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Comparing the Foreign Policy Events of Nations

CHARLES F. HERMANN

This chapter deals with initial efforts to collect machine-readable data on foreign policy actions for a sample of thirty-five nations.¹ Three assumptions underlie both the chapter and the research it describes.

First, despite years of study, there exist few ways of conceptualizing foreign policy activities that allow one to classify the entire range of national foreign policy actions in order to allow reliable comparisons between nations. Why should anyone want to classify foreign policy behavior? It would be difficult for a brokerage firm to work effectively in stocks without descriptive statistics about the performance across time not only of the entire market but also of particular industries and given companies. Similarly, an insurance company needs actuarial data on people, information on the frequency of various kinds of accidents, and so on. Such numerical data record human behavior and are vital to the industries that use them. This chapter assumes that establishing such patterns could be at least as beneficial in increasing our understanding of foreign policy and in improving the quality of foreign policy analysis.

An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 9-12 September 1970, in Los Angeles. The present version was written specifically for this volume.

¹The Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project, which is its basis, is supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (GS-40356) and the Mershon Center at Ohio State University.

Second, given the desirability of mapping the entire spectrum of foreign policy for a variety of nations, one must assume that "soft" data are better than no operational data at all for large areas of foreign policy activity. Soft data are not readily available in standardized, countable units, as are U.N. votes, trade statistics, or amounts of military assistance, which represent only a small component of the entire foreign policy activity of most nations. What is needed is a means of measuring behavior ranging from a diplomatic note of congratulations on the anniversary of a nation's independence to acts of massive violence against the people or property of another country. One unit that lends itself to such comprehensive coding is the discrete foreign policy act, or what has been called events data. With careful definition, events can encompass not only "soft," or normal, data but also "hard," or quantifiable data. Only such an inclusive unit will allow us to map the complete spectrum of foreign policy activity.

Third, given the assumption that any foreign policy activity can be broken down into discrete events, how shall we group, or classify, foreign policy activities to comprise a national profile? The search described in this chapter assumes that some fragments of theory exist that require better description of the empirical universe of foreign policy events before they can be developed further or replaced.

The present research draws upon three theoretical frameworks in constructing a definition of foreign policy actions and in selecting the properties of these actions to be coded. The first of these is decision-making, which was brought to the attention of students of politics by men like Lasswell (1956), Simon (1957), and Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), but whose subsequent development has proceeded largely outside of political science in such fields as organizational behavior, social psychology, and economics. Though not all decisions lead to action, those behaviors which are conscious and deliberate result from decision processes undertaken by one or more individuals who must be treated as actors. Decision-making gives prominence to the organizational context in which the actor operates.

The second theoretical perspective underscores the importance of this organizational setting in foreign policy. It has been emphasized in the recent writings of men like Neustadt (1970), George (1972), Hilsman (1967), Halperin (1972), and Allison (1971), who stress that foreign policy actions are not exclusively the product of the decision-makers' perceptions of the environment external to their society, but also reflect their struggle as members of competing bureaucratic organizations

within the government, each

Finally, Rosenau (1966) has argued that the size of nations—political accountability—size—which may serve as partial kinds of variables in explaining

The research effort described here is from theoretical perspectives. The ultimate interest is in the decision-makers or their representatives. The positions or roles these actors play in the bureaucratic organizations are of interest. These types figure prominently in the study. The aim is to show that events do occur with sufficient regularity to allow the study of the comparative study of foreign

Using Events Data

One of the tasks in using events data is to identify an event in which a specific action can be coded. The analytical concept which imparts meaning to international activities. The data used in this chapter, taken from the CREON project (CREON), a study of thirty-five countries for one year from 1959 to 1968. Although data from multiple sources, the present study is based on *Deadline Data on World Affairs* (1968) in the study and the number of events coded in thirty months for which data

Table IV-1 also indicates the classification of events formed by dichotomizing the events by countability (open/closed), event type (developed), and size (large/small). The nature of a nation's foreign policy is considered. The analysis, can be regarded as a test of the theory of Rummel (1968), Tanter (1968)

² Rosenau's (1966) article on predictive foreign policy deal with more than one aspect. Although some other aspects of his research and data collection strategies

within the government, each with different objectives and perspectives.

Finally, Rosenau (1966) has called attention to certain basic qualities of nations—political accountability, economic development, and physical size—which may serve as parameters affecting the potency of certain kinds of variables in explaining foreign policy actions.²

The research effort described below is guided by these related theoretical perspectives. The ultimate actors are individual, authoritative decision-makers or their representatives. Efforts are made to identify the positions or roles these actors occupy and to ascertain whether large bureaucratic organizations are involved in the event. Rosenau's genotypes figure prominently in the interpretation of the data. The ultimate aim is to show that events data can be found in public sources with sufficient regularity to allow the use of these theoretical perspectives for the comparative study of foreign policy.

Using Events Data

One of the tasks in using events data is to define the foreign policy event in which a specific action is embedded. "Event" is an arbitrary, analytical concept which imposes boundaries on a continuous stream of international activities. The particular collection of events data used in this chapter, taken from the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations project (CREON), consists of foreign policy activities of thirty-five countries for one randomly selected quarter in each of the years from 1959 to 1968. Although the data set ultimately will draw on multiple sources, the present events are those reported in a single source—*Deadline Data on World Affairs*. Table IV-1 lists the nations included in the study and the number of foreign events initiated by each in the thirty months for which data were collected.

Table IV-1 also indicates the eight nation-types which Rosenau (1966) formed by dichotomizing three fundamental variables—political accountability (open/closed), economic development (developed/less developed), and size (large/small). Rosenau suggests that the nature of a nation's foreign policy is conditioned by these variables, which, in static analysis, can be regarded as parameters. In contrast to the early work of Rummel (1968), Tanter (1966), Gurr (1968), and Feierabend and

² Rosenau's (1966) article on pretheories and his subsequent writing on comparative foreign policy deal with more than nation-types, or what he calls genotypes. Although some other aspects of his conceptualization have been influential in our research and data collection strategy, they are not dealt with in this essay.

TABLE IV-1
CREON Event Frequencies for 35 Nations Classified into Rosenau Genotypes
 (Total Number of Events = 11,617)

Developed nations				Less developed nations											
Large		Small		Large		Small									
Open	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Closed								
France	845	Spain	172	Belgium	386	Cuba	326	India	491	China	449	Costa Rica	173	Ghana	271
Italy	430	USSR	968	Canada	393	East Germany	165	Turkey	312	Mexico	195	Kenya	98	Guinea	208
Japan	272			Chile	208							Lebanon	160	Ivory Coast	170
USA	1,859			Iceland	177							Philippines	214	Thailand	163
West Germany	539			Israel	321							Tunisia	271	Yugoslavia	257
				New Zealand	207							Uganda	159		
				Norway	236							Zambia	79		
				Switzerland	71										
				Uruguay	148										
				Venezuela	224										
Total	3,945	Total	1,140	Total	2,371	Total	491	Total	803	Total	644	Total	1,154	Total	1,069

Sources: Attribute data for this table were collected and archived by the Comparative Analysis of Policy Environments (CAPE) at Ohio State University and are outlined in Burgess 1970a and 1970b.

Note: Nations are classified according to discriminant function analysis (see n. 5, chap. 5). Values after each nation refer to the total number of events currently in the data set for that nation. The following indicator variables for 1963 were used to construct the scale by which nations were classified: *for economic development*, (1) GNP/capita, (2) energy consumption/capita, (3) agricultural workers as percentage of total economically active population, (4) newspapers/1,000 population, (5) radios/1,000 population, (6) urban primary, and (7) ratio of population from age 5-19 enrolled in primary and secondary schools; *for size*, (1) total population, (2) total GNP, (3) total land area, and (4) total KWH; *for political accountability*, (1) freedom of the press (revised), (2) competitiveness in election for head of government, (3) horizontal power distribution, and (4) representative character of regime. In each case the indicator first mentioned was used as the primary variable for establishing alternative points of partition.

Comparing the F

Feierabend (1966b)—who sees behaviors for all nations (Rosenau contends that many behavior will be obscured unless groups, such as the nation-type each of the eight genotypes will problem by Burgess (1970b)

Descriptive Findings on the

As Table IV-1 indicates, the nations with respect to the number. At one extreme, Switzerland half events per month; whereas almost sixty-two events per month occur between nations in the but the small number for so possibility that the difference the data source. The confounding of events with source differences with confidence what differences in number of events

Eleven large countries initiated twenty-four small countries in

³ Of course, there are other regions in Rosenau. For example, one might region, as has been done by Russett

⁴ Discriminant function analysis partitions the derived scale. The number of misclassifications and maximum. The indicators used by Burgess (1970) and by Gary Hoggard for political IV-1. Mexico has been assigned to determined by Burgess and Hoggard is possible, of course, to treat size rather than dichotomous variables each variable. Although there is no follow the Rosenau (1966) scheme

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Feierabend (1966b)—who seek to find relationships between selected behaviors for all nations (e.g., political instability and conflict)—Rosenau contends that many relationships involving foreign policy behavior will be obscured unless nations are differentiated into some subgroups, such as the nation-types.³ The method used to assign nations to each of the eight genotypes was discriminant analysis developed for this problem by Burgess (1970b) and others.⁴

Descriptive Findings on the Components of Events

As Table IV-1 indicates, there are enormous inequalities between nations with respect to the number of events initiated by any given nation.⁵ At one extreme, Switzerland averaged fewer than two and one-half events per month; whereas the United States initiated an average of almost sixty-two events per month. Undoubtedly, substantial differences occur between nations in the frequency with which they initiate actions, but the small number for some states in the CREON data raises the possibility that the difference is due partially to unequal coverage by the data source. The confounding of actual differences in the initiation of events with source differences in coverage makes it difficult to conclude with confidence what variables might account for the following differences in number of events reported for each of the nation-types:

Eleven large countries initiated 6,532 events (mean 593.8);
twenty-four small countries initiated 5,085 events (mean 211.9).

³ Of course, there are other groupings of nations besides the one proposed by Rosenau. For example, one might cluster nations according to some concept of region, as has been done by Russett (1967).

⁴ Discriminant function analysis provides a technique for grouping entities (in this case, nations) when multiple indicators of a single concept are employed. First, one indicator (the primary variable) is used to establish alternative cutting points for partitioning the derived scale. Then, an analysis is performed that minimizes the number of misclassifications and maximizes the distance on the scale between groups. The indicators used by Burgess (1970b) for physical size and economic development and by Gary Hoggard for political accountability are listed in the note in Table IV-1. Mexico has been assigned to a different group from the one originally determined by Burgess and Hoggard as a result of calculations by Salmore (1972). It is possible, of course, to treat size, development, and accountability as continuous rather than dichotomous variables and analyze the effect of gradual increments in each variable. Although there is merit in performing such analysis, it would not follow the Rosenau (1966) scheme presented in this chapter.

⁵ The exact number of events in the CREON data set may vary slightly from one published report to another during the present period of data cleaning. The version of the CREON data used here has been designated as 2.03.

Twenty-four open countries initiated 8,273 events (mean 344.7); eleven closed countries initiated 3,344 events (mean 304.0).

Nineteen developed countries initiated 7,947 events (mean 418.3); sixteen underdeveloped countries initiated 3,670 events (mean 229.4).

These breakdowns tend to conform to my prior expectation that western data sources will underreport the activities of relatively small as compared to large nations, open as compared to closed societies, and developed as compared to less-developed countries. It should be noted, however, that the mean difference between open and closed systems is not very substantial.

In addition to total frequencies of actions, a few findings should be reported on the other components of an event as the term has been defined. Every event was required to have one or more direct targets. Ninety percent (10,443) of all the events had only one direct target, with little variation occurring when events for the nations were grouped under each of the three dichotomized genotypic variables. For example, 89 percent of all events initiated by open countries had one target, as compared to 92 percent for closed countries. This was the largest difference. If this initial pattern of findings is substantiated, it would suggest that decision-makers usually seek to address one target at a time, no matter how many other entities the actor attempts to affect indirectly by his action.⁶ Events were also required to have indirect objects of influence; 61 percent (7,046) had one or more explicitly mentioned indirect objects that were entities other than those classified as direct targets. In other words, in three out of every five events, the actor addressed one entity but sought to influence someone else in addition to the immediate recipient of his action. As with direct targets, none of the three genotypic dichotomies differentiated between nations that had separate indirect objects and those that did not. The largest difference between nation-types was 3 percent: 60 percent of all events in open nations and 63 percent of all events in closed nations had separate objects.

The absence of differences between nations with respect to the number of targets and indirect objects is in marked contrast to the results on governmental participation in multilaterally-initiated actions. Sixty-five

⁶ The percentage of events with a single direct target includes those in which the target was an international body such as the U.N. General Assembly. If such targets were separated into their separate member governments, the number of single target events would be substantially reduced.

percent of all actions in our governments⁷ with the nation- vs. small, 80 percent; developed cent; open, 69 percent, vs. closed countries, governments may co actions. Governmental decision more collaborative efforts out a desirable tactic.

One additional finding on the nature of the direct target and percent of the direct targets and other governments. Six percent of the indirect objects own country. The percentages consisted of external, nonnational officials of international organizations respectively.

Classification by nation-type kinds of indirect objects. National distribution of direct targets, however, 48 percent of all direct targets governments, as contrasted with. Similarly, events initiated by more direct targets that were initiated by less-developed nations addressed other governments than those in open societies. In closed nations initiated more events by actors—most likely, alliances between different types of nations. Governments may believe that their foreign relations with international governments. These nations less relevant to small or less-d

⁷ The CREON definition of an event is one national government as the actor and one or more national governments as the target. The assumption is that the decision as to whether it will be a bilateral event, however, a record is kept as to that variable which is being used

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percent of all actions in our sample were undertaken by two or more governments⁷ with the nation-type division as follows: large, 53 percent, vs. small, 80 percent; developed, 61 percent, vs. less developed, 74 percent; open, 69 percent, vs. closed, 55 percent. In small or less-developed countries, governments may collaborate to add to the authority of their actions. Governmental decision-makers in open societies may engage in more collaborative efforts out of a conviction that consensus-building is a desirable tactic.

One additional finding on the components of events concerns the nature of the direct target and indirect object. For all countries 39 percent of the direct targets and 71 percent of the indirect objects were other governments. Six percent of the direct targets, but less than 1 percent of the indirect objects, were domestic entities within the actor's own country. The percentages of direct targets and indirect objects that consisted of external, nonnational entities (e.g., political parties and officials of international organization) were 55 percent and 29 percent, respectively.

Classification by nation-type revealed no substantial differences in kinds of indirect objects. Nation-types, or genotypes, do affect the distribution of direct targets, however, as indicated in Table IV-2. Almost 48 percent of all direct targets of events from large nations were other governments, as contrasted with only 27 percent for small nations. Similarly, events initiated by developed nations had proportionately more direct targets that were other governments than did events initiated by less-developed nations, and governments in closed societies addressed other governments as targets proportionately more than did those in open societies. In comparison, small, less-developed, and open nations initiated more events having as targets external, nonnational actors—most likely, alliances or international organizations. This pattern may suggest differences in the world view of governments in different types of nations. Governments in large or developed countries may believe that their foreign affairs require the attention of other national governments. These national targets, at least individually, seem less relevant to small or less-developed nations either because such com-

⁷ The CREON definition of an event stipulates that no event may have more than one national government as the actor. Therefore, a joint communiqué by the foreign ministers of Japan and New Zealand would be considered two events—one for each nation. The assumption is that each government must make its own separate decision as to whether it will be a party to a collaborative undertaking. For each event, however, a record is kept as to whether it involved a joint initiative, and it is that variable which is being used at this point in the text.

TABLE IV-2
 Relationship between Kinds of Direct Targets and Rosenau Genotypes
 (Total Number of Direct Targets = 13,669)

Direct targets	Large	Small	Less			All	
			Developed	developed	Open	Closed	genotypes
Other governments	3,681 (47.9%)	1,618 (27.0%)	3,839 (41.1%)	1,460 (33.7%)	3,655 (37.1%)	1,644 (43.1%)	5,299 (39.0%)
External, nonnational	3,367 (43.8%)	4,129 (68.9%)	4,887 (52.3%)	2,609 (60.2%)	5,712 (57.9%)	1,784 (46.8%)	7,496 (55.0%)
Domestic	631 (8.2%)	243 (4.1%)	611 (6.5%)	263 (6.1%)	492 (5.0%)	382 (10.0%)	874 (6.0%)

munication is an inefficient they believe that individual g The proportionately smaller actors by governments in clos may reflect the former's minor cal and financial bodies. Tal large as compared to small n open systems have twice as targets are mentioned. In bot internal control may account groups.

Types of Foreign Policy I

The CREON data provide measuring foreign policy bel involves the use of a series of representing predetermined a judged to be of potential th included for scales on (1) th in terms of energy and resour with which the action is defin and the target; (3) the affect the direct target; and (4) th approach to scale construction techniques, such as factor ana behavior. Scales formed in t concepts which the researche terests. At the time of this w early stages of scale construc

Still another procedure for categories. For example, data threats and promises, various which a state yields control o (The latter type of action ra total surrender.) Inspection ately few actions involve tra or restrictions on sovereignty

⁸ Alternative types of policy cl section, are described in C. F. Her

munication is an inefficient use of their limited resources or because they believe that individual governments are less likely to be responsive. The proportionately smaller attention given external, nongovernmental actors by governments in closed societies, as compared to open societies, may reflect the former's minority position in many international political and financial bodies. Table IV-2 also reveals that governments in large as compared to small nations and those in closed as compared to open systems have twice as many foreign events in which domestic targets are mentioned. In both large and closed systems the problem of internal control may account for the observed attention to domestic groups.

Types of Foreign Policy Behavior

The CREON data provide several distinctive ways of describing and measuring foreign policy behavior on a cross-national basis.⁸ One involves the use of a series of items which are combined to form scales representing predetermined attributes of behavior that the investigators judged to be of potential theoretical significance. Variables have been included for scales on (1) the intensity of a government's commitment in terms of energy and resources present in the action; (2) the specificity with which the action is defined with respect to the problem it addresses and the target; (3) the affect (hostility-friendliness) of the actor toward the direct target; and (4) the duration of the event. An alternative approach to scale construction uses statistical reduction and aggregation techniques, such as factor analysis, to identify underlying dimensions of behavior. Scales formed in this manner may or may not reflect those concepts which the researcher regarded as basic to his theoretical interests. At the time of this writing, the CREON project is still in the early stages of scale construction using both of these approaches.

Still another procedure for event classification involves simple nominal categories. For example, data have been collected on various kinds of threats and promises, various uses of military force, and various ways by which a state yields control over its territory, citizens, or their property. (The latter type of action ranges from commercial air rights to acts of total surrender.) Inspection of 11,617 events suggests that proportionately few actions involve transfers (513 events), military force (825), or restrictions on sovereignty (368). Of course, the significance of any

⁸ Alternative types of policy classification, including the two reported in this section, are described in C. F. Hermann (1972).

Domestic	631 (8.2%)	243 (4.1%)	611 (6.5%)	263 (6.1%)	492 (5.0%)	382 (10.0%)	874 (6.0%)
	(43.8%)	(68.9%)	(52.3%)	(60.2%)	(57.9%)	(46.8%)	(55.0%)

TABLE IV-3

Revised WEIS Scheme for Categorizing Foreign Policy Event Actions

Direction of action	Verbal			Nonverbal
	Evaluation	Desire	Intent	Deed
Conflictive	<i>Category 1</i>			
	Deny	<i>Category 3</i>		<i>Category 7</i>
	Accuse	Demand	Threaten	Use force
	Comment (Neg.)	Protest	Warn	Demonstrate
		Propose (Neg.)	Reject	Increase military capability
		Request (Neg.)	Intend (Neg.)	Aid opponent
				Reduce relationship
				Seize
				Expel
				Subvert
Neutral or cooperative	<i>Category 2</i>			
	Comment (Pos.)	<i>Category 4</i>		<i>Category 8</i>
	Approve	Request (Pos.)	Intend (Pos.)	Yield
		Propose (Pos.)	Offer	Grant
		Negotiate	Promise	Decrease military capability
			Agree	Consult
				Carry out agreement
				Reward
				Increase relationship

Increasing commitment to action from left to right

Action

Note: The actions are those of the actor toward the first direct target, unless the actor and direct target are in the same country, in which case the action is that of the actor toward the most affected foreign indirect object. The original WEIS categories were developed by Charles McClelland and associates at the University of Southern California. The present eight-fold classification was prepared by Walter Corson. The individual categories in their present form were revised by Maurice A. East, Walter Corson, Patrick McGowan, Stephen Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann.

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Table IV-4 presents some
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just described. The first colun
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data set. The largest proportio
appears in the category consis
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this lowest level of neutral o
every column in Table IV-4; t
every type of nation represen
Similarly, the second highest
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Using this information, if we
the three categories with the
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type of action in foreign policy does not necessarily correspond to the frequency with which it appears. The relatively infrequent occurrence of some classes of behaviors, however, reinforces one assumption of this essay; namely, that students of foreign policy tend either to overlook or to be unfamiliar with the most frequent activities undertaken in foreign affairs. By concentrating on the behaviors that we regard as in some way important—such as political crises, military engagements, or trade agreements—we lose perspective on the scope and distribution of external activities conducted by governments. It may well be that these little-recognized foreign activities make certain types of “significant” actions more or less likely.

One of the most elaborate sets of nominal categories in the CREON data is derived from the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS). Every event is assigned to one (and only one) of the thirty-five categories, grouped into eight clusters, as shown in Table IV-3. The categories in the upper half of Table IV-3 include all hostile or conflictual behavior, while those in the bottom half incorporate neutral and friendly, or cooperative, behavior. Furthermore, from left to right, the eight categories in the table represent an increasing disposition toward physical action and thus offer a crude measure of commitment.

Table IV-4 presents some preliminary results with the data for all thirty months when actions are grouped into the eight broad categories just described. The first column of that table gives the frequency and percentage of actions in each category for all nations in the CREON data set. The largest proportion of actions in this column (27 percent) appears in the category consisting of friendly or neutral evaluations of some aspect of the actor’s external environment (category 2). In fact, this lowest level of neutral or affirmative commitment ranks first in every column in Table IV-4; that is, the highest percentage of events for every type of nation represented in the table falls into this category. Similarly, the second highest ranking category not only for all nations but also for each of the separate nation-types involves expressions by the actor of a desire for neutral or favorable actions by others (category 4). The third highest percentage for all nations (14 percent) is category 6, which consists of expressions by the actor of his own intention to take neutral or favorable action in the future. (In other columns of the table, category 6 is ranked or is tied for third or fourth rank.)

Using this information, if we look back at Table IV-3, we discover that the three categories with the largest proportion of events fall in the lower half of this table and move sequentially from left to right through

Foreign Policy Event Actions

Intent	Nonverbal Deed
<i>Category 5</i>	<i>Category 7</i>
Threaten	Use force
Warn	Demonstrate
Reject	Increase
Intend (Neg.)	military capability
	Aid opponent
	Reduce relationship
	Seize
	Expel
	Subvert
<i>Category 6</i>	<i>Category 8</i>
Intend (Pos.)	Yield
Offer	Grant
Promise	Decrease
Agree	military capability
	Consult
	Carry out agreement
	Reward
	Increase relationship

From left to right Action

The first direct target, unless the actor case the action is that of the actor the original WEIS categories were the University of Southern California. Walter Corson. The individual categories A. East, Walter Corson, Patrick Ann.

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TABLE IV-4
CREON Events Distributed by Nation-Types and Categories of Action

Categories of action	Type of nation						
	All nations	Large	Small	Developed	Less developed	Open	Closed
1. Hostile evaluation of external situation	1,453 (13%)	1,044 (16%)	409 (8%)	1,052 (13%)	401 (11%)	876 (11%)	577 (17%)
2. Neutral/coop. evaluation of external situation	3,137 (27%)	1,659 (25%)	1,478 (29%)	2,076 (26%)	1,061 (29%)	2,329 (28%)	808 (24%)
3. Desires others act in way unfavorable to target	461 (4%)	281 (4%)	180 (4%)	253 (3%)	208 (6%)	226 (3%)	235 (7%)
4. Desires others act in way neutral or favorable to target	2,376 (21%)	1,136 (17%)	1,240 (24%)	1,546 (19%)	830 (23%)	1,738 (21%)	638 (19%)
5. Actor's intended unfavorable action to target	738 (6%)	497 (8%)	241 (5%)	548 (7%)	190 (5%)	465 (6%)	273 (8%)
6. Actor's intended neutral or favorable action to target	1,669 (14%)	971 (15%)	698 (14%)	1,225 (15%)	444 (12%)	1,297 (16%)	372 (11%)
7. Deeds hostile to target	313 (3%)	180 (3%)	133 (3%)	236 (3%)	77 (2%)	226 (3%)	87 (2%)
8. Deeds neutral or friendly to target	1,442 (12%)	747 (11%)	695 (14%)	1,004 (13%)	438 (12%)	1,090 (13%)	352 (11%)
Total N	11,589	6,515	5,074	7,930	3,659	8,257	3,332

the three types of verbal behavior. The higher commitment in a neutral or friendly mode, as represented by category 8, ranks fifth for all nations, but ranks third or fourth for some individual nation-types. The category that ranks fourth for all nations and interrupts the progression of ranks across the bottom of Table IV-3 is hostile evaluation of the external situation (category 1). Behaviors in this category are judged to represent

the least degree of commitment to action. At all but the highest level, the pattern suggests that nations do more than they do any kind of hostile or common type of behavior for all nations. Hostile or conflictual deeds (category 7) are more common in less developed nations. Commitment. In sum, the first category is typically keep their hostile behavior.

One of the striking characteristics of Table IV-4 is the rather small difference between nation-types. The largest percentage difference appears between large and small nations in the neutral situation (category 1). Governments of large nations are more secure from reprisals for their behavior in the international situation. The second category (category 4) indicates that governments of large states, express the desire for affiliation with the target is consistent with our general finding that governments voting much of their external behavior.

The same explanation might be given for the less-developed countries making more positive action by others (category 6) than developed countries. In fact, less developed countries are more concerned with seeking action from others, neutral, favorable, or unfavorable, than developed nations respect to the target. If we compare the data, we count for 29 percent in less-developed nations and 29 percent for developed nations.

Turning to the last pair of categories, we find two different patterns. Governments of closed nations are more concerned of their external environment than governments of open nations (category 1). Moreover, governments of closed systems have a larger proportion of neutral or favorable declarations to their target (neutral or favorable declarations to target). As suggested by the data, some sort of paranoia regarding the target is present in most closed systems, leading them to be more concerned about foreign affairs. In

s and Categories of Action

of nation			
Developed	Less developed	Open	Closed
1,052 (13%)	401 (11%)	876 (11%)	577 (17%)
2,076 (26%)	1,061 (29%)	2,329 (28%)	808 (24%)
253 (3%)	208 (6%)	226 (3%)	235 (7%)
1,546 (19%)	830 (23%)	1,738 (21%)	638 (19%)
548 (7%)	190 (5%)	465 (6%)	273 (8%)
1,225 (15%)	444 (12%)	1,297 (16%)	372 (11%)
236 (3%)	77 (2%)	226 (3%)	87 (2%)
1,004 (13%)	438 (12%)	1,090 (13%)	352 (11%)
7,930	3,659	8,257	3,332

er commitment in a neutral
3, ranks fifth for all nations,
l nation-types. The category
pts the progression of ranks
evaluation of the external
gory are judged to represent

the least degree of commitment that can be associated with a hostile action. At all but the highest levels of positive commitment, the overall pattern suggests that nations initiate more neutral or friendly behavior than they do any kind of hostile or conflictual behavior. The least common type of behavior for all nations—and for every nation-type—is conflictual deeds (category 7), which is the highest level of hostile commitment. In sum, the first column of Table IV-4 suggests that nations typically keep their hostile behavior confined to low intensity.

One of the striking characteristics about the remaining columns of Table IV-4 is the rather small percentage differences between pairs of nation-types. The largest percentage difference (eight percentage points) appears between large and small nations on hostile evaluation of the situation (category 1). Governments of large nations have a higher proportion of negative evaluations. Policymakers in large states may feel more secure from reprisals for making negative evaluations of the international situation. The second largest percentage difference (category 4) indicates that governments of small states, more than those of large states, express the desire for affirmative action by others. This last finding is consistent with our general characterization of small states as devoting much of their external effort to seeking aid.

The same explanation might apply to the finding that governments of less-developed countries make proportionately more statements urging positive action by others (category 4) than do the governments of developed countries. In fact, less-developed countries generally seem more concerned with seeking action by others, regardless of whether they urge neutral, favorable, or unfavorable action (categories 3 and 4) with respect to the target. If we combine categories 3 and 4, all such events account for 29 percent in less-developed nations as compared to 22 percent for developed nations.

Turning to the last pair of nation-types in Table IV-4—open and closed systems—we find two differences of five percentage points or more. Governments of closed nations more frequently make hostile evaluations of their external environment than do those in open systems (category 1). Moreover, governments of open systems as compared to those of closed systems have a larger proportion of their events in category 6 (neutral or favorable declarations of their own future action toward the target). As suggested by the first six categories for these nation-types, some sort of paranoia regarding the external world may be inherent in most closed systems, leading them to talk more negatively and less favorably about foreign affairs. It should be noted, however, that in the

CREON data this pattern does not carry over into physical deeds. Open nations appear to be slightly more active in both categories of physical deeds (7 and 8), including those which are hostile to the target.

Conclusions

It must be emphasized again that the findings in this essay should be regarded as tentative, although suggestive. Before we can place confidence in them, we must seek answers to further questions, including the following:

1. Would the pattern of results be sustained if additional data sources were added to the present one and coverage were extended to include all months between 1959 and 1968?
2. With respect to the variables in the CREON data, what is the variability among nations in the same nation-type? Are only a subset of nations within each type accounting for the observed patterns?
3. How stable is the pattern of process and actions with respect to different targets or with different samples of initiating states?
4. To what extent are the observed differences in the three Rosenau genotypic variables independent? For example, if one controls for accountability and size, are there differences between developed and less-developed countries?
5. How stable are the patterns across time? If one divided the data into smaller time intervals, would the same pattern exist in most time periods?

Regardless of whether the answers to these questions substantiate the findings in this particular study, they will strengthen our understanding of foreign policy by providing a means of empirically investigating pretheories of foreign affairs such as those described at the outset of this essay. As these theoretical frameworks are modified and improved, they become the keys to better explanation and forecasting.

6

Size and Foreign Policy A Test of Two Models

MAURICE A. EAST

Recently, the concept of size has received an increasing amount of concern is the renewed interest in states.¹ In his pretheory of foreign policy as one of three "genotypic" variables on foreign policy. Several empirical studies have shown that size is an important factor underlying the behavior of nation-states (see Rummel and Hermann 1969).

The focus of this study is on the foreign policy behavior of small states. In models of such behavior, we will test comparative Research on the Events of their validity.

This chapter is an abridged version of *Politics* 25 (July 1973):556-76. Copyright printed by permission of the author. The bibliography have been altered for this edition.

¹Recent books focusing on small states are (1971), Schou and Brundtland (1971).