Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions: Interpreting Soviet Arms for Egypt in 1973 through Process or Domestic Bargaining Models?

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EXPLAINING SELF-DEFEATING FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS: INTERPRETING SOVIET ARMS FOR EGYPT IN 1973 THROUGH PROCESS OR DOMESTIC BARGAINING MODELS?

How should we explain why a state sometimes adopts a foreign policy in one region that interferes with its concurrent policies elsewhere? In their article in the March 1989 issue of this Review, Stewart, Hermann and Hermann proposed a three-level process model of foreign policy to explain such Soviet behavior towards Egypt in 1973. The analysis has continuing interest because it interprets the puzzling behavior as a manifestation of general problems of information processing in making foreign policy choices. Richard Anderson suggests that a two-level model of domestic bargaining better accounts for the causal sequence in Soviet-Egyptian relations and is in general more parsimonious. Margaret and Charles Hermann defend their substantive analysis and argue in any case for the complementarity of process and bargaining approaches.

COMMENT

Why does a state sometimes adopt a foreign policy toward one country or world region that impairs the prospects for success of policies concurrently followed by the same state toward other countries or world regions? Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann (1989) offer a process model of foreign policy to explain one case of this puzzling behavior—the Soviet decision in January 1973 finally to grant Egypt’s requests for offensive arms to launch the October War against Israel. This decision remains puzzling because Egyptian use of Soviet arms to attack an ally of the United States could be expected to, and ultimately did, jeopardize the détente that the Politburo was concurrently pursuing.

Even though the Soviet Union is now defunct, both the question raised by the authors and their proposed answer remain worthwhile. Many states adopt self-defeating foreign policies (Snyder 1991). The general model proposed by the authors conditions the observed Soviet behavior not on any peculiar institutional or ideological characteristics of the Soviet Union but on general problems of information processing that might distort foreign policy choices by any national leadership. The authors’ model has the particular merit of linking levels of analysis by treating foreign policy as contingent on international events, not determined by them. They explain the Soviet decision by an empirical investigation of two processes: (1) the individual-level process by which each of six Soviet policymakers adjusts his attitude toward the issue in response to new information (in this case, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s July 1972 decision to expel Soviet military personnel from Egypt) and (2) the group-level process by which policy responds to change in individual attitudes toward Sadat’s request for arms. In the authors’ model, the Politburo approves delivery of arms to Egypt, despite this decision’s incompatibility with détente, because Sadat’s expulsion order triggers reconsideration of Soviet Middleast policy without simultaneously motivating a reevaluation of East-West policy.

While flaws in information processing have often drawn attention as candidates to explain self-defeating organizational behaviors, another possibility is domestic bargaining. Belonging to the family of “two-level” or “nested” games (Putnam 1988, Tsebelis 1990), a model of domestic bargaining explains self-frustrating behavior in the international arena as a consequence of interactions among the decision makers in the domestic arena. A domestic bargaining model differs from a process model in analytic focus. While the process model draws attention to the processing of salient international events, the bargaining model draws attention to national leaders’ purposive behavior.

One way to evaluate the relative merits of process models and domestic bargaining models is to compare their handling of the evidence in particular cases. In the case of Soviet arms for Egypt, the process model, drawing the authors’ attention to Sadat’s July expulsion order, induces them inadvertently to commit a causal inversion by attributing an event to an observably posterior cause. I begin with a discussion of the causal inversion. Then I present the alternative domestic bargaining model and lay out its historical reconstruction of the case. I conclude with a discussion of the relative merits of the two models.

THE CAUSAL INVERSION

To explain the Soviet policy reversal in granting Egyptian requests for offensive arms, the authors build a causal chain. They examine change over time in the attitudes expressed toward the Egyptian requests by four Politburo “oligarchs” (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov) and two key advisers (Defense Minister Grechko and party foreign affairs specialist Ponomarev). Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet military personnel in early July 1972 causes a shift in the declaratory stand taken by Kosygin in the third
quarter of 1972. The resulting disagreement over policy toward the Mideast causes Suslov to realign his public stance with Kosygin’s. Realignment among the oligarchs produces approval of the arms deliveries in January 1973.

To detect changes in the oligarchs’ and their advisers’ expressed attitudes toward the Egyptian demands for arms, the authors rely on a quantitative content analysis of all “speeches and writings” by the six Soviet officials during 1970–72. They measure the ratio of “references” deemed “supportive” or “resistive” to Sadat’s demand for weapons deliveries. A reference to advances in the Third World is considered supportive, while a reference to East–West détente is considered resistive.

One may question whether the ratio of references carries any significance. Any speech or article is not a concatenation of isolated references but a coherent text. A feature especially pronounced in Soviet political discourse was the tendency for speakers to communicate differing policy preferences not only by varying the number of references to agreed policies but also by varying the manner in which these references were combined (Ploss 1971, 120). For example, in each of two speeches given by the oligarchs Kosygin and Podgorny two days apart in October 1971, references to advances in the Third World considerably outnumber references to East–West détente. But Podgorny says that advances in the Third World will make détente feasible, while Kosygin says that détente is necessary for advances in the Third World. Because meaning can depend on overall organization of a speech, the ratio of references to one policy or another might vary without any change in the attitude expressed by the speaker.

Rather than relying on quantitative content analysis, the authors might examine Politburo members’ explicit comments on the Arab–Israeli conflict. They would discover that the Politburo’s specialist on Mideast issues during 1970–72 was Podgorny, whose role they (following Spechler 1986) overlook entirely. Although the authors score him as paying zero attention to the Mideast, in fact, 10 of his 70 speeches concern the Mideast almost exclusively; and he addressed it in other speeches. He commented on the Mideast much more than any other Soviet leader. In opposition to Sadat’s demands for arms, Podgorny advocated a “political settlement” to be achieved not by direct U.S.–Soviet or Israeli–Arab negotiations but by building a diplomatic coalition that would isolate Israel and the United States and compel unilateral concessions.1

Until 9 December 1971, Brezhnev and Kosygin echoed Podgorny’s calls for a political settlement. But at summits with Sadat in February and April 1972, from which Podgorny was excluded, Brezhnev and Kosygin agreed to communiqués that shifted Soviet declaratory policy in favor of Sadat’s view that offensive war was a justifiable solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict (Glassman 1975, 94; Rubinstein 1977, 179; Porter 1984, 122, n. 19). Their speeches began to call for “liberation” of occupied Arab territories without repeating Podgorny’s strictures against military means.2 Podgorny, meanwhile, continued to advocate a political settlement in the Mideast; but he also lost his 1971 predominance in the public exposition of Middle East policy.3

Thus, the shift in Kosygin’s declaratory stand on the Mideast conflict—the first link in the authors’ causal chain—occurs at least five months before the event, Sadat’s expulsion order, which the authors say causes his attitude to shift.4

A DOMESTIC BARGAINING MODEL

To explain the Soviet decision to arm Egypt, one might turn to a simple domestic bargaining model of foreign policy. The bargaining model posits that each national leader seeks to control policy on as many issues as possible. (It lets stand the question why leaders want control of policy—perhaps because they are ambitious, perhaps because they think their policy preferences are optimal for their state.) Each national leader is assumed to have two choices of action: (1) to insist on his or her own policy proposal and (2) accept some other policy proposal. If some leaders accept some other policy proposal than their own when one leader insists on his or her own, the “other” policy is assumed to be the insistent leader’s own proposal; if all leaders accept some proposal other than their own, the policy is assumed to be some intermediate compromise. This set of assumptions produces a game matrix, shown in Figure 1 for the two-leader case.

If the assumption that leaders want to control policy is interpreted to mean that they would rather disagree than surrender policy to another leader’s control but prefer a mutually acceptable policy to disagreement, this game is the familiar prisoner’s dilemma. It is iterated over indefinitely many policy decisions over time. This particular prisoner’s dilemma has the interesting feature of uncertainty about who plays last. For example, under the rules in 1972, Politburo members could die in office or fall ill and retire or the Central Committee could remove them from office. Consequently, this indefinitely iterated prisoner’s dilemma is not subject to the usual logic of backward induction, and there are many possible equilibria (Tsebelis 1990). Among these equilibria is an “alternating sucker” pattern in which each leader accepts an insistent leader’s proposal on one issue in return for obtaining acceptance of his or her insistence on some other issue (Hardin 1982; for a spatial formalization, see Austen-Smith and Banks 1990).

In order for policy to change in response to world events, the model further assumes the existence of an informal norm among national leaders. Any leader who proposes a policy must justify it by setting forth a public agenda of goals that the leader promises the policy will accomplish. According to the posited norm, information that the policy is not accomplis-
ing this agenda eventually requires the proponent leader to stop insisting on the proposal.

HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION

This model can explain the Soviet reversal of policy toward Egypt. Podgorny disagreed with Brezhnev and Kosygin about both Middle East policy and East–West détente. They wanted to negotiate with the United States on both issues. He wanted to negotiate only with friendly regional states: the Arabs in the Mideast, and France, Italy, and the small states in Europe. During 1970, these policy preferences imposed no particular choice on this subset of Soviet leaders, since Podgorny’s desire for separate negotiations with West European countries could be accommodated in a general program of exploring détente through bilateral diplomacy with a variety of Western countries. Beginning in early 1971, Israeli recalcitrance and Henry Kissinger’s duplicity combined to frustrate Brezhnev and Kosygin’s efforts for superpower cooperation in sponsoring a negotiated settlement in the Mideast (Breslauer 1983), while the European NATO members’ unwillingness to negotiate security issues separately from the United States frustrated Podgorny’s program in Europe. Consequently, both Podgorny and the Brezhnev–Kosygin pair could invoke the informal norm; a compromise would combine Podgorny’s policy in the Mideast with Brezhnev and Kosygin’s policy on East–West issues. (The other three officials examined by the authors—Grechko, Suslov, and Ponomarev—were inactive in the Mideast; and Brezhnev and Kosygin used concessions on other issues to buy off their opposition to détente.)

During 1971, Podgorny’s speeches advocated his political solution to the Israeli–Egyptian dispute. Sadat, having declared 1971 the “year of decision,” immediately complained about the gradualist aspects of Soviet policy but was willing in the short run to accept proposals for efforts through the United Nations to achieve an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. However, as 1971 wore on without results, Sadat began to argue that Israeli rejection of the UN initiatives justified his demands that the Soviets provide offensive arms for his preferred military solution. He also sought a settlement through direct bilateral contacts with Washington (Golan 1990, 76–79). His spokesman Mohammed Haykal (1975, 1978) accused the Soviets of perpetuating a condition of “no war, no peace” for their own benefit.

By the end of 1971, Sadat’s arguments, his contacts with Washington, and Haykal’s accusations constituted information that Podgorny’s coalition for a gradualist policy was falling apart. In fact, in a speech for the visiting Sadat in October 1971, Podgorny tried to rebut such concerns. Consequently, at this stage Brezhnev and Kosygin could invoke the informal norm again. They would prefer to return to a policy of negotiating a Middle East settlement in tandem with the United States. However, Kissinger’s unwillingness to enter serious negotiations on the Mideast, combined with his efforts to lure Sadat away from the Soviet alliance, made their preferred policy impractical. As Kissinger himself writes, “[Foreign Minister] Gromyko was experienced enough to know what I was doing” (quoted in George 1983). Consequently, Kosygin and Brezhnev proposed a policy of maintaining the Egyptian alliance (and frustrating Kissinger’s plans in the Mideast) by conceding to Sadat that Egypt had the legitimate right to undertake war against Israel.

At the same time, Brezhnev and Kosygin recognized that an Egyptian attack on the Sinai would seriously interfere with their policy of U.S.– Soviet détente. To manage this tension within their policy, they took advantage of Egypt’s known lack of hard currency by insisting that Egypt pay cash for any new arms deliveries (Central Asian Research Centre vol. 1, p. 208 and vol. 2, pp. 93, 246). This demand prevented arms deliveries during 1972. Resorting to
the only leverage he could imagine, Sadat ordered the expulsion of the Soviet military personnel in July 1972 (Sadat 1977). His move did not affect the Politburo bargaining; for he did not withdraw from the Soviet alliance, and keeping troops in Egypt was not part of Brezhnev and Kosygin’s stated agenda. They willingly “overcomplied” with the expulsion order, withdrawing more troops and weapons than Sadat had asked (Golan 1990, 79; Roi 1975).

In January 1973, however, Saudi Arabia suddenly granted Egypt five hundred million dollars for the purchase of Soviet arms (Golan 1990, 84; Rubinstein 1977, 242). Brezhnev and Kosygin did not foresee this development; for their image of Arab countries distinguished “progressives” like Egypt from “reactionaries” like Saudi Arabia, said to be tacitly allied with Israel. Within days an Egyptian delegation left for Moscow to buy arms. If, as per my assumption, Brezhnev and Kosygin’s purpose was to control policy on as many issues as possible, they would have acceded to the Egyptian demand for arms deliveries because this move would have enabled their policy proposal to retain control of the Mideast issue. Otherwise, they would have had to admit that their policy had failed to maintain the Egyptian alliance and agree to some policy sponsored by someone else. Podgorny held them to their bargain with Sadat because he expected the arms deliveries to interfere with the détente that he opposed.

In short, the Soviet leaders chose a policy of delivering arms to Egypt that later interfered with U.S.—Soviet détente because this suboptimal policy in the international game was optimal in a domestic bargaining game.

CONCLUSION

Both process models and domestic bargaining models offer general explanations why states often adopt self-frustrating foreign policies. Process models attribute these policies to deficiencies in processing information about new events. In domestic bargaining models, leaders may be uninformed about circumstances and surprised by events; but they adjust their strategies reliably to new information. According to the domestic bargaining model, states adopt self-frustrating policies whenever these policies win in the domestic game, because a win in the domestic game is prerequisite for any policy to advance to the international game. In the case of Soviet arms for Egypt, the process model’s focus on the impact of salient international events leads the authors to attribute the change in the Soviet leaders’ attitude toward Mideast policy to an event, Sadat’s expulsion order, that followed the observed change by five months. A domestic bargaining model avoids this causal inversion.

Bargaining models and process models are alternatives, not complements, because their explanatory logics make incommensurable assumptions about decision makers’ use of information. The domestic bargaining model has the advantage of being much more compact than the authors’ very elaborate process model. At the same time, the bargaining model preserves all the desirable features of the process model. Individual-level variables (preferences, perceptions of the international situation, information) combine with group-level variables (bargaining, norms) and state-level variables (rules affecting choice of equilibrium, number and identities of bargainers) to produce policy choices that react to international events but are contingent in the sense that national leaders can choose any of a wide variety of possible equilibria to the game. While the explanation of Soviet policy is consistent with evidence of oligarchic decision making by the Politburo, the model is well known to be general to policy choice, domestic and foreign, in other states.

This last point deserves emphasis. The propensity for strategic interaction within collectivities to produce behaviors suboptimal for the collectivity in larger social and natural environments is familiar from virtually every subfield of political science. Failures of information processing are inherently plausible as explanations for suboptimal behaviors, but they are inordinately difficult to detect against the background of the general disarray introduced into policy by collective choice.

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RESPONSE

Anderson, in critiquing the process model we employ to understand one puzzling case of a self-defeating foreign policy, claims (1) that the indicators we use do not adequately assess aspects of the process model, (2) that we have engaged in a causal inversion, and (3) that the domestic bargaining model is more parsimonious and better fitted to explaining the Soviet shift in early 1973 to granting Egypt’s request for offensive arms. We would like to rephrase Anderson’s criticisms into a set of questions and compare and contrast the process and domestic bargaining models in light of these queries: (1) Do self-defeating foreign policies reflect compartmentalized or competing attitudes among the leadership? (2) How do we know when attitudes change? and (3) Is the domestic bargaining model too parsimonious?

COMPARTMENTALIZED OR CONFLICTING ATTITUDES?

The differences between Anderson’s and our approaches to assessing leaders’ commitment to their preferences are at the heart of a debate among scholars studying the Brezhnev regime and lie at the heart of the questions that arise around self-defeating foreign policies. Two schools of thought have developed
to account for the Soviet government’s simultaneous pursuit of essentially contradictory policy lines during the 1970s. One—like Anderson—sees a consensus among the Soviet leaders about their image of the Soviet Union as a global and imperial power that included within it the complementary elements of military growth, Third World activism, and détente (e.g., Glassman 1975; Head 1982; Rigby 1970). As Head has noted, the leadership practiced “separatism”—the Soviet Union had “the right to seek cooperation with the West in some matters, while challenging it in others” (1982, 41). Differences among Politburo members focused on how these various elements should be combined—how each might condition, or be conditioned by, the others—rather than on which should be the center of attention.

The other school—the one we have followed—proposes that the sharp differences in Soviet policy reflected similar differences among the leaders about the nature of Soviet objectives and appropriate methods of achieving them. Which objective should be the number one priority was at issue. Politburo members held different images of the Soviet role in international relations. Consequently, Soviet foreign policy could shift dramatically as the coalitions supporting different objectives aligned themselves in different ways. The data from studies by Specchler (1986) and Stewart, Warhola, and Blough (1984) persuaded us of the appropriateness of following the conflict theory approach and developing a ratio measure of commitment to preference (see also Dawisha 1979 and Kass 1978).

Specchler (1986) identifies two dominant images toward the United States among Politburo members during the years 1967–73. These images, she argues, had implications for the Arab–Israeli conflict and the decision to provide Egypt with offensive, strategic weapons in 1973. She labels the two the “cooperative” and “antagonistic” images. Members with the cooperative image “were impressed by the fragility of détente. . . . They did not want events in the Middle East (or in any other region) to cause or deepen mistrust and hostility between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” (Specchler, 1986, 448). Those with the antagonistic view argued, “The U.S. must be actively countered and restrained, both militarily and politically. Highest priority must therefore be given to expansion of Soviet military power and political influence on a global scale. The Soviet Union must acquire friends and military facilities and maintain loyal allies wherever these would help to combat, contain, or undermine American power” (p. 450). In Specchler’s study of the Soviet decision to give arms to Egypt, Politburo members held one or the other of these images, not both. In effect, the images were inverse, not conditional.

In support of Specchler’s argument for the conflict between these two images in Soviet foreign policy during this time period, we note the content analysis of themes surrounding East–West relations done by Stewart, Warhola, and Blough (1984). References to détente and Soviet military power were the most prevalent in the 1970s when compared to all other themes (43% and 28% respectively), reflecting the importance of these two issues in Soviet foreign policy discourse. An R-factor analysis of all the themes across Politburo members indicated that these two foci were in competition with one another. Factor scores for individual Politburo members showed that the spokesmen for détente were not the spokesmen for increased military power, and vice versa.

The emphasis on either compartmentalized or conflicting attitudes has led Anderson and us to employ different techniques to measure commitment to preference. Anderson has used a more qualitative content analysis procedure in developing leaders’ positions. He is as interested in noting when phrases describing policies and approaches change as in keeping track of how often a particular theme is repeated. He focuses on how the Politburo members link the various streams of Soviet foreign policy to deal with what appear on the surface as contradictory ideas. One result of this focus is his interest in conditional policies. We, on the other hand, have used a more quantitative content-analytic approach that looks for how much Politburo members emphasized certain themes relative to other themes. We have paid particular attention to which leaders have focused on which issues to facilitate our understanding of the positions each is likely to advocate in a decision-making process where there are basic disagreements over objectives.

**HOW DO WE KNOW WHEN ATTITUDES CHANGE?**

One of the important concerns of both Anderson and us is to determine when Brezhnev and Kosygin began to be influenced by the environment to change their attitudes regarding supplying Egypt with offensive, strategic weapons. Because these two leaders are classified as cue-takers by our process model, we are interested in how contextual information shaped their positions. What environmental cues triggered a change has implications not only for the positions of these two leaders but for what happened in the group process as the Politburo worked to solve the problem. Ascertaining such environmental impacts is important for Anderson, as well, in determining when Brezhnev and Kosygin’s views began to diverge from Podgorny’s and, thus, when the bargaining equilibrium started to shift from Podgorny. Anderson argues that Brezhnev and Kosygin changed their positions in December 1971, or at least by February 1972, when they stopped advocating a political settlement. We focus on Sadat’s two dramatic steps in the summer and fall of 1972 (expelling Soviet military personnel and returning “hat in hand” to seek Soviet support when overtures to the West were rebuffed) as catalytic agents for shaping Brezhnev and Kosygin’s positions. In effect, Anderson believes that the change occurred from five to seven months earlier.
For Anderson, it is a change in the expressed attitude that took place by February 1972. Brezhnev and Kosygin stopped advocating a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and began shifting toward Sadat’s position, indicating that means other than diplomacy could be used in dealing with Israel. Anderson refers to a shift in “Soviet declaratory policy.” He argues that Brezhnev and Kosygin could shift their rhetoric and not interfere with their policy of détente with the West because they added the caveat that Egypt would have to pay hard currency for any new arms deliveries. They knew Egypt did not have sufficient hard currency to buy the weapons. Their bluff was called in January 1973 when Saudi Arabia provided Egypt with the hard currency for Soviet weapons; and the Soviets sold offensive, strategic arms to Egypt.

As Anderson describes the scenario, his choice of words for Brezhnev and Kosygin’s positions seems quite appropriate—a change in Soviet “declaratory policy.” The two Soviet leaders changed their public posture, but did they change their attitude before their bluff is called? Indeed, this change in public posture without a coterminous change in Soviet foreign policy behavior led to Sadat’s frustration and his expulsion of Soviet military personnel in July 1972. The Soviet leadership appeared hypocritical—saying one thing and doing another. In a description of the communiqués issued from the series of meetings between Soviet and Egyptian leaders between February 1972 and July 1972, Rubinstein notes the increased tension and disagreement occurring as Sadat heard Brezhnev and Kosygin’s words encouraging him to use other means than a political settlement to deal with the Israelis but saw no action in providing him with the military support he needed (1977, app. 4). As Rubinstein notes for the meeting on 27–29 April 1972, “Moscow expresses ‘full support’ for Arab efforts, though, ‘the sides found it necessary to study again in a spirit of fraternal cooperation measures’ for increasing the military potential of Egypt” (p. 362). At the meeting on 13–14 July 1972—just three days before Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet military personnel, Rubinstein observes, “the brevity of Sidqi’s visit suggested tension and disagreement” and “the mention of economic cooperation serves to highlight the absence of any mention of military cooperation or of Soviet efforts to increase Egypt’s defense capability” (p. 363). In effect, as Anderson has recorded the events, the Soviet leaders’ attitudes may never have changed. By providing hard currency to Egypt, the Saudis helped Sadat to call the Soviet bluff. As a result, Brezhnev and Kosygin were forced by the strategies they had used to maintain their position to act contrary to their preferences.

In our application of the process model to this case, we present a table with commitment-to-preference ratios for the Soviet leaders whose positions counted in this decision for each of five quarters beginning with the first quarter of 1972 (Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann 1989, Table 3). Only in the first quarter of 1973 are the commitment-to-preference ratios for three of the leaders more than one standard deviation above the mean for the Politburo and in the direction of supporting sending offensive weapons to Egypt (over .50). Two of them (Kosygin and Suslov) are leaders in the oligarchy at this point in time; that is, by the first quarter of 1973—after Sadat’s two dramatic moves—half of the oligarchs whose positions counted have become advocates for supplying Egypt with such weapons. Throughout the period, Grechko, the defense minister, has scores one standard deviation above the mean—the lone advocate for supporting Egypt militarily. Interestingly, Kosygin’s commitment-to-preference ratio increases dramatically in the third quarter of 1972 during the period when Sadat expelled Soviet military personnel (going over .50) and again when the decision to provide weapons is made. He appears to have been affected by what was happening to Soviet influence in the Middle East as a result of Sadat’s behavior.

Brezhnev’s scores remain an anomaly, staying close to the mean of the Politburo across the five quarters. We hypothesize that as a cuetaker Brezhnev may have been more interested in what was going on in the Politburo than what was happening in the international environment. He retained his position based on support among his colleagues in this body. Thus, when there was disagreement among members of the Politburo, we would argue, Brezhnev made a conscious effort to determine where everyone stood, wanting to reflect the consensus among the members and not be too different until the position of the group was fairly well defined. There is some support for this proposition in Valenta’s (1979) study of the Politburo’s decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Brezhnev sat on the fence between the arguing factions until a definite consensus began to emerge.

Thus, our data suggests that the change in Politburo members’ attitudes, particularly Kosygin’s and Suslov’s, occurred in the early part of 1973 after Sadat’s moves away from, and then back toward, the Soviet Union. The data also indicate that Kosygin’s reaction to the expulsion of Soviet military personnel may have helped to begin a reevaluation of the situation among Politburo members. In any case, there appears to have been a growing consensus in the first quarter of 1973 to supply Egypt with offensive, strategic weapons. The knowledge of a change in the consensus among Politburo members probably led Brezhnev to acquiesce and agree to providing Egypt with the weapons Sadat wanted.

**IS THE DOMESTIC BARGAINING MODEL TOO PARSIMONIOUS?**

The process model asks three questions: (1) Whose positions count in making a decision on a particular issue? (2) What are their positions on the issue under consideration? and (3) How are disagreements handled? As a consequence of these three questions, the process model examines decision making using three
levels of analysis: the individual, the group, and the state. In some interesting ways, the process model is a more inclusive model that provides the input information required by the domestic bargaining model. For example, Anderson does not question the part of the process model that indicates whose positions count—which Politburo members had influence and had to be included or consulted before a decision was made. He assumes this part of our model, as he concludes that the Brezhnev regime during the period 1970–72 was an oligarchy. The domestic bargaining model does not provide a mechanism for deciding whom to focus on as the bargainers in a decision-making body. They must be stipulated by the researcher. The process model includes a way to determine whose positions count.

Data from the process model are also useful in assessing which of the two positions the bargainers are likely to take in the domestic bargaining model (accept another proposal or insist on one's own proposal; see Figure 1). The advocate in the process model is equivalent to the bargainer who insists on his own proposal; the cuetaker is equivalent to the bargainer who is willing to accept another proposal. In the process model, using personality and organizational information, we are able to identify different types of advocates and what cues are likely to be valued by the cuetakers. Thus, there are advocates who push their positions only when the timing is right or their position is congruent with that of their organization, as well as advocates who persistently push their positions or their organization's agenda regardless of the situation. Cuetakers likewise differ on where they look for cues on appropriate behavior. Some focus on the particular situation, others on their patrons or clients, and still others on their organizations. Again, the process model provides the means for determining the positions needed—but not established—by the bargaining model.

Assuming Anderson's description of Podgorny to be correct, we probably have in this leader an advocate who was interested in pushing his position, perceiving only the information from the environment that supports what he believed was right. There was little flexibility when he was strongly committed to something. As we have already noted, the data in our study indicate that both Brezhnev and Kosygin were cuetakers who, though focusing on different kinds of cues, used situation-specific data in making up their minds, ever taking stock of context factors before assuming a position and cautious in jumping to conclusions without knowing what was going on around them at a particular point in time. In terms of the domestic bargaining model, then, using information from the process model, we would expect Podgorny to have insisted on his proposal in a competitive and aggressive manner and Brezhnev and Kosygin to have been willing to accept another's proposal and, most likely, seek a mutually acceptable policy. The data Brezhnev and Kosygin would use in seeking a mutually acceptable policy, however, would be different. Brezhnev would want to know what his colleagues were thinking; Kosygin would be interested in what was happening in the international environment regarding the particular issue under debate.

An examination of Andropov's historical reconstruction suggests the accuracy of these profiles. Throughout his description of what happened in the bargaining process during 1971–73, Anderson notes how events were driving Brezhnev and Kosygin while Podgorny continued to hold the position he began with. Podgorny held to his original point of view, while Brezhnev and Kosygin responded to what was going on in the Politburo, as well as to Israeli recalcitrance, Sadat's growing frustration, and Saudi grants of hard currency to Egypt, in fashioning a policy that tried to respond to the situation that they perceived was facing them at the time.

The domestic bargaining model and our process model are most similar in stipulating rules for how Politburo members resolve differences and disagreements among themselves. In both, the models are focused on the dynamics in the group as members try to reach a decision. When those who count in the decision-making process disagree and come into conflict, how they go about resolving this conflict is at issue. Interestingly, the outcomes of the two models mirror one another. In the process model, "adopt oligarch's position" is similar to the case in the domestic bargaining model where Leader 1's or Leader 2's policies are selected. In the process model, deadlock can occur just as in the domestic bargaining model. And compromise is possible in the process model, matching "mutually acceptable policy" in the domestic bargaining model.

In actuality, the process model helps to spell out some of the activities in the group that underlie the domestic bargaining model. Whereas the domestic bargaining model searches for equilibria and builds on the rules of nested games, the process model arises out of the group dynamics and organization literatures where the emphases are, among others, on understanding majority–minority influences, building cohesion, achieving compromise and consensus, preventing deadlock, and developing decision norms. The process model offers ways to explain why certain equilibria are possible, given the configuration of roles and positions in a decision unit.

**CONCLUSION**

If our aim is to understand and explain how foreign policy decisions are made, it seems important to use a variety of models and methods to study self-defeating policies such as this Soviet decision. Only if we engage in these endeavors, can we begin to see how the models might interrelate, might explain different aspects of the decision process, might be relevant under different conditions, or might hold in different contexts. Moreover, only by taking different perspectives on the problem and making different assumptions can we gain a multifaceted view of
leaders’ preferences, positions, and roles. The tendency to see models and methods as always in competition with one another with only one supposed to win and supersede the others does not facilitate such an exploration. We may learn more by comparing and contrasting the models, as we have done in this point–counterpoint analysis, than by focusing on one model to the exclusion of all others.

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Notes

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2. For Kosygin, see Pravda, 12 February, 10 April, 4 July, and 3 and 17 October 1972. For Brezhnev, see Pravda, 9 December 1971 and 19 March, 6 and 28 June, and 14 November 1972. Kosygin’s speech published on 17 October 1972 coupled the call for liberation with a call for a political settlement as an alternative if possible; his speech on 25 October defined a political settlement as equal to an Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territory. Brezhnev’s speech on 22 December adopted this same position.

3. For Podgorny’s continuing advocacy of a political settlement, see Pravda, 13 October and 8, 9, and 14 December 1971 and 13 April, 7 July, and 15 September 1972. Note that Podgorny’s three references to a political settlement during December 1971 coincide with Brezhnev’s abandonment of this phase.


5. Greciok possibly preferred to grant Sadat’s requests for arms, but the Poliburo had an arrangement with the high command that the generals could have autonomy in military policy if they accepted the Poliburo’s right to decide larger foreign policy issues (Colton 1979; Colton and Gustafson 1990; Rice 1987). Suslov and Ponomarev concentrated on relations with world communist parties. Because communist parties were inactive in Egypt and Syria, the Mideast issue played little role in world communist politics.

6. See n. 3

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