policy Dynamics

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or of nations long hypothesized to be

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12

Superpower Involvement with Others:

Alternative Role Relationships

Charles F. Hermann

Certain actions of governments in foreign policy seem expected. As

relations between the United States and Ethiopia soured in 1976–77,

any were not surprised to see the Soviet Union seek to replace the

United States as Ethiopia's patron. Nor were those persons familiar

with the Reagan administration surprised that it refused to make many

cessions to Third World countries at the Law of the Sea conference

 regard the right of private companies in industrialized nations to

age in deep-sea mining. When such actions occur observers are

inclined to say that they were predictable or, at least, not surprising.

There are many reasons why some actions of governments may be

pected. One potential source for explaining such actions is role

ory. National governments, it can be suggested, have certain roles

that they assume in world affairs. When we know the roles, and govern-

ments actually act to fulfill those roles, then the actions should be

pected. This idea is appealing. If we had systematic knowledge about
government roles in foreign policy, it could be an important source of explanation.

This potential of role theory has encouraged a number of scholars to explore its development in systematic research, including Holsti (1970), Wish (1980), and Walker (1979, 1981). The Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project also has sought to incorporate role conceptions in its model building. In fact, CREON uses role in two separate ways, each of which is intended to contribute to an integrated explanation of foreign policy behavior.

One approach (see Hermann and Hermann 1979; Hudson, Singer, and Hermann 1982; and Singer and Hudson, chapter 11 in this volume) employs role as a basic element in establishing the relationship of other international entities to the acting government in dealing with transitory situations. Although the roles are defined from the perspective of the actor, it might reasonably be said that this is an international system perspective on the use of role.

The second CREON application of role is in the process of decision making. More specifically, national role is used as part of a larger conceptual structure to establish the shared preferences of policymakers for foreign policy. The larger construct in CREON is called regime orientation. It can be defined as the shared political system belief of authoritative decision makers about their country's relationship to its external environment and the roles of government appropriate for pursuing the belief. In other words, in this framework national foreign policy roles are determined by the beliefs of a regime's authoritative decision makers. These are the individuals in a state that, with respect to foreign policy issues, have the ultimate authority to commit the resources of the government. A foreign policy core political system belief is a conviction that is shared by the authoritative decision makers (a) about their own nation and its relationship to other entities in the world and (b) about how the international system operates. Roles are these decision makers' expectations about the pattern or configuration of foreign policy activity that their government will follow in certain situations in support of their beliefs. Thus a regime's authoritative policy makers may share a common belief about another nation's commitment to destroy their society. In certain situations involving that other nation, the regime leaders would expect their government to assume a certain role to resist that opponent. In different situations with the opposing nation, the regime leaders' expectation about their government's activity (that is, their sense of its role) may vary, although their belief remains constant.

Regime orientations are not applicable to every making circumstances. The regime may have differing core political system beliefs. These may not exist on an explicable previous circumstances—suffice to say how the government should act. For example the government may have sufficient capability to make opposition to the authoritative decision makers in the regime. In these orientation, there are elements in these orientation that can form a nation's foreign policy role.

This essay attempts to advance the case for using regime orientation in foreign policy. In Hermann, Hermann, and Haga, questions:

1. when a regime's leaders have a foreign policy belief about foreign affairs?
2. When a government has multiple orientations for a given political belief, which?
3. With a given foreign policy role, does the government have a foreign policy?

Although the conceptual work is capable of systematic empirical presentations here. (Regime orientation concept is presented here. (Regime orientation concept is represented elsewhere. The immediate concern is the Soviet Union and the United States. Although the CREON project is concerned with foreign policy in a number of countries, the concentration on the USSR is justified by its role in several reasons beyond strong interest. The focus is on the United States, which have multiple core and multiple roles for their beliefs toward Third World countries might give a substantial variety of those differences compared to those used with their blocs.)
Regime orientations are not applicable in all foreign policy decision-making circumstances. The regime's authoritative decision makers may have differing core political system beliefs on a particular subject. These may not exist on an experiential base—that is, a set of comparable previous circumstances—sufficient to generate expectations about how the government should act. Finally, even when regime orientations do exist other factors may cause the government to act in ways contrary to the authoritative decision makers' normal expectations. For example the government may not appear to the policymakers to have sufficient capability to make the role feasible, or strong domestic opposition may lead them to alter their course. The CREON associates regard regime orientation, and the national foreign policy roles which are elements in these orientations, as one of the various features that can form a nation's foreign policy in response to a given kind of problem.

This essay attempts to advance the theoretical underpinnings necessary for using regime orientation beyond the level previously reported in Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan (1982). It is concerned with three questions:

1. When a regime's leaders have more than one shared core political system belief about foreign affairs, which one applies?
2. When a government has multiple foreign policy roles appropriate for a given political belief, which one applies?
3. With a given foreign policy role, what is the probable foreign policy behavior?

Although the conceptual work advanced here is intended to be capable of systematic empirical investigation, no such analysis is presented here. (Regime orientation coding instructions are available from the author.) The immediate concern is with the regime orientations of the Soviet Union and the United States toward Third World countries. Although the CREON project is concerned with the explanation of foreign policy in a number of contemporary national governments, the present concentration on the USSR and the United States occurs for several reasons beyond strong intrinsic interest. First, it makes a more manageable focus for a paper-length exploration. Second, regimes in both countries have multiple core system beliefs about foreign policy and multiple roles for their beliefs. Third, actions of the superpowers toward Third World countries might reasonably be expected to engage a substantial variety of those different beliefs and roles (as, say, compared to those used with their bloc allies) because of the great hetero-
geneity of Third World countries. Thus, superpower relations with the Third World highlight the concerns this paper seeks to address.

**Ordering Multiple Sets of Beliefs**

In constructing core political system beliefs, the CREON project has chosen to conceptualize beliefs so that they can apply to a number of regimes, not just those in a single country. We recognize, however, that there are other important basic beliefs about foreign policy that may be held by only one regime. Although the empirical work is not complete for determining which specific regimes hold the general categories of beliefs that we have constructed, our preliminary work provides strong clues. It suggests that Soviet and American regimes during the 1960s each held at least four core political system beliefs applicable to Third World countries. Two sets of beliefs were common to both countries and two others were distinctive for each nation. The political system beliefs are:

1. **Anti-communism** (USA). A belief that political systems ruled by communist parties are inherently dangerous to the actor nation's interests. Unless communist political systems are held in check, they will undermine democratic political processes and capitalist, free enterprise economic activities in and between other countries by all means possible including extralegal and illegal operations extending to the use of military force.

2. **Communism/anti-Western capitalism** (USSR). A belief that political systems with a capitalist or quasi-capitalist economic system will, in the interests of their economies, attempt to destroy communist (socialist) political systems. Because political and economic systems gradually evolve through history with capitalism only as a stage in the evolution toward communism, capitalists will resist by all possible means the progression toward communism that would mean the loss of their control. Western capitalist states will attempt to undermine and discredit communist parties everywhere and particularly parties which exercise political rule. These attempts to destroy communism must be vigorously resisted.

3. **Oppose traditional enemies** (USA, USSR). The regimes and political elites in certain countries are enemies of the acting nation as a result of historical experience and tradition, religion, ideology, or falsely held views about injustice done that country by the actor's nation. This enemy seeks the destruction of the acting country.

4. **International cooperation theories** (USSR). A belief that the United States, upon its ability to engage in economic actions must be conducted within the framework of international actors not under its control. The exchange, and the kinds of international economic commitments count

5. **International cooperation theories** (USA). A belief that the well-being of the acting nation is enhanced through economic cooperation and investment in developing countries. The success of the policies of the government will be measured by the economic success of the private and public sectors. Additionally, the government promotes domestic industries from unfaired interests or nation-shaping interests.

6. **Subsystem solidarity** (USA, USSR). A belief that the government to develop and sustain relations with the countries which share the values and interests. The government must give attention to other
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isms this paper seeks to address.

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military force.

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or quasi-capitalist economic system
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gression toward communism that
control. Western capitalist states will
discredit communist parties every-
which exercise political rule. These
ism must be vigorously resisted.

(USA, USSR). The regimes and politi-
are enemies of the acting nation as a
and tradition, religion, ideology, or
ice done that country by the actor's
struction of the acting country.

the overthrow of its political system, or other unacceptable ends
such as the acquisition of certain territories. Continuous vigilance
is necessary to hold the enemy in check and whenever possible it
is necessary to take the initiative with offensive actions to weaken
its ability to harm the actor's country. This belief has two
subdivisions: zero sum and non-zero sum beliefs. Zero sum beliefs
about the traditional enemy conclude that the conflict is indivisible
(which leads to denial of the enemy's right to exist, the inevita-
bility of war, and so on). Non-zero sum adherents hold that the
conflict is real and dangerous, but that under some realizable
circumstances an accommodation can be reached that will per-
mit the continued existence of both sides under acceptable
conditions.

4. International cooperation through centralized/planned econo-
 mies (USSR). A belief that the well-being of the nation depends
upon its ability to engage in economic transactions with other
international actors not under its political jurisdiction. Such trans-
actions must be conducted with the government as the agent that
determines such things as the terms of trade, rates of currency
exchange, and the kinds of international specialization and future
economic commitments countries should undertake.

5. International cooperation through developed market economies
(USA). A belief that the well-being of the nation depends upon its
ability to engage in economic transactions with other interna-
tional actors not under its political jurisdiction. The government
should promote and maintain international institutions that enable
full participation by the private sector in international trade and
investment opportunities. The government should establish such
financial and monetary arrangements as are necessary to facilitate
successful and stable private-sector economic transactions.
Additionally, the government should act to protect necessary
domestic industries from unfair competition at home while pro-
moting their success abroad.

6. Subsystem solidarity (USA, USSR). A belief that it is essential for
the government to develop and maintain a cohesive alignment of
countries which share with the acting nation certain fundamental
values and interests. The common interests may result from geo-
ographical proximity, shared cultural or religious heritage, trade
interests, or nation-shaping historical experiences. The govern-
ment must give attention not only to efforts at building the coali-
Table 12.1  Core political system beliefs and their associated roles in CREON regime orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Anti-communism</th>
<th>Anti-Western capitalism</th>
<th>Oppose traditional enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Godfather/protector</td>
<td>Godfather/protector</td>
<td>Conciliationist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>Liberator</td>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policeman</td>
<td>Policeman</td>
<td>Recruiter/promoter</td>
<td>Recruiter/promoter</td>
<td>Opponent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruiter/promoter</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policeman</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subsystem solidarity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contending leader</td>
<td>International cooperation through developed market economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>development market economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Bilateralist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>Donor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruiter/promoter</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reluctant ally</td>
<td>Protectionist</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nonalignment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Development</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contending leader</td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Donor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Foreign assistance seeker</td>
<td>Foreign assistance seeker</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Mediator</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruiter/promoter</td>
<td>Recruiter/promoter</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-colonialism</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>Conflict resolution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberator</td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiter/promoter</td>
<td>Peacekeeper</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For an explanation of all the core beliefs and roles mentioned in this table, see Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan (1982).

Recall that the above beliefs are not intended to be exhaustive. They represent efforts to capture beliefs that several regimes shared during the 1960s and, in the case of the latter, held by either the United States or the Soviet Union. The beliefs pertain to the Third World. Table 12.1 is designed to allow for the model to consider the possibility of a larger set of beliefs identifiable to various regimes. In addition, the core beliefs are not restricted to a particular role or role combination but also to discouraging those parties who may be antithetical to the subsystem.

To a lesser extent the decision makers must consider the values in the problem. When we talk about the problem of how to use the value construct to determine the problem, any problem can be fitted into the value construct of the problem. From the value constructs of Hart and others, policy basic values have been divided into four categories: (a) national security, (b) wealth/economic conditions, (c) social well-being/welfare, and
the 1960s and, in the case of these six, they are beliefs assumed to be held by either the United States or the Soviet Union which might pertain to the Third World. Table 12.1 offers a somewhat broader context in which to consider the described beliefs. It shows them to be part of a larger set of beliefs identified by the CREON project as applicable to various regimes. In addition the table shows that for all core beliefs there are a number of roles that a government might follow in realizing its beliefs. Before examining roles in more detail, attention is addressed to the first question posed in this paper.

Assuming that Soviet and American regimes in the 1960s held multiple core beliefs, which ones may have influenced decision making at any one point in time? In the simplification of reality that is the CREON model, it is assumed that only one belief is applicable in the consideration of a given problem. (This may not be quite as restrictive as it first seems when we note in table 12.1 that some roles appear under several different beliefs.)

To establish which beliefs prevail, a set of decision rules have been stipulated that depend upon systemic roles and the basic values involved in a foreign policy problem. Before introducing the decision rules it will be necessary to describe the CREON concepts of systemic roles and basic values.

The CREON project assumes that foreign policy behavior results only after a nation’s authoritative decision makers have perceived a problem. As defined by the decision makers, every problem has a source (who caused the problem) and a subject (who is deprived by the problem). In addition, some problems have actual or potential facilitators and aggravators. Source, subject, facilitator, and aggravator are systemic roles in the problem. This is the other conception of role in the CREON project developed in the external predisposition component (see Hudson, Singer, and Hermann 1982). Any international entities may be perceived by the actor as occupying one of these roles. The decision rules about core beliefs depend in part upon which nations are occupying these roles for a specific problem.

To a lesser extent the decision rules also depend upon the basic values in the problem. When we want to estimate behavior the first task is to determine the problem from the actor’s perspective. Once established, any problem can be coded for the basic values it entails. From the value constructs of Harold Lasswell (1971) a set of five foreign policy basic values have been derived: (a) military security/physical security, (b) wealth/economic condition, (c) respect/diplomatic status, (d) social well-being/welfare, and (e) education/enlightenment.
These systemic roles and basic values are used in the following decision rules for establishing the priority of alternative political beliefs.

1. Oppose traditional enemy. If the traditional enemy is the source or subject, it is the only entity in that role, and the basic value of the problem in a collaborative situation (defined below) is not economic, then traditional enemy belief prevails.

   Justification: The powerful nature of the threat posed in any situation in which that entity alone plays a dominant role should override other beliefs. The instinct of survival is assumed to be most basic.

2. Anti-communism (anti-Western capitalism). If source, subject, or facilitator roles are occupied by communist bloc [Western capitalist bloc] members and (a) the basic value is not wealth/economics and (b) the traditional enemy condition above is not fulfilled, then the anti-communist [anti-Western capitalist] belief prevails.

   Justification: For those with this belief set, it has much of the same threat motivation as traditional enemy. Therefore, it can be expected to exercise more influence than any beliefs other than traditional enemy if the appropriate actors appear in the problem. The exception involving the basic value of wealth deals with cross-bloc negotiations on economic matters. Special roles under the international economic cooperation beliefs cover such situations.

3. Subsystem solidarity. If the source and the subject are both subsystem members or if either the source or the subject consists exclusively of multiple subsystem members and the other role occupants are either friendly countries or former bloc members (who are not currently traditional enemies), then subsystem solidarity applies. (Note: If the subsystem is primarily economic in function the international economic cooperation roles are added to those normally listed under subsystem solidarity.)

   Justification: These beliefs are engaged in problems that occur among subsystem members or between them and potential or former bloc members. When hostile blocs or traditional enemies do not intrude into such situations, the beliefs about subsystem solidarity can be expected to be a powerful influence.

4. International cooperation through centralized/planned economies (international cooperation through developed market economies). If the basic value is wealth/economics and none of the roles is occupied by a traditional enemy in other than a collaborative situation, then the international economic cooperation roles apply.

   Justification: The circumstances under which international economic cooperation roles apply in the CREON model together with core beliefs apply in a manner that are not involved, or they are not in the situation. If a subsystem is economic cooperation roles (subsystem solidarity) are likely to intervene in the international economic cooperation roles to structure the situation.

The above describes the belief conditions operable in the CREON model together with core beliefs apply in a manner that are not involved, or they are not in the situation. If a subsystem is solidary cooperation are likely to intervene in the international economic cooperation roles to structure the situation.

Role Differentiation in Core Beliefs

As evident in table 12.1, each of the core beliefs associated with the previous section has associated with it potential expectations are the expectations a regime leadership will act with respect to their underlying beliefs into expected behavior. A role exists for a government with a particular regime leaders all concur that a particular regime's foreign policies of nations, identified with the core beliefs that underlie them with the core beliefs that underlie it. The CREON project has reviewed various countries and identified the following six roles for the anti-communism belief set: capitalism, five for oppose traditional enemy belief, and one for collaborative situation, then the international economic cooperation roles apply.

Appendix 4 provides further information on the roles and belief sets in table 12.1. In addition to the
laborative situation, then the international economic cooperation beliefs prevail.

Justification: The circumstances under which beliefs about international economic cooperation are likely arise when economic wealth values appear in the problem and traditional enemies either are not involved, or they are part of a collaborative economic situation. If a subsystem is economic in function then the two belief sets (subsystem solidarity and international economic cooperation) are likely to interact. This is handled by adding all economic cooperation roles to the subsystem solidarity set.

The above describes the belief component of regime orientation as it operates in the CREON model together with arrangements for determining which core beliefs apply in a given situation. It should again be apparent from the decision rules that there are cases in which none of the decision rules apply, and therefore there is no impact on foreign policy of regime orientation. In those situations in which beliefs do come into play, the task becomes deciding which role will apply.

Role Differentiation in Core Beliefs

As evident in table 12.1, each of the six core beliefs introduced in the previous section has associated with it a number of roles. Role conceptions are the expectations a regime's leaders hold as to how government will act with respect to their beliefs. In other words, roles translate beliefs into expected behavior patterns.

A role exists for a government when, in facing a kind of problem, the regime leaders all concur that a particular pattern of action is the appropriate means for acting on the beliefs engaged by the problem. The CREON project has reviewed various patterns of action in the foreign policies of nations, identified sets of behaviors as roles, and associated them with the core beliefs that they might reasonably serve. For example, as shown in table 12.1, CREON investigators currently propose six roles for the anti-communism belief, seven roles for anti-Western capitalism, five for oppose traditional enemy, and so on. Although as researchers we may judge a role to be appropriate for a given core belief about the world, it is not assumed that a given national government will necessarily use that role even though they adhere to the belief.

Appendix 4 provides further information on some of the roles listed in table 12.1. In addition to the definition of each role, the CREON
project has determined (1) the basic values present in a problem that could trigger a role, (2) assumptions about the conditions necessary for the role to exist, and (3) the situations in which an actor might use the role. The concept of situation requires further consideration.

In the classic development of role, some construct similar to situation has seemed necessary. Thus, in the theater analogy, an actor plays a role in a given play. The plot is the context or situation that determines which role in the actor's repertoire is appropriate. Similarly in foreign policy we need to establish the international situation in which particular roles might be applicable.

Because core political system beliefs about the world are necessarily broad, a number of roles are conceivable in support of any core belief— as table 12.1 makes evident. The second concern of this paper is precisely with this problem—determining which of several roles is appropriate. As has been suggested, one basic means of distinguishing any type of role is by situation. In the CREON project, we have constructed five types of situations based on the acting government's relationship to the other systemic roles described briefly in the previous section. These situations can be used to sort out roles. The five CREON situations are:

1. **Confrontation.** The acting government is also either the source or the subject of the problem. Such situations precipitate the following question for the acting government: How can we reduce the adverse effects that the other entity (or entities) in the problem has produced for us?

2. **Intervention.** The acting government is neither the source nor the subject in such situations. It faces the question: Should we intervene in this problem on one side, mediate, or remain aloof?

3. **Assistance needed.** When the acting government is both the source and the subject of the problem it may seek outside help. The question becomes: Who can give us assistance to reduce the adverse effects we are experiencing from this problem?

4. **Assistance resource.** If another entity is the source and the subject and the acting government is a potential facilitator (that is, a role with resources), then the question is: Should we provide assistance to those who are experiencing adverse effects from the problem?

5. **Collaboration.** When the actor and one or more other entities mutually recognize that they are each both source and subject,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core beliefs</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Confrontation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-communism</td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or anti-capitalism</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Godfather/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>protector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policeman</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Recruiter/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>promoter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose traditional</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enemy</td>
<td>Conciliator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opponent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policeman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the question is: Can we reach an agreement with whom we share this problem?

This situation classification is associated with various core beliefs and opposes traditional enemies is engendered between the actor and a target (defined in the appendix) is exceeded. A matrix indicating what roles might be expected to particular core beliefs. As is evident from the situation alone cannot establish core beliefs. As important as situation analysis is insufficient to achieve the second goal. To complete the task it is necessary to sort information. In addition to the analysis about (1) the problem (that is, the alignment of entities in the system...
e basic values present in a problem that
options about the conditions necessary
e situations in which an actor might use-
tion requires further consideration.
of role, some construct similar to situ-
Thus, in the theater analogy, an actor
The plot is the context or situation that
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beliefs about the world are necessarily
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tical roles described briefly in the previous
be used to sort out roles. The five CREON
government is also either the source
blem. Such situations precipitate the
acting government: How can we reduce
other entity (or entities) in the problem

the question is: Can we reach a substantive agreement with those
with whom we share this problem?

This situation classification enables some differentiation of roles
associated with various core beliefs. For example, when the belief to
oppose traditional enemies is engaged and the situation is a confronta-
tion between the actor and a traditional enemy, the donor role (as
defined in the appendix) is exceedingly unlikely. Table 12.2 provides
a matrix indicating what roles might reasonably be associated with par-
ticular core beliefs. As is evident from the table, however, knowledge
of the situation alone cannot establish one and only one role for most
core beliefs. As important as situation is in determining roles, it is
insufficient to achieve the second objective of this paper.

To complete the task it is necessary to introduce some additional
sorting information. In addition to situation, we use selected informa-
tion about (1) the problem (that is, the basic values involved), (2) the
alignment of entities in the systemic roles (whether other entities are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core beliefs</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Confrontation</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Assistance needed</th>
<th>Assistance resource</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-communism or anti-capitalism</td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Godfather/protector</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberator</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policeman</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruiter/promoter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose traditional enemy</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conciliationist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defender of the faith</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opponent</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policeman</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 12.1 The decision tree for oppose traditional enemy belief, which determines whether any of the five associated roles apply.
Figure 12.2 The confrontation, collaboration, and assistance needed branches of the decision tree for anti-capitalism (anti-communism) beliefs, which determine which role may apply in those types of situations. Note: This tree includes only information for differentiating among roles. The tree outcomes do not note the necessary check to see if all requirements for a given role are met. If they are not, no role occurs.
Figure 12.3 The intervention branch of the decision tree for anti-capitalism (anti-communism) beliefs, which determines which role may apply in that type of situation. Note: This tree includes only information for differentiating among roles. The tree outcomes do not note the necessary check to see if all requirements for a given role are met. If they are not, no role occurs.
members of the same bloc as the actor; gross strength relative to the relationship among entities in the system; and, strength relative to the differentiation of roles the actor plays. The differentiation of roles and situations should be made. First, all the roles associated with the information required is quite understandable.

The actual process of sorting relations among roles and situations rules that employ the role and situation categories, values, and situations associated with them. Although not difficult, the process of deciding the roles associated with only to a given decision will be based on the role of the decision rules using the value of the decision rules in the process of organizing the decision rules using the value of the decision rules in the decision process. The decision tree and through 12.4 show the comparative decision-making process for a similar type of decision tree can be applied to situations with other core beliefs.

Properties of Foreign Policy Behaviors

Regime orientation enables any of the foreign policy makers to influence foreign policy oriented toward any national roles. That is the perspective of the issue is what beliefs and roles are associated with a given kind of foreign policy. What are the new conditions, can determine both the kind of role that is associated with the role would have on foreign policy decisions it created.

To deal with this issue we must ask how to shape policy as it is to be explained or explained. To the project we have posed the task is the role of a national government is the response of a national government to the entities, that is recognized by the policy, is viewed as an action of verbal or as an attempt to influence other...
members of the same bloc as the actor or an opposing one), and (3) the relationship among entities in the systemic roles (their salience for the actor; gross strength relative to the actor). With such additional information the differentiation of roles can be completed. Two further observations should be made. First, all this information is not necessary to distinguish the roles associated with each core belief. Second, the information required is quite obtainable for nations and is relatively stable.

The actual process of sorting roles is accomplished by use of decision rules that employ the role definitions, stipulated assumptions, basic values, and situations associated with each one (see appendix 4). Although not difficult, the process can be protracted. For that reason the roles associated with only two core beliefs are illustrated here: oppose traditional enemy and anti-communism. The sequential application of the decision rules using the sorting information and the role specifications is represented through a decision tree. Figure 12.1 displays the process for oppose traditional enemies and figures 12.2 through 12.4 show the comparable procedure for anti-communism. A similar type of decision tree can be used to sort the roles associated with other core beliefs.

**Properties of Foreign Policy Behavior Associated With Roles**

Regime orientation enables any shared beliefs of authoritative policymakers to influence foreign policy decision making through expected national roles. That is the perspective we have developed. The practical issue is what beliefs and roles come into play when a government faces a given kind of foreign policy problem. In this paper we have proposed a system of decision rules that, in response to specifiable conditions, can determine both the set of beliefs and a single associated role. Still to be addressed is the question of the effect a particular role would have on foreign policy if the government pursued the expectations it created.

To deal with this issue we must be clear about the nature of foreign policy as it is to be explained or forecasted by roles. In the CREON project we have posed the task as the explanation of the most likely response of a national government to a problem, involving external entities, that is recognized by the regime. The government's response is viewed as an action of verbal or physical communication designed as an attempt to influence others. Rather than trying to account for
certain acts of foreign policy communication directly (for example, trade agreements, diplomatic visits, troop maneuvers), we have opted to explain the attributes or properties that combine to create various kinds of foreign policy behavior. The properties of an act of communication—of which we contend foreign policy is a type—frequently have been posed as who does what to whom, when and how?

For the moment we regard the actor (the "who") and the timing ("when") as a given; that is, we specify what national government or ruling political party will be the actor and assume that action follows promptly after decision. The behavior properties we want to explain are (1) the recipients—whom will the actor address? (2) the affect—what does the actor do in terms of expressed feelings? (3) the commitment—what does the actor do toward its resolution or resolve to do? (4) the instruments—what skills and resources of statecraft will the actor use in its behavior?

**Recipients.** Even though it may be clear whom a national government may ultimately wish to influence, its action may be addressed to any number of other parties to seek further information, mobilize support, obtain mediation, and so on.

**Affect.** A key to the actor's intentions is the basic dimension of expressed affect—the stated desire to assist and support or oppose and obstruct.

**Commitment.** The resolve with which an actor binds itself or allocates its resources to another entity conveys a great deal about the intensity with which it pursues its course.

**Instruments.** The tools of statecraft available to an actor comprise the skills and resources it can use in various ways to affect another.

These measurable properties are common to all foreign policy behaviors. If we are able to understand why they are likely to assume certain values under certain conditions, we have gained much of practical and theoretical worth in understanding foreign policy. By combining these properties together with the classification of situations, we can reconstruct most of the familiar acts of foreign policy behavior. The individual properties, however, provide basic and ever-present behavior features that lend themselves effectively to theory building (see Callahan et al. 1982; Dixon and Hermann 1982). It is these individual properties of foreign policy behavior that we wish to associate with various roles.

Given the previously created verbal descriptions of each role's general pattern of behavior and the assumptions established to specify when a given role occurs, it is now properties for each role. For each, has been described as an ideology criticizes those that do not accept and those that adhere to it. It is as government elects to take no strong faith role is followed in conformance that can be confident that the government opposing ideological bloc as the result of the role of the nonbeliever. Because the ideological role of stronger action, we can assume statecraft are being engaged an resources or future behavior will all roles, the most probable determined for each role and are listed each role characterization.

**Illustrations and Conclusions**

The postulated effects of regime foreign policy behavior are stated in a systematic empirical analysis. During the meantime, this essay will provide several illustrations drawn from: These examples in no way constitute an argument. They may, however, clarify these procedures that more formal tests.

We assert that in the 1960s and the Soviet Union's authoritative decline included anti-capitalism and opposition to the United States was one of the Union. Similarly we contend that the decision makers of the United States National Security Council: it had both anti-communism an the Soviet Union as one of the enem of détente in the late 1960s and consensus on these beliefs. Although there is a better basis for assessing core bel...
when a given role occurs, it is not difficult to infer the probable behavior properties for each role. For example, the defender of the faith role has been described as an ideological commentary on world affairs that criticizes those that do not accept the actor's ideology and praises those that adhere to it. It is assumed to occur most often when the government elects to take no stronger action. When a defender of the faith role is followed in confrontation or intervention situations, we can be confident that the government is addressing a member of an opposing ideological bloc as the recipient. The affect will be negative because the acting government in this role will be condemning the nonbeliever. Because the ideological attack is being conducted in lieu of stronger action, we can assume that only diplomatic instruments of statecraft are being engaged and that no commitment of the actor's resources or future behavior will be made. Using a similar process for all roles, the most probable foreign policy behaviors have been determined for each role and are listed in appendix 4 as the fifth item in each role characterization.

Illustrations and Conclusions

The postulated effects of regime orientation on the properties of foreign policy behavior are stated so as to permit investigation through systematic empirical analysis. Data collection for that purpose is under way. In the meantime, this essay will conclude with the introduction of several illustrations drawn from Soviet and American actions in Africa. These examples in no way constitute a test of the proposed relationship. They may, however, clarify this presentation and outline the basic procedures that more formal tests will follow.

We assert that in the 1960s and 1970s the shared political beliefs of the Soviet Union's authoritative decision makers (notably the Politburo) included anti-capitalism and oppose traditional enemies. Furthermore, the United States was one of the traditional enemies of the Soviet Union. Similarly we contend that during the same period the authoritative decision makers of the United States (represented by members of the National Security Council) included among their shared political beliefs both anti-communism and oppose traditional enemy, with the Soviet Union as one of their enemies. Some might argue that the period of détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s may have reduced the consensus on these beliefs. Although empirical research can provide a better basis for assessing core beliefs, we contend that, at best, détente
confirmed that conflict between the United States and USSR had become non-zero sum. The beliefs of both sides can be applied to their actions in Africa.

On the eve of the Ogaden War of 1977–78 in the Horn of Africa between Somalia and Ethiopia, the relationships of both the United States and the Soviet Union to those two African nations underwent dramatic changes (Napper 1983). Under Haile Selassie, Ethiopia and the United States had been strong allies. During the first several years after Selassie’s demise, the United States tried to sustain the relationship with the military junta and even increased its already substantial military assistance. Following the internal struggles in the winter of 1976–77 and the emergence of Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam as head of state, the United States changed its policy. In late February 1977 the United States first reduced military assistance, claiming human rights violations, and then in April suspended all weapons shipments.

Consider the situation from the Soviet perspective in the spring of 1977. One of its traditional enemies—the United States—is experiencing a serious rupture of relations with a client. For the Soviet Union it is an intervention situation and the question the Soviet leaders face is whether they should intervene. The decision tree in figure 12.1 can be consulted to reveal what we would expect the Soviet Union to do. Neither the source (United States) nor subject (Ethiopia) are Soviet bloc members. Nor is the Soviet Union clearly weaker in the pertinent area of military capabilities. Furthermore, the basic value the problem entails is military security. These conclusions lead down the decision tree to the point where one must see if the USSR meets the requirements for the policeman role. They do. According to the appendix, the probable behavior properties are positive affect, moderate commitment, and military instruments addressed to the regime the actor wants to help.

In fact, the Soviet Union invited the Ethiopian leader Mariam to Moscow in May 1977 where he met with Soviet First Secretary Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov. Also in the spring of 1977, 200 Cuban troops arrived in Ethiopia to help with military training. This action undoubtedly was encouraged, if not actually arranged, by the USSR. Thus, the Soviet Union addressed the foe of its enemy (Ethiopia) as the recipient with positive affect, military instruments, and what CREON would scale as moderate commitment.

Because the Soviet Union sought to befriend Ethiopia, its relationship with Ethiopia’s own traditional adversary, the Somali Democratic Republic, faltered and then ruptured. A mirror image of the American-

Ethiopian division now presented an emerging split between the Soviet Union in figure 12.1 would suggest that the intervention branch of role with Somalia. In the summer the United States made initial gestures toward Somalia requests for military assistance. In Ogaden, however, the United States role behavior was disrupted by constraints of the recipient.

As a second illustration let us consider the liberation movements in Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence (UNITA) — following the Portuguese. In their combat with each other inside military assistance. The MPLA received military aid. The FNLA gained aid from China. In the summer of 1975 the flow of Soviet aid and Cuban aid to Angola, despite Chinese support for the FNLA, the MPLA of gaining control of the Angolan capital.

At that juncture the anti-communist logic made it seem that US and European powers in Washington it appeared that the communist-backed MPLA with the non-communist FNLA-UNITA coalition. The MPLA, with the Angolan guerrillas, against the South Africans also in the new coalition. In terms of the decision tree near the MPLA, the US problem as an intervention situational role. In fact it did so with positive affect, described for the liberator role in Angola.

Again, we have a mirror image of the FNLA-UNITA fortunes improved in the States, South Africa, and Zaire, with capitalism beliefs to be engaged States — of a liberator role. Subsequently with the expectation.
he United States and USSR had both sides can be applied to of 1977–78 in the Horn of African relationships of both the United two African nations underwent under Haile Selassie, Ethiopia and Illies. During the first several years, states tried to sustain the relation- increased its already substantial internal struggles in the winter of onel Mengistu Haile Mariam as its policy. In late February 1977 ity assistance, claiming human suspension all weapons shipments. Soviet perspective in the spring of the United States—experiencing a client. For the Soviet Union it is question the Soviet leaders face is decision tree in figure 12.1 can be expect the Soviet Union to do. or subject (Ethiopia) are Soviet blocs are the problem in the pertinent area are, the basic value the problem inclusions lead down the decision if the USSR meets the require-ment. According to the appendix, the positive affect, moderate commitment to the regime the actor

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to befriend Ethiopia, its relation- adversary, the Somali Democratic d. A mirror image of the American-

Ethiopian division now presented itself to the United States in the emerging split between the Soviet Union and Somalia. Our decision tree in figure 12.1 would suggest that the United States too would move down the intervention branch of the tree and assume the policeman role with Somalia. In the summer of 1977 the Carter administration made initial gestures toward Somalia and suggested it would consider requests for military assistance. When Somali invaded the Ethiopian Ogaden, however, the United States withheld its offer. Thus, the expected role behavior was disrupted by change in the American perception of the recipient.

As a second illustration let us examine the struggle among the competing liberation movements in Angola—the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement of the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—following the Portuguese decision to grant it independence. In their combat with each other the liberation movements sought outside military assistance. The MPLA had been receiving Soviet and Cuban military aid. The FNLA gained aid from Zaire and the People’s Republic of China. In the summer of 1975 following a considerable increase in the flow of Soviet aid and Cuban advisors (and the withdrawal of Chinese support for the FNLA), the MPLA appeared to be on the verge of gaining control of much of the country.

At that juncture the anti-communist beliefs of the American decision makers may have come into play (Davis 1978). To the policymakers in Washington it appeared possible to distinguish between a communist-backed MPLA with a Marxist ideology and a non-communist FNLA-UNITA coalition. The latter faced extremely serious difficulties. In July 1975 the U.S. government’s Forty Committee decided to channel substantial covert military assistance to FNLA-UNITA through Zaire. The South Africans also intervened in Angola on behalf of the new coalition. In terms of the decision tree for anti-communist beliefs diagrammed in figure 12.2, the United States should have viewed the problem as an intervention situation and should have played a liberator role. In fact it did so with policies having the behavior properties described for the liberator role in the appendix.

Again, we have a mirror image condition for the superpowers. When the FNLA-UNITA fortunes improved with assistance from the United States, South Africa, and Zaire, we would expect the Soviet’s anti-capitalism beliefs to be engaged with adoption—like the United States—of a liberator role. Subsequent Soviet behaviors are congruent with the expectation.
Several concluding observations are in order about this attempt to design a system with which to model the effects of regime orientation (political beliefs plus roles) on foreign policy behavior. First, it should be recalled that we do not expect the conditions for regime orientation to be present in all occasions for foreign policy decision making. There may be no consensus in beliefs among regime leaders in many areas. Moreover, the historical experience necessary to establish role expectations for some problems may be insufficient even when core beliefs are shared.

Second, in situations where the conditions for regime orientation are met, the orientation should not be expected to determine foreign policy behavior all the time. As in the American example with Somali in the summer of 1977, role expectations may be outweighed by other considerations in the decision process. An adequate model of foreign policy decision making must integrate regime orientation with some of these other major explanatory factors.

Finally, we recognize that authorities on Third World countries and regions may be uncomfortable with a system that proposes to interpret Soviet and American behavior toward so much of the world in terms of anti-communism, anti-capitalism, and traditional enemies beliefs. As suggested in table 12.1, there are other beliefs, not developed in this paper that the CREON project has identified and still others that are unique to single countries which we do not attempt to include. Nevertheless, it may be appropriate to ponder how much of the superpowers' behaviors toward the Third World can be understood in terms of these beliefs in which the Third World explicitly figures only marginally.

Role Theory and Foreign Policy Dynamics

Analysis: An Appraisal

Stephen Krasner

An evaluation of role analysis for understanding international political behavior and an assessment of its descriptive, explanatory, and normative potential. In the course of such an appraisal, there may be a case for improvement, a confrontation with the criticism that role theories are too simple, or a demand for the methodological refinement of a much more sophisticated conceptual framework and achievement of results. These questions were raised briefly in a discussion that is appropriate to address them in a more thoroughgoing manner. The essays in part I of this volume, which are followed by this essay, address the case for a role-oriented approach to the study of foreign policy. A review of the applications of role theory should also lend itself to a role-oriented approach to the analysis of foreign policy. The contributions in this volume, in light of the results of this discussion, will further illustrate the potential and limitations of role-oriented analysis.