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Comparing the Foreign Policy Events of Nations

CHARLES F. HERMANN

This chapter deals with initial efforts to collect machine-readable data on foreign policy actions for a sample of thirty-five nations. Three assumptions underlie both the chapter and the research it describes.

First, despite years of study, there exist few ways of conceptualizing foreign policy activities that allow one to classify the entire range of national foreign policy actions in order to allow reliable comparisons between nations. Why should anyone want to classify foreign policy behavior? It would be difficult for a brokerage firm to work effectively in stocks without descriptive statistics about the performance across time not only of the entire market but also of particular industries and given companies. Similarly, an insurance company needs actuarial data on people, information on the frequency of various kinds of accidents, and so on. Such numerical data record human behavior and are vital to the industries that use them. This chapter assumes that establishing such patterns could be at least as beneficial in increasing our understanding of foreign policy and in improving the quality of foreign policy analysis.

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¹ The Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project, which is its basis, is supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (GS-40356) and the Mershon Center at Ohio State University.
Second, given the desirability of mapping the entire spectrum of foreign policy for a variety of nations, one must assume that “soft” data are better than no operational data at all for large areas of foreign policy activity. Soft data are not readily available in standardized, countable units, as are U.N. votes, trade statistics, or amounts of military assistance, which represent only a small component of the entire foreign policy activity of most nations. What is needed is a means of measuring behavior ranging from a diplomatic note of congratulations on the anniversary of a nation’s independence to acts of massive violence against the people or property of another country. One unit that lends itself to such comprehensive coding is the discrete foreign policy act, or what has been called events data. With careful definition, events can encompass not only “soft,” or normal, data but also “hard,” or quantifiable data. Only such an inclusive unit will allow us to map the complete spectrum of foreign policy activity.

Third, given the assumption that any foreign policy activity can be broken down into discrete events, how shall we group, or classify, foreign policy activities to comprise a national profile? The search described in this chapter assumes that some fragments of theory exist that require better description of the empirical universe of foreign policy events before they can be developed further or replaced.

The present research draws upon three theoretical frameworks in constructing a definition of foreign policy actions and in selecting the properties of these actions to be coded. The first of these is decision-making, which was brought to the attention of students of politics by men like Lasswell (1956), Simon (1957), and Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), but whose subsequent development has proceeded largely outside of political science in such fields as organizational behavior, social psychology, and economics. Though not all decisions lead to action, those behaviors which are conscious and deliberate result from decision processes undertaken by one or more individuals who must be treated as actors. Decision-making gives prominence to the organizational context in which the actor operates.

The second theoretical perspective underscores the importance of this organizational setting in foreign policy. It has been emphasized in the recent writings of men like Neustadt (1970), George (1972), Hilsman (1967), Halperin (1972), and Allison (1971), who stress that foreign policy actions are not exclusively the product of the decision-makers’ perceptions of the environment external to their society, but also reflect their struggle as members of competing bureaucratic organizations within the government, each with its own agenda.

Finally, Rosenau (1966) has emphasized the role of nations—political accounting size—which may serve as an important dimension to explain foreign policy behavior. The research effort described here addresses all these theoretical perspectives. The ultimate aim is to show that events data are sufficiently regular to allow the comparative study of foreign policy activity.

### Using Events Data

One of the tasks in using events data is to search for event in which a specific act, an activity, an action, or an event could be considered as a discrete unit of analysis. The event in question could be anything from a single act to a series of acts, depending on the nature of the event and the research questions being addressed. The choice of event should be guided by the research design and the theoretical framework being used.

Table IV-1 also indicates the use of dichotomizing the data, which is a common practice in the social sciences. Dichotomizing a variable, such as the frequency of events or the nature of events, allows for the examination of patterns and trends within the data. This can be particularly useful in identifying key events or trends that may be associated with specific conditions or circumstances.

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2 Rosenau’s (1966) article on political foreign policy deal with more limited aspects of his research and data collection strategies.
Comparing the Foreign Policy Events of Nations

Among the entire spectrum of foreign policy issues, we may assume that "soft" data are large areas of foreign policy activity in standardized, countable terms of military assistance, if the entire foreign policy effort is a means of measuring behavioral congratulations on the acts of massive violence against the unit that lends itself to foreign policy act, or what definition, events can encompass "hard," or quantifiable events, we can map the complete scope of foreign policy activity can be group, or classify, foreign events. The search described in this theory exist that require the use of foreign policy events placed.

Theoretical frameworks in contention and in selecting the first of these is decision theory, which imposes boundaries on a continuous stream of international activities. The particular collection of events data used in this chapter, taken from the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations project (CREON), consists of foreign policy activities of thirty-five countries for one randomly selected quarter in each of the years from 1959 to 1968. Although the data set ultimately will draw on multiple sources, the present events are those reported in a single source—Deadline Data on World Affairs. Table IV-1 lists the nations included in the study and the number of foreign events initiated by each in the thirty months for which data were collected.

Table IV-1 also indicates the eight nation-types which Rosenau (1966) formed by dichotomizing three fundamental variables—political accountability (open/closed), economic development (developed/less developed), and size (large/small). Rosenau suggests that the nature of a nation's foreign policy is conditioned by these variables, which, in static analysis, can be regarded as parameters. In contrast to the early work of Rummel (1968), Tanter (1966), Gurr (1968), and Feinabend and

* Rosenau's (1966) article on pretheories and his subsequent writing on comparative foreign policy deal with more than nation-types, or what he calls genotypes. Although some other aspects of his conceptualization have been influential in our research and data collection strategy, they are not dealt with in this essay.
### TABLE IV-1

**CREON Event Frequencies for 35 Nations Classified into Rosenau Genotypes**  
*(Total Number of Events = 11,617)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Developed nations</th>
<th>Less developed nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large Open</td>
<td>Large Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>Spain 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>USSR 968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>Chile 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1,859</td>
<td>Israel 321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>539</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,945</td>
<td>Total 1,140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Attribute data for this table were collected and archived by the Comparative Analysis of Policy Environments (CAPE) at Ohio State University and are outlined in Burges 1970a and 1970b.

Note: Nations are classified according to discriminant function analysis (see n. 5, chap. 5). Values after each nation refer to the total number of events currently in the data set for that nation. The following indicator variables for 1966 were used to construct the scale by which nations were classified: for economic development, (1) GNP/capita, (2) energy consumption/capita, (3) agricultural workers as percentage of total economically active population, (4) newspapers/1,000 population, (5) radios/1,000 population, (6) urban primary, and (7) ratio of population from age 5–19 enrolled in primary and secondary schools; for size, (1) total population, (2) total GNP, (3) total land area, and (4) total KWH; for political accountability, (1) freedom of the press (rev), (2) competitiveness in election for head of government, (3) horizontal power distribution, and (4) representative character of regime. In each case the indicator first mentioned was used as the primary variable for establishing alternative points of partition.

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*Comparing the FEICERBAND (1966) — who contends for all nations that many Rosaner cultures tend to other groupings such as the nationality or political group, the problem of ethnocentrism is evident in the events that occur between nations in the almost sixty-three events per month that occur during the month. As Table IVI indicates, the difference between events in 491 nations is low, but the small difference in number of events in 291 nations is high. The difference between the events in 491 nations is low, but the small difference in number of events in 291 nations is high.*
Feierabend (1966b)—who seek to find relationships between selected behaviors for all nations (e.g., political instability and conflict)—Rosenau contends that many relationships involving foreign policy behavior will be obscured unless nations are differentiated into some subgroups, such as the nation-types. The method used to assign nations to each of the eight genotypes was discriminant analysis developed for this problem by Burgess (1970b) and others.

Descriptive Findings on the Components of Events

As Table IV-1 indicates, there are enormous inequalities between nations with respect to the number of events initiated by any given nation. At one extreme, Switzerland averaged fewer than two and one-half events per month; whereas the United States initiated an average of almost sixty-two events per month. Undoubtedly, substantial differences occur between nations in the frequency with which they initiate actions, but the small number for some states in the CREON data raises the possibility that the difference is due partially to unequal coverage by the data source. The confounding of actual differences in the initiation of events with source differences in coverage makes it difficult to conclude with confidence what variables might account for the following differences in number of events reported for each of the nation-types:

Eleven large countries initiated 6,532 events (mean 593.8); twenty-four small countries initiated 5,085 events (mean 211.9).
Twenty-four open countries initiated 8,273 events (mean 344.7); eleven closed countries initiated 3,344 events (mean 304.0).

Nineteen developed countries initiated 7,947 events (mean 418.3); sixteen underdeveloped countries initiated 3,670 events (mean 229.4).

These breakdowns tend to conform to my prior expectation that western data sources will underreport the activities of relatively small as compared to large nations, open as compared to closed societies, and developed as compared to less-developed countries. It should be noted, however, that the mean difference between open and closed systems is not very substantial.

In addition to total frequencies of actions, a few findings should be reported on the other components of an event as the term has been defined. Every event was required to have one or more direct targets. Ninety percent (10,443) of all the events had only one direct target, with little variation occurring when events for the nations were grouped under each of the three dichotomized genotypic variables. For example, 89 percent of all events initiated by open countries had one target, as compared to 92 percent for closed countries. This was the largest difference. If this initial pattern of findings is substantiated, it would suggest that decision-makers usually seek to address one target at a time, no matter how many other entities the actor attempts to affect indirectly by his action. Events were also required to have indirect objects of influence; 61 percent (7,046) had one or more explicitly mentioned indirect objects that were entities other than those classified as direct targets. In other words, in three out of every five events, the actor addressed one entity but sought to influence someone else in addition to the immediate recipient of his action. As with direct targets, none of the three genotypic dichotomies differentiated between nations that had separate indirect objects and those that did not. The largest difference between nation-types was 3 percent: 60 percent of all events in open nations and 63 percent of all events in closed nations had separate objects.

The absence of differences between nations with respect to the number of targets and indirect objects is in marked contrast to the results on governmental participation in multilaterally-initiated actions. Sixty-five percent of all actions in our open governments' with the nations' vs. small, 80 percent; developed, 60 percent; open, 69 percent, vs. closed, 59 percent; governments may be a desirable tactic.

One additional finding on the nature of the direct target and percent of the direct targets and other governments. Six percent percent of the indirect objects of own country. The percentages consisted of external, nonnational officials of international organizations respectively.

Classification by nation-type kinds of indirect objects. Nation distribution of direct targets, however, 48 percent of all direct targets addressed other governments, as contrasted with 33 percent. Similarly, events initiated by more direct targets that were initiated by less-developed nations addressed other governments more than those in open societies. In closed nations initiated more events addressed by actors—most likely, alliances nation may suggest differences different types of nations. Governments may believe that their foreign national governments. These nations less relevant to small or less-

The CREON definition of an event national government as the action ministers of Japan and New Zealand nation. The assumption is that decision as to whether it will be an event, however, a record is kept as that variable which is being used.
percent of all actions in our sample were undertaken by two or more
governments with the nation-type division as follows: large, 53 percent,
vs. small, 80 percent; developed, 61 percent, vs. less developed, 74 per-
cent; open, 69 percent, vs. closed, 55 percent. In small or less-developed
countries, governments may collaborate to add to the authority of their
actions. Governmental decision-makers in open societies may engage in
more collaborative efforts out of a conviction that consensus-building is
a desirable tactic.

One additional finding on the components of events concerns the
nature of the direct target and indirect object. For all countries 39 per-
cent of the direct targets and 71 percent of the indirect objects were
other governments. Six percent of the direct targets, but less than 1
percent of the indirect objects, were domestic entities within the actor's
own country. The percentages of direct targets and indirect objects that
consisted of external, nonnational entities (e.g., political parties and
officials of international organization) were 55 percent and 29 percent,
respectively.

Classification by nation-type revealed no substantial differences in
kinds of indirect objects. Nation-types, or genotypes, do affect the dis-
tribution of direct targets, however, as indicated in Table IV-2. Almost
48 percent of all direct targets of events from large nations were other
governments, as contrasted with only 27 percent for small nations.
Similarly, events initiated by developed nations had proportionately
more direct targets that were other governments than did events
initiated by less-developed nations, and governments in closed societies
addressed other governments as targets proportionately more than did
those in open societies. In comparison, small, less-developed, and open
nations initiated more events having as targets external, nonnational
actors—most likely, alliances or international organizations. This pat-
tern may suggest differences in the world view of governments in dif-
f erent types of nations. Governments in large or developed countries
may believe that their foreign affairs require the attention of other na-
tional governments. These national targets, at least individually, seem
less relevant to small or less-developed nations either because such com-

7 The CREON definition of an event stipulates that no event may have more than
one national government as the actor. Therefore, a joint communiqué by the foreign
ministers of Japan and New Zealand would be considered two events—one for each
nation. The assumption is that each government must make its own separate de-
cision as to whether it will be a party to a collaborative undertaking. For each
event, however, a record is kept as to whether it involved a joint initiative, and it is
that variable which is being used at this point in the text.
## Table IV-2

Relationship between Kinds of Direct Targets and Rosenau Genotypes

(Total Number of Direct Targets = 13,669)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct targets</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Developed</th>
<th>Less developed</th>
<th>Open</th>
<th>Closed</th>
<th>All genotypes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other governments</td>
<td>3,681</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>3,839</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>5,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47.9%)</td>
<td>(27.0%)</td>
<td>(41.1%)</td>
<td>(33.7%)</td>
<td>(37.1%)</td>
<td>(43.1%)</td>
<td>(39.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External, nonnational</td>
<td>3,367</td>
<td>4,129</td>
<td>4,887</td>
<td>2,609</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>7,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(43.8%)</td>
<td>(68.9%)</td>
<td>(52.3%)</td>
<td>(60.2%)</td>
<td>(57.9%)</td>
<td>(46.8%)</td>
<td>(55.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.2%)</td>
<td>(4.1%)</td>
<td>(6.5%)</td>
<td>(6.1%)</td>
<td>(5.0%)</td>
<td>(10.0%)</td>
<td>(6.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Types of Foreign Policy

The CREON data provide information on the proportion of actors who believe that individual governments may act, individually or together, in order to solve problems that they believe are national or international in scope. Comparing the proportions of the open and closed systems, it is evident that more actors in the open systems believe that governments may act, either alone or in concert, in order to solve problems that are at least partly national in scope. The proportionately smaller number of actors in closed systems who believe that national governments may act may reflect the fact that governments in closed systems are more likely to be faced with problems that are largely local or domestic in nature. On the other hand, the proportionately larger number of actors in open systems who believe that national governments may act may reflect the fact that national governments in open systems are more likely to be faced with problems that are international in scope.
munication is an inefficient use of their limited resources or because they believe that individual governments are less likely to be responsive. The proportionately smaller attention given external, nongovernmental actors by governments in closed societies, as compared to open societies, may reflect the former’s minority position in many international political and financial bodies. Table IV-2 also reveals that governments in large as compared to small nations and those in closed as compared to open systems have twice as many foreign events in which domestic targets are mentioned. In both large and closed systems the problem of internal control may account for the observed attention to domestic groups.

Types of Foreign Policy Behavior

The CREON data provide several distinctive ways of describing and measuring foreign policy behavior on a cross-national basis. One involves the use of a series of items which are combined to form scales representing predetermined attributes of behavior that the investigators judged to be of potential theoretical significance. Variables have been included for scales on (1) the intensity of a government’s commitment in terms of energy and resources present in the action; (2) the specificity with which the action is defined with respect to the problem it addresses and the target; (3) the affect (hostility-friendliness) of the actor toward the direct target; and (4) the duration of the event. An alternative approach to scale construction uses statistical reduction and aggregation techniques, such as factor analysis, to identify underlying dimensions of behavior. Scales formed in this manner may or may not reflect those concepts which the researcher regarded as basic to his theoretical interests. At the time of this writing, the CREON project is still in the early stages of scale construction using both of these approaches.

Still another procedure for event classification involves simple nominal categories. For example, data have been collected on various kinds of threats and promises, various uses of military force, and various ways by which a state yields control over its territory, citizens, or their property. (The latter type of action ranges from commercial air rights to acts of total surrender.) Inspection of 11,617 events suggests that proportionately few actions involve transfers (513 events), military force (825), or restrictions on sovereignty (368). Of course, the significance of any

8 Alternative types of policy classification, including the two reported in this section, are described in C. F. Hermann (1972).
TABLE IV-3
Revised WEIS Scheme for Categorizing Foreign Policy Event Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction of action</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Verbal</th>
<th>Nonverbal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desire</td>
<td>Intent</td>
<td>Deed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicte</td>
<td>Category 1</td>
<td>Category 3</td>
<td>Category 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deny</td>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Use force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accuse</td>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>Demonstrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comment (Neg.)</td>
<td>Propose (Neg.)</td>
<td>Warn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reject</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>military capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aid opponent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral or cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Propose (Pos.)</td>
<td>Subvert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comment (Pos.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>Intend (Pos.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offer</td>
<td>Category 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral or cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Request (Pos.)</td>
<td>Intend (Pos.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Offer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiate</td>
<td>Promise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Increasing commitment to action from left to right & Action

Note: The actions are those of the actor toward the first direct target, unless the actor and direct target are in the same country, in which case the action is that of the actor toward the most affected foreign indirect object. The original WEIS categories were developed by Charles McClelland and associates at the University of Southern California. The present eight-fold classification was prepared by Walter Corson. The individual categories in their present form were revised by Maurice A. East, Walter Corson, Patrick McGowan, Stephen Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann.

Comparing the frequency with which it appears type of action in foreign policy, we see that some classes of behaviors, by essay, namely, that the students of world affairs. By concentrating on the important—such as political comments—we lose perspective of the activities conducted by governments of recognized foreign activities may be more or less likely.

One of the most elaborate sets of data is derived from the WEIS data set. Every event is assigned to one category, grouped into eight categories in the upper half of Table IV-4, behavior, while those in the lower half, or cooperative, behave in eight categories in the table responsive to physical action and thus offer Table IV-4 presents some thirty months when actions are just described. The first column is a percentage of actions in each category. The largest proportion of actions appears in the category consisting of some aspect of the actor's external environment, this lowest level of neutral or other, every column in Table IV-4; the same type of nation represents a second highest percentage, but also for each of the separate actors of a desire for neutral or neutral...

The third highest percentage of actions, which consists of expressions intended to be neutral or favorable action in the table, category 6 is ranked or is tied...
type of action in foreign policy does not necessarily correspond to the
frequency with which it appears. The relatively infrequent occurrence
of some classes of behaviors, however, reinforces one assumption of this
essay; namely, that students of foreign policy tend either to overlook or
to be unfamiliar with the most frequent activities undertaken in foreign
affairs. By concentrating on the behaviors that we regard as in some way
important—such as political crises, military engagements, or trade agree-
ments—we lose perspective on the scope and distribution of external
activities conducted by governments. It may well be that these little-
recognized foreign activities make certain types of “significant” actions
more or less likely.

One of the most elaborate sets of nominal categories in the CREON
data is derived from the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS). Evey
event is assigned to one (and only one) of the thirty-five cate-
gories, grouped into eight clusters, as shown in Table IV-3. The cate-
gories in the upper half of Table IV-3 include all hostile or conflictual
behavior, while those in the bottom half incorporate neutral and
friendly, or cooperative, behavior. Furthermore, from left to right, the
eight categories in the table represent an increasing disposition toward
physical action and thus offer a crude measure of commitment.

Table IV-4 presents some preliminary results with the data for all
thirty months when actions are grouped into the eight broad categories
just described. The first column of that table gives the frequency and
percentage of actions in each category for all nations in the CREON
data set. The largest proportion of actions in this column (27 percent)
appears in the category consisting of friendly or neutral evaluations of
some aspect of the actor’s external environment (category 2). In fact,
this lowest level of neutral or affirmative commitment ranks first in
every column in Table IV-4; that is, the highest percentage of events for
every type of nation represented in the table falls into this category.
Similarly, the second highest ranking category not only for all nations
but also for each of the separate nation-types involves expressions by the
actor of a desire for neutral or favorable actions by others (category 4).
The third highest percentage for all nations (14 percent) is category 6,
which consists of expressions by the actor of his own intention to take
neutral or favorable action in the future. (In other columns of the table,
category 6 is ranked or is tied for third or fourth rank.)

Using this information, if we look back at Table IV-3, we discover that
the three categories with the largest proportion of events fall in the
lower half of this table and move sequentially from left to right through
### Table IV-4

CREON Events Distributed by Nation-Types and Categories of Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of action</th>
<th>Type of nation</th>
<th>All nations</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Developed</th>
<th>Less developed</th>
<th>Open</th>
<th>Closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hostile evaluation of external situation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,453</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral/coop. evaluation of external situation</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,137</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>2,329</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desires others act in way unfavorable to target</td>
<td></td>
<td>461</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desires others act in way neutral or favorable to target</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>1,738</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor's intended unfavorable action to target</td>
<td></td>
<td>738</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor's intended neutral or favorable action to target</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,669</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deeds hostile to target</td>
<td></td>
<td>313</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deeds neutral or friendly to target</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,442</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total n</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,589</td>
<td>6,515</td>
<td>5,074</td>
<td>7,930</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>8,257</td>
<td>3,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The least degree of commitment to action. At all but the highest levels, the pattern suggests that nations are less likely to commit than they do any kind of hostilized behavior for all but the least common type of behavior for all but the least committed. In sum, the first column typically keep their hostile beliefs.

One of the striking characteristics of Table IV-4 is the rather small proportion of negative evaluation. The second line of Table IV-4 indicates that governments and states, express the desire for action, but the action is consistent with our general voting and the external situation. The second line of Table IV-4 indicates that governments and states, express the desire for action, but the action is consistent with our general voting of their external environment.

The same explanation might apply to less-developed countries making positive action by others (category 1). Governments of closed nation-types express less concern with seeking action neutral, favorable, or unfavorable to the target. If we combine the data from Table IV-4, we find that closed systems lead to action in less than 29 percent of less-developed nations.

Turning to the last pair of Table IV-3, we find two distinct patterns. Governments of closed nations have a larger number of actions (neutral or favorable declarative action or to target). As suggested by the data in Table IV-3, governments of less-developed nation-types have a larger number of actions, leading the government to act in most closed systems, leading the government to act in most closed systems.
Comparing the Foreign Policy Events of Nations

the least degree of commitment that can be associated with a hostile action. At all but the highest levels of positive commitment, the overall pattern suggests that nations initiate more neutral or friendly behavior than they do any kind of hostile or conflictual behavior. The least common type of behavior for all nations—and for every nation-type—is conflictual deeds (category 7), which is the highest level of hostile commitment. In sum, the first column of Table IV-4 suggests that nations typically keep their hostile behavior confined to low intensity.

One of the striking characteristics about the remaining columns of Table IV-4 is the rather small percentage differences between pairs of nation-types. The largest percentage difference (eight percentage points) appears between large and small nations on hostile evaluation of the situation (category 1). Governments of large nations have a higher proportion of negative evaluations. Policymakers in large states may feel more secure from reprisals for making negative evaluations of the international situation. The second largest percentage difference (category 4) indicates that governments of small states, more than those of large states, express the desire for affirmative action by others. This last finding is consistent with our general characterization of small states as devoting much of their external effort to seeking aid.

The same explanation might apply to the finding that governments of less-developed countries make proportionately more statements urging positive action by others (category 4) than do the governments of developed countries. In fact, less-developed countries generally seem more concerned with seeking action by others, regardless of whether they urge neutral, favorable, or unfavorable action (categories 3 and 4) with respect to the target. If we combine categories 3 and 4, all such events account for 29 percent in less-developed nations as compared to 22 percent for developed nations.

Turning to the last pair of nation-types in Table IV-4—open and closed systems—we find two differences of five percentage points or more. Governments of closed nations more frequently make hostile evaluations of their external environment than do those in open systems (category 1). Moreover, governments of open systems as compared to those of closed systems have a larger proportion of their events in category 6 (neutral or favorable declarations of their own future action toward the target). As suggested by the first six categories for these nation-types, some sort of paranoia regarding the external world may be inherent in most closed systems, leading them to talk more negatively and less favorably about foreign affairs. It should be noted, however, that in the
CREON data this pattern does not carry over into physical deeds. Open nations appear to be slightly more active in both categories of physical deeds (7 and 8), including those which are hostile to the target.

Conclusions

It must be emphasized again that the findings in this essay should be regarded as tentative, although suggestive. Before we can place confidence in them, we must seek answers to further questions, including the following:

1. Would the pattern of results be sustained if additional data sources were added to the present one and coverage were extended to include all months between 1959 and 1968?
2. With respect to the variables in the CREON data, what is the variability among nations in the same nation-type? Are only a subset of nations within each type accounting for the observed patterns?
3. How stable is the pattern of process and actions with respect to different targets or with different samples of initiating states?
4. To what extent are the observed differences in the three Rosenau genotypic variables independent? For example, if one controls for accountability and size, are there differences between developed and less-developed countries?
5. How stable are the patterns across time? If one divided the data into smaller time intervals, would the same pattern exist in most time periods?

Regardless of whether the answers to these questions substantiate the findings in this particular study, they will strengthen our understanding of foreign policy by providing a means of empirically investigating pretheories of foreign affairs such as those described at the outset of this essay. As these theoretical frameworks are modified and improved, they become the keys to better explanation and forecasting.

Size and Foreign Policy
A Test of Two Models

MAURICE A. EAST

Recently, the concept of size has received an increasing amount of concern is the renewed interest in nation-states. In his pretheory of foreign policy, as one of three "genotypic" variables, size is seen as an important factor underlying the behavior of nation-states (see Rummel and Hermann 1969).

The focus of this study is on the foreign policy behavior of small states. By testing models of such behavior, we will contribute to research on the empirical validity of these theories.