusive and pluralistic rather than one based on ethnicity, religion, race, or language.

It is not difficult to recognize that a number of American interests could be served by the emergence of such a polity. It must be acknowledged that basic security issues of concern to the United States such as nuclear weapons control, the export of weapons and defense experts to third parties, and troubling military alliances would not automatically be resolved by such developments. The relations between India and the United States demonstrate that such issues can remain contentious even when the scenario's conditions are approximated. Yet a strong argument can be made that accommodation on security issues is most likely between democracies.

CAN WE EXERCISE INFLUENCE, AND DO WE KNOW WHAT TO DO?

It is not enough to recognize that vital interests of the United States will be affected differentially depending upon the evolution of the successor countries. If it is acknowledged that the political, economic, and military direction of each of the 15 countries will be determined primarily by the dynamic interaction of elements within each country and to some degree by their relations with nearby neighbors, then the possible role of the United States could be quite limited—regardless of any attempt at influence.

Explicit reference to the proposition that the United States and other industrial democracies should seek to influence the direction of the internal evolution of the successor countries may trigger a sense of alarm among some people (who view such action as unethical meddling or intervention in others' sovereignty) while confirming the reality of world politics to others. Any U.S. attempt to influence or encourage a particular development in the successor countries, it is argued, should be undertaken in order to create a positive, long-term relationship with post-Soviet societies, which we would regard as valued partners. Given that goal, influence attempts cannot be undertaken without the support of those within each of the successor countries who share U.S. aspirations for the future direction of their country. Thus, as used here, "attempted influence" is not understood as "covert operations" or "military intervention" but as efforts to offer advice, engage in persuasion, provide assistance, and take other collaborative steps designed to promote the emergence of countries with whom we can sustain positive relationships. It is a commitment to become engaged with the development of
other countries as it affects our relationship with them. Some observers believe, however, that such external influence attempts are unlikely to succeed.

It would be foolish to deny the central role of domestic factors in shaping the polities that are emerging in each of these countries in the post-Soviet period. This acknowledgment does not, however, negate the possible influence at the margin of the United States and other industrialized democracies. While it is probable that the outside contribution will not be effective in some cases, it may well be in others. Often in politics, there are conflicting domestic forces that create competing pressures for policy to move in opposing directions. Under these conditions, additional efforts by outside actors can tip the balance. It is in this sense that outside influence, even if marginal, can nevertheless become critical at certain junctures.

Although examples abound of failed external influence attempts, a sufficient number of counterexamples exist to prevent any easy assertions that outside powers have no effect. Such examples range from the American Revolution to the contemporary transformations in South Africa, from the Marshall Plan to the “green revolution” in India. The conditions prevailing in individual cases must be considered. In that regard, it is important to highlight certain features of the present situation as they pertain to the United States and the successor countries.

First, despite the prolonged confrontation of the Cold War, there is considerable positive regard for the United States and the other industrial democracies. For example, questionnaires given in June, 1991, to various Moscow elites prior to their participation in a focus group study led by Russian and American social scientists revealed that a majority (53 percent) of the 72 respondents had a strong orientation toward westernizing their country and another 24 percent said clear, if more moderate, westernizing orientations. Many of these individuals benefited from the then existing Soviet system—they were apparatchiki, journalists, military officers, directors of enterprises, and so on. An interview study conducted in late 1989 (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992) with over 2000 respondents in six republics found broad support for political change in the direction of “Western” values (e.g., free speech, competitive elections, differential incomes). Although some scholars fear that support for the United States and the West may be declining as the hardships associated with rapid economic change are seen as resulting from approaches urged by the West, anecdotal reports continue to suggest a reserve of goodwill remains toward the industrialized democracies. With this degree of respect and interest in replicating some features of our society, as well as the expressed need for more assistance, a foundation exists for exercising persuasion.

Second, given the turmoil that exists in most of the successor countries, the opportunity to exercise influence and give advice has seldom been greater. If external influence is indeed greater when polities have rejected their prior form of government but have not yet solidified new structures and processes, then the present moment is a window of opportunity open for a brief period of time. With regard to exercising some influence on the future direction of the successor countries, this may literally be the chance of a lifetime.

Finally, studies concerned with building positive, cooperative relationships (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Goldstein and Freeman, 1990) stress the importance of tak-
ing sustainable, supportive initiatives and offering responses in proportion to the other side’s reactions (including the reciprocation of positive moves). At the same time, these studies underscore the importance of taking a long-term perspective that is measured and cautious in response to immediate disruptions. It would appear from such research that creating a positive, enduring relationship entails engaging the republics across a broad front of actions that they can regard as supportive.

There remains the question as to whether the United States and its partners know how to encourage the evolution of the successor countries in the direction that would be congenial to Western interests. An argument could be made that at this point in the development of the instruments of statecraft we know more about the effective use of deterrence, compellence, and, perhaps, conflict resolution than we do about helping nations develop peacefully toward economic capitalism and political democracy. Our track record with respect to the developing countries of the world is not overwhelmingly reassuring. Speaking to this concern in early 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency’s senior analyst for Russia and Eurasia candidly told the Senate Armed Services Committee that serious disagreements existed both in government and academic circles over what measures Russia and the other successor countries should be advised to follow.18

Despite these uncertainties, it would appear foolish in such a high-stakes set of issues to take a hands-off approach because we have no definitive answers. Certainty about cause-and-effect relationships on substantive problems is a condition seldom realized in policy-making. Of great relevance is the experience gained when the United States and other Western countries attempted to assist with development elsewhere (even if much of this learning consists of pitfalls to be avoided). The storehouse of resources and expertise and the important perspective of a more detached but concerned partner are valuable assets. This latter view—the perspective of those not actually experiencing the difficult transition—has liabilities, but also advantages. The strengths can be especially important in setting forth options and particularly in conducting impartial evaluations of the impact of ongoing policy initiatives and trends.

We should recognize that our understanding of the necessary strategies for realizing the desired outcomes may vary substantially from one area to another. For example, while there are many problems to be worked out in how to safely reduce the shared threat of nuclear weapons, the basic steps to achieve that status are reasonably well comprehended. By contrast, the strategy for moving a large economy from a centrally planned structure to a market system may be far less clear.

The United States and its partners can make a useful psychological contribution by getting involved with the development of the successor countries. Leaders in those countries can derive strength for making difficult decisions from the support they receive from industrialized democracies. Furthermore, as they proceed with reforms and engage in inevitable adjustments and corrections (some of which will certainly be major), they can take advantage of the natural human disposition captured in attribution theory (e.g., Kelley and Michela, 1980) to attribute successes to their own efforts and to blame painful actions, missteps, and outright
failures on others (in this case, the West, the International Monetary Fund, the United States). If this allocation of credit and blame allows democratically oriented reform leaders to survive and move toward goals we support, it seems a small price to pay.

CARPE DIEM (SEIZE THE DAY OR MISS THE BOAT)

This essay has confronted the problem of forging a new constructive relationship with the successor countries of the former Soviet Union to replace the old belligerent one that defined the Cold War. As developed to this point, the argument has been as follows:

1. The relationships with the successor countries are likely to drift unless major initiatives by the United States can offset natural tendencies.

2. The people of the United States have vital long-term interests in the evolution of the successor countries; therefore, our well-being is ultimately interdependent with theirs. (When recognized, interdependence is a key for a strong—but not necessarily positive—relationship.)

3. Although we cannot forecast the future evolution of any of the successor countries, we can construct alternative scenarios, each with some likelihood of occurrence given present known circumstances. These alternative futures would affect American interests in quite different ways. Accordingly, the future relationship between the United States and each successor country is critically dependent upon internal developments in these countries and how we respond to them.

4. Although the ability of the United States and other industrialized democracies to affect internal developments in the successor countries must be at the margin in some cases, our involvement can make a critical difference at particular points in their evolution. In fact, in the present circumstances, there may be more receptivity in the successor states for constructive involvement by the United States than in more normal times.

5. Despite the lack of any clear consensus on strategies for producing the desired outcomes in the evolution of the successor countries, we have some insights based on experience and a valuable perspective as well as critical assets that justify an effort to encourage evolution in a particular direction. Given the high stakes, these capabilities provide a basis for active involvement.

Given the case for active engagement in shaping our relationships with the successor countries, the task shifts to designing specific strategies for involvement. Such initiatives need to be sensitive to certain basic principles:

- **Partnerships.** Whenever possible, engagement with a successor country must actively involve public, civic, and private leaders and groups from the former Soviet republic itself. If the purpose is to construct positive relationships with countries that will help us realize some of our interests, they
must see our involvement with them as mutually beneficial. Moreover, their ideas and ownership are essential for success. Certainly this was a key element of the postwar Marshall Plan for Europe. The Europeans themselves designed much of the plan for reconstruction.

* Multilateral action. American engagement must be multilateral. Not only do we lack the resources to undertake many assistance programs by ourselves, it is important to give others a vital stake in the future of the successor countries. A number of institutions for such collaboration already exist (e.g., NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Group of Seven, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the UN), but others will have to be created.13

* Leadership. America must exercise solid leadership. Given the present structure of the international system in the post-Cold War world, evidence seems to be accumulating that many governments expect the United States to take the initiative in organizing any cross-regional or global collaboration. Such leadership, however, must entail full respect for partners and tangible and commensurate commitments from the United States. Acts of unjustified "showmanship" quickly undermine credible leadership (e.g., at a conference on humanitarian assistance, America insisted on appearing publicly as the mobilizing force, yet contributed less than 1 percent the amount of aid provided by Germany).

* Broad-based but differential treatment. Involvement must recognize all the republics are potential partners but must acknowledge their differing conditions and receptivity as well as their varying contribution to our interests. Though we cannot focus exclusively on Russia, or on Russia plus several other successor countries, it is evident that at this historical moment, some countries will be more responsive and central to our interests. In some areas the objective may be to encourage the most promising indigenous programs with the expectation that they can subsequently serve as models for others.

* Public and private basis. Programs of engagement need to be both public and private. As depicted in Figure 10.2, positive relationships between countries (as contrasted with hostile ones) involve sustained interactions among a vast array of non-central government entities. Their talents, resources, and commitment will be necessary for any enduring, successful involvement.

* Sustainability. The engagement must be long-term and continuing rather than viewed as a quick fix and must not be subject to termination by momentary crises. The magnitude of the problems as well as the scope of American interests dictate that strategies be designed for a sustained effort. Although domestic crises and setbacks are inevitable—and no one can be indifferent to their political consequences—it must be evident that the United States is always prepared to continue engagement when domestic conditions permit. We must convey resolve and reliability.

* Multidimensional strategies. Finally, strategies for engagement must be multidimensional, just as our interests in the successor countries are multi-
ple and their needs are diverse. The interdependence of such issues as security, economic development, and political stability suggests the importance of attending to multiple critical areas.

To begin to think about the multidimensional nature of engagement, we can distinguish between security, political, and economic sectors. Reviewing American interests, we recognize that a number of them involve questions of security. They involve dismantling the military threats that gripped the Cold War and preventing the emergence of new virulent conflicts that pose dangers to the region and beyond. These are not only concerns of the United States and the West. Each of the successor states faces significant security problems that could easily expand in the years ahead, distorting or completely ending domestic developments that we would hope to encourage. As grim as the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the civil war in Georgia have been, they pale against the convulsions that would occur in a war between Ukraine and Russia.

One way the industrial democracies and their neighbors might have great influence involves the creation of a security environment that covers the successor states and in which they participate. Suppose a reoriented NATO, using its experience in developing deterrence strategies and their implementation through coordinated interstate defense programs, moved to provide an expanded deterrence umbrella for an enlarged membership. The new NATO would have an expanded membership that would be open to the former Soviet nations as well as other members of the Warsaw Pact if their governments agreed to certain basic domestic considerations. These membership requirements might include a commitment to certain basic human rights and protections for minorities within their political jurisdictions as well as a commitment to peaceful means of resolving boundary and border issues.

The development of an effective, collective security force deployed throughout the region and backed by reinforcements located elsewhere could profoundly alter the security issues for members, prove sobering to those not participating, and provide a vital and productive mission for the military in both the East and the West. NATO, having successfully achieved the purposes for which it was formed, must either lead in addressing the most urgent new security problems or get out of the way. It has a critical opportunity for leadership.

Direct engagement with domestic political structures and processes in the successor states generates some of the most sensitive issues. The tolerance of any government or people for political advocacy by outsiders, who are not embedded in their historical experience and culture and who do not have to live with the consequences, is extremely limited. Given this understandable constraint, the emphasis should be on actively offering models for observing and evaluating. The emphasis might be on large-scale programs designed to encourage a broad range of leaders from every level of political life to visit and discuss our political systems.

The Bush administration in its last year in office initiated a variety of programs of this kind, including the Democracy-in-Practice Training Program, the East-West Parliamentary Practice Project, and the Rule of Law Program. Numerous private initiatives with the same general purpose are introducing present and
future political leaders from the successor states to democratic systems through visits, study programs, conferences with parliamentarians, and so forth. At any one time the number of representatives from successor countries who can participate in a specific program is necessarily modest. The task is to create enough such opportunities and sustain them over a sufficient period of time, together with appropriate opportunities for follow-up. Moreover, it is critical that participants from the successor countries have experience with practical forms of governance at multiple levels and in different Western democracies. It is possible, for example, that for some countries with deeply divided nationality problems, the forms of democracy in Belgium or Switzerland may be more instructive than the model in the United States. Some of these experiences need to be in sufficient depth and focus so that specific learning is possible in areas such as property law, tax codes, or banking regulation. The focus of such efforts needs to address not only the current generation of political leaders but also those who will educate a new generation into the meaning of participation in a civic society.16 Another activity with potential in the area of politics and law is the Western experience with mediation and dispute resolution. These techniques, growing in popularity in the United States as a means of augmenting an overloaded judicial system, could fulfill a critical need in a country where a reformed legal system is still developing.

Against the bold government efforts in security, such proposals in the political sector may appear anemic—and they are, if only a small number of people from the successor countries actually experience opportunities for firsthand observation, training, and discussion. If pursued on a sufficient scale, however, this could be one of the most dramatic efforts at building a new political system. Its effectiveness may be greater if the role of the central governments of the industrial democracies remains indirect while the lead comes from civic and grassroots organizations—vigorously backed and coordinated by their governments—at every level of society.

In discussions of linkage with the successor countries, most attention has been given to economic aid programs to reconstruct the shattered post-Soviet economies. Even before the Soviet Union collapsed, proposals were advanced for exchanging massive Western aid for major democratic reforms and military reductions (e.g., Allison and Yavilhasky, 1982). It is noteworthy, however, that some see a major role for the same kind of direct observation and practical how-to advice proposed earlier as the cornerstone for political programs. "The primary thing that the West can offer is knowledge and know-how about market institutions and business operations in a market environment—ignorance in those areas at all levels is a major obstacle to instituting necessary policies" (Ericson, 1992:80).

Suppose that each of 25,000 businesses in the United States, with the help of local governments and civic groups and foundation travel grants, sponsored a month-long visit for a citizen of the former USSR to observe and participate in the conduct of daily operations. Further suppose that when these enterprise visitors returned home they had access in their own communities to retired business managers and executives from the Western democracies who were there in Peace Corps-type programs to help the returnees follow up their experiences to inter-
pret and apply what they had learned. The same sort of program could be undertaken in the professions to address other sectors of society. Of course, some of this is beginning. The magnitude of the effort probably will fall short of that necessary to have a far-reaching impact unless conceptualized and coordinated as a priority international effort. The purpose is at least twofold. It is obvious that the opportunity to see and discuss the actual operation of various enterprises can be a powerful form of learning. Beyond that, however, is the effort to create stakeholders in the successor countries who have a vision that they can operate and prosper in a reformed society. It is an effort to win over some of the existing elites and supplement them with others.

As badly needed as is technical advice, it is also clear that the successor countries need capital. Exactly how much governmental assistance has already been provided is difficult to determine. With respect to the United States, some aid involves outright grants; some is in the form of loans and credit guarantees, which can be subject to restrictions. Other assistance is channeled through multilateral programs. Reportedly the United States has pledged $9.2 billion from 1991 through 1993 and has increased its allocation to the IMF by $12 billion, which in part will be used for additional loans to the successor countries. Against the need, the contributions of the United States and the other industrialized democracies seem modest. Given the state of the economies of potential donors and their domestic pressures, further substantial government funding may be very difficult to obtain and may carry more stipulations.

From the perspective of the governments of the industrialized democracies, assistance needs to follow evidence that the successor states are taking steps to reform their existing economic systems, to increase the likelihood that transfers will not simply sustain the present declining institutions. Stabilizing currencies, controlling inflation, reducing subsidies to unproductive state industries, moving toward privatization, and creating new financial institutions are among the conditions which the International Monetary Fund, the Group of Seven (G-7), and individual governments like the United States insist must be pursued more vigorously before additional funds of other than an emergency and humanitarian nature can be expected. Political leaders of the successor countries quarrel among themselves over the wisdom of these measures and the speed with which they should be pursued.

A comparable set of conditions appears to be needed before a significant increase can be expected in the level of private initiatives such as trade, foreign investment, or joint enterprises. Again, political leaders in the successor countries, though varying in their personal commitment to such programs, find that even when they advocate them, the political obstacles multiply.

Although proposals occasionally emerge (e.g., Soros, 1992), it seems unlikely that there will be any major breakthrough for substantial increases in capital flow unless conditions change in the successor countries. All sides in any of the emerging relationships might find it easier to make the case for investment from either public or private sources for specific projects, whether it be for repairing nuclear power stations with potential global pollution dangers or constructing new gas lines. The merit and urgency will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION

There is no escape from the fundamental dilemma we face. It is captured in the fate of George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. In differing ways, both leaders invested much of their energy and political capital in attempting to realize a new international arrangement that each thought would be much better for their countries and the world. In the process, both neglected other urgent domestic priorities and lost office. New leaders are unlikely to miss the significance of their experience.

Yet this essay has sought to suggest that some form of new positive relationships with the successor countries is of vital importance to the United States. The chance for its realization depends upon the active engagement of the United States and the other industrial democracies with the reform efforts of the successor countries. The opportunity to construct new positive relationships—against what we have hypothesized is the likely tendency, given so many other pressing needs—would create a profound change in the international system. It would affect the daily life of everyone on the planet as surely as did the Cold War.

NOTES

1. The phrase “successor countries” is used throughout this chapter along with the term “republics” to refer to the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union. Following Saunders (1992), in discussing the development of positive relationships between countries, I refer to potential interactions between the entire polity of each nation and not just the states. Accordingly, I have generally avoided use of the more common referent “successor states.” Even though the United States government treats the three Baltic countries differently and refers to 12 former republics, the general reference in this paper is intended to include all 15.

2. Studies that explore some aspect of change in relationships include Rapport’s (1990) discussion of shifting away from arms races; Osgood (1962) and Etzioni (1967) on tension reduction; and Axelrod (1984) on developing cooperation.

3. This definition of relationship draws upon Herrold, Hudson, and Singer (1960) and Snyder and Diesing (1977).

4. See Kranzhammer (1991) and compare with those suggesting that the United States may be a declining hegemon (e.g., Kennedy, 1987).

5. There are two primary categories of nuclear weapons, tactical and strategic. All of the former Soviet Union’s tactical or battlefield and short-range nuclear weapons are supposed to have been moved to Russia and are under its control. Mutual reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, capable of being delivered across intercontinental distances, are to be made under two agreements negotiated with the United States. The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was negotiated with the Soviet Union and signed in 1991 by Presidents Gorbachev and Bush. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the four republics in which the weapons are located have agreed to serve as implementing parties to the START I agreement. Three of the four former Soviet republics—Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—have subsequently ratified the treaty along with the United States. Ukraine has held out for greater assurances about its security and more assistance. The START II agreement, signed in 1992 by President Bush and
Russian President Yeltsin, was premised on the assumption that all remaining strategic nuclear weapons will be in Russia. When implemented, the treaties will reduce strategic nuclear weapons on both sides to about one-third of their current level and will completely eliminate the types of systems that the United States regarded as most threatening. When ratified, both treaties will involve considerable cost and time to implement. The provisions of START II are scheduled to be met by 2003 (or 2000 if the United States provides financial assistance). By the end of 1992, the United States had appropriated $800 million to assist the four republics in the dismantling and destruction task.

6. This statement of an American interest considers alignments between successor countries and others outside the former Soviet Union, but a question also arises about military alliances among the successor states themselves. Such possibilities could indicate a more serious security problem—for example, a threat from an outside party such as Russia leading an alliance against it, a regime seeking the protection of Russia (or another republic) against serious internal challenge, or simply a desire to expand through collaborative military action. The possibility of some form of military alliance between Russia and some of the other republics was recently noted by the U.S. ambassador at large for the successor states, Strobe Talbott: "If that happens under present circumstances it will mean war, and probably with the outside world coming in. But I think in the long run we have to recognize that these new independent states have been associated with Russia for a long time. . . . These are adjacent countries whose infrastructure, economies, elites, and everything about them binds them to Russia" (Talbott, 1992:19).

7. At present, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are proceeding to set up their own armed forces. Others, such as Kazakhstan, are developing substantial militias whose primary mission may be internal (e.g., protecting the regime), but they could become the forerunners of national armed forces. In a few others, such as Georgia, it is questionable whether any of the current combatants can properly be called national armed forces, but certainly some military experience is being acquired. The present disparity among military institutions makes large-scale military operations by most states unlikely, but the infrastructure for a sobering future exists in several republics.

8. For a discussion of the breakdown of some of the existing successor countries into regional semi-autarky, see Ericson (1992).

9. Colton (1992) divided the 15 successor countries into pro-democracies and pre-democracies. The six pro-democracies at the time of his analysis had all had national experience with relatively honest, competitive elections for key national positions, with most of the adult population eligible to vote and without subsequent removal of the elected officials. On his list of pro-democracies were Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The other nine countries fall in the pre-democratic category.

10. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker gave a number of speeches in which they stressed American interests in the successor countries as including the establishment of market economies, the promotion of democratic governments, and the dismantling of the military systems of the Cold War. The eight more specific interests presented here can easily be derived from the elaboration of these three. Illustrative of their presentations are President Bush’s address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (1992) and Secretary Baker’s Princeton University address (1991).

11. The focus group study was done by scholars at the Merishon Center in collaboration with Russian colleagues. An initial report on this research appears in a Merishon Center Occasional Paper by Judith Kaliberg (1993).

12. George Kolt’s testimony was reported in the New York Times (February 4, 1993).

13. In January, 1992, some 47 countries formed the Coordinating Conference on Assistance
to the New Independent States, designed primarily to provide emergency assistance. Meeting in Tokyo in October, 1992, the group decided to reorganize and put their efforts on a more permanent footing organized for each of the successor countries.

14. This three-way classification should be elaborated in a more detailed analysis of the multidimensional nature of engagement to include education, scientific and technical matters, humanitarian affairs, medicine, law, and so on.

15. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) could be an alternative structure to NATO, and it already includes all the successor states plus Central and Eastern Europe. Its total size (51 states) and limited security experience would appear to make it a less attractive candidate.

16. Under grants from both the United States government and private foundations, the Mershon Center and the National Ministry of Education in Poland are engaging in a major project that is one example of the kind of efforts in civic education that could be valuable for the successor countries. In consultation with a broad range of educators and other experts in civic education at Mershon, Polish educators are developing courses for both secondary schools and universities.

17. Funding efforts of the United States are regularly reported in various sources, including the U.S. Department of State Dispatch and in Parliamentary Development, a periodic newsletter of the Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress. The latter provides an overview of U.S. assistance in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, including private initiatives of which its editors are aware.

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