

# The Situational Imperative: A Predictive Model of Foreign Policy Behavior

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Foreign policy behaviors, defined in terms of the intensity of affect and commitment an actor conveys to external recipients using various instruments of statecraft, are explained in terms of a situational model. The model represents an externally-defined predisposition that will influence any group of policy-makers to act in a certain way once they recognize a specific foreign problem. In addition to different types of situations, the model includes as its variables the configuration of roles assumed in a situation by other international entities. It also includes a set of relationships, each capable of assuming different values, that exist between the actor and other role occupants. For each type of situation a decision logic is developed and expressed in a decision tree. Each branch of the decision tree constitutes a hypothesis about the configuration of behavior properties that will likely result. The model is illustrated by reference to two cases of foreign policy decision-making — the Zambian government's response to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the white regime in Rhodesia in 1965 and the response of the United States government to the impending war between Britain and Argentina over the Falklands in 1982.

## I. SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

In some intriguing respects an international situation resembles a single frame of motion picture film. Imagine an endless reel of film, each frame of which captures a set of actors engaged with each other over some issue. Reviewing the strip of the frames up to a given point frequently enables one to forecast the likely behavior of the actors in the next frame. If in previous frames we have seen one actor jabbing his fist toward another actor, we might expect that in subsequent frames we would see the recipient duck and perhaps strike back. The situational context provides structure and behavioral cues for the actors involved that shape the form and often the content of their behavior. If one defines an international situation as

the relationship at a given point in time and space between two or more international actors who assume certain roles with respect to a foreign policy issue, then the similarity to the film frame becomes evident.

As a means of analyzing foreign policy, the power of a situational approach is enhanced by shifting from the orientation of an outside observer to that of one of the actors in the situation. From the perspective of any involved actor, the situation, like the film frame, permits the actor to establish who else is immediately involved and to define the roles of others in relation to itself. As the actor sorts out who is doing what to whom and where it stands in relation to the other players, we argue that a predisposition for a certain type of foreign policy behavior on the part of the actor will arise from the requirements of the situational context.

We propose a conceptual framework for understanding these situational predispositions and their ramifications for foreign policy behavior. A situational approach appears to offer at least three major advantages. First, situations are observable. Analysts frequently can observe the situational features vital in reconstructing an actor's perspective far more readily than many other aspects of the foreign policy process. If a model of foreign policy is to be subject to empirical investigation, we must be able to acquire the necessary information to check it out. Second, situations organize the external environment. For any contemporary international actor (and for analysts studying that actor) the external environment of potential influences is extensive and complex. A simple enumeration of all current international entities, governmental and otherwise, illustrates the point. Situations provide a vantage point or frame by which policy-makers establish that part of their external environment that is immediately of concern. Third, situations offer necessary antecedents for predicting action. We have long acknowledged the logical importance of any actor's external environment for understanding its foreign policy behavior. If one views foreign affairs as a continuous stream of sequential situations, as suggested by the film analogy, then knowledge of situational features would appear to be an effective means of capturing environmental features close to the point of decision.

The proposed model consists of a set of decision rules and hypotheses based upon a series of assumptions about the effects of three kinds of situational variables.

### 1.1. Roles

The model requires us to designate one entity in the situation as the foreign policy "actor" from whose perspective a problem

is defined. Other situationally involved international entities (either governments or non-governments) occupy various roles defined from the actor's perspective.

### 1.2. Role Relationships

To establish the actor's motivation, power base, and relative autonomy the model requires information on various dimensions of the relationship between the actor and the other role occupants in the situation.

### 1.3. Types of Situations

An actor can be expected to deal with a situation based not only on its previous relationship with the other role occupants but also on the nature of the immediate configuration of roles. Because a foreign policy actor can assume multiple roles in a situation, we believe a potentially powerful classification of situations can be devised from the roles occupied by the actor.

Before detailing roles, relations, and situations, the cornerstone of the situational approach must be introduced. Every situation involves an immediate foreign policy problem as defined by the actor's policy-makers. The nature of the problem determines which other international entities occupy roles in the situation; in other words, the problem establishes the boundaries of the situation.

A problem exists when the authorities of a government perceive a discrepancy between present (or anticipated) conditions and those that they would prefer. A problem can be said to involve foreign affairs when (1) the policy-makers perceive the origin of the problem as beyond the political jurisdiction of the government, (2) the policy-maker's intended remedy requires action or restraint by external entities, or (3) the policy-makers

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## 2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

On 11 November 1974, the British government announced its unilateral decision to recognize Rhodesia as an independent state. This decision was widely criticized and led to the formation of the Rhodesian Front government. The Rhodesian Front government was a white-minority government and was widely criticized for its policies towards the black majority. The Rhodesian Front government was widely criticized for its policies towards the black majority. The Rhodesian Front government was widely criticized for its policies towards the black majority.

A specific problem in the Rhodesian situation was the role of the white-minority government. The Rhodesian Front government was widely criticized for its policies towards the black majority. The Rhodesian Front government was widely criticized for its policies towards the black majority. The Rhodesian Front government was widely criticized for its policies towards the black majority.

seek to influence domestic audiences indirectly by communication to external entities. In the situational approach, we assume that governments act in foreign affairs only in response to a problem they recognize. They act (or deliberately decide not to act) if, and only if, they believe their action will somehow influence a problem that they perceive to exist. We do not assume that their response to the problem need be "rational" or even that the problem is "real" to others.<sup>1</sup> The basic variables (i.e. roles, role relationships, types of situations) constituting the situational model can be illustrated by reference to an actual foreign policy problem.

## 2. INTERNATIONAL ROLES IN RELATION TO A PROBLEM

On 11 November 1965, the white minority government in Rhodesia issued its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain.<sup>2</sup> Until its own independence a year earlier, Zambia had been part of a federated British colony with Rhodesia that entwined their economies and necessitated a high level of interaction. Zambia's President Kaunda and his associates had expected the British to establish majority rule in Rhodesia followed by the granting of its independence. Indefinite rule in Rhodesia by the white minority, free of British control, posed not only serious ideological difficulties for Zambia's government but also appeared likely to complicate Zambia's own development.

A specific problem, such as the one Zambian leaders recognized in UDI, provides the means for establishing a set of roles in the foreign policy arena and allows us to determine the entities occupying those roles. From the perspective of an actor in a situation, every problem it recognizes will produce a source role and a subject role and possibly facilitator or

potential facilitator roles as well. The actor, source, and subject roles are the minimal set required to define a situation.

### 2.1. Actor

The first role in every problem is the actor. The entity whose behavior the analyst seeks to explain is stipulated as the actor in the situation. In the government or ruling political party designated as actor, the individuals with the authority to allocate resources to foreign policy are the policy-makers from whose perspective the problem as well as the source and subject are identified. Assuming that we wish to know what Zambia's response will be to UDI, the Zambian government is the actor.

### 2.2. Source

Every problem has an inferred source or a "cause". We refer to the source as that which is perceived by the actor to be responsible for the immediate problem (regardless of whether such perceptions are accurate). Any human entities — governmental or non-governmental — or nature or the will of God may be regarded as a source by the actor's policy-makers. The actor may recognize multiple entities as constituting the source. Moreover, the immediate problem might be seen as flowing from a prior problem with a different, more remote source. The concern here, however, is with the perceived source in the immediate problem. From the Zambian government's perspective, the problem was perpetrated in the most direct sense by the white minority government of Rhodesia.

### 2.3. Subject

Every problem also has a perceived subject. The subject is some collective entity that suffers or is deprived by the prob-

conflict.

lem — or will do so in the future. As with the source role, a problem as perceived by the actor may have multiple entities as the subject. The political leadership of Zambia could be expected to perceive the black majority in Rhodesia as one collectivity immediately deprived by UDI. In addition, Zambia itself also would be deprived by a potentially hostile regime in Rhodesia.

Notice that not only can one role be occupied by more than one separate entity, but the same entity may also appear in several roles. The actor, for example, may also be the subject or the source. In the case of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, we have seen that two entities comprised the subject — the black majority in Rhodesia and Zambia. For a number of situations, two other roles — facilitator and potential facilitator — may be present in the problem environment. In contrast to the three previously mentioned roles, however, these two may not always be involved.

#### 2.4. Facilitator

Any entity that the actor perceives as aligned with itself or one of the other role occupants is a facilitator for the role. From the actor's perspective, the facilitator neither caused the problem nor suffers from it, at least not directly. Nevertheless, the facilitator supports one or more role occupants. From the perspective of the actor, if an entity serves as a facilitator for someone the actor opposes, then (from the actor's point of view) the entity would be an aggravator.

#### 2.5. Potential Facilitator

This role applies to any entity the actor perceives as having the ability to assist a role occupant in the immediate future, but that is not presently involved. Thus, a facilitator is anyone who already has

committed support to one of the primary roles and a potential facilitator is one that could offer such support. By definition, neither a facilitator nor potential facilitator can occupy one of the primary roles — actor, source, or subject. Zambia's government regarded Britain as a potential facilitator with the ability to intervene on one side or the other in the UDI problem. Britain's potential role resulted from its status as the colonial power with authority over Rhodesia. From Zambia's perspective, South Africa might have been viewed as a potential aggravator because of its strong ties with the white government in Rhodesia. In fact, however, Zambia's leaders seem to have shown little immediate concern about South Africa.

Fig. 1 diagrams the five roles that can be found in any situation and illustrates them with the UDI problem from the perspective of the Zambian government as actor. The different types of lines connecting the role occupants in Fig. 1 represent the essential relationships between them described below.

### 3. DIMENSIONS OF RELATIONSHIP AMONG ROLE OCCUPANTS

In deciding how to treat a problem situation in which they are involved, the actor's policy-makers must know not only who else is involved in the situation, but what their relationship is to these relevant others. Of many possible dimensions of relationships, the proposal model uses three: prior affect, salience, and relative capabilities. As will be detailed later, these dimensions offer the theoretical bases for assessing the actor's motivation, autonomy, and power base.

#### 3.1. Prior Affect

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


Fig. 1. Schematic of the situational model. The model seeks to explain what the actor's behavior is to the other roles defined by the problem.

lishes the affective history between the actor and each of the entities or other roles. Affect is expressed toward another entity ranging from extreme hostility to unequivocal friendship. The accumulated affect in previous interactions that the actor has expressed toward another, and has received from it, comprise prior affect. Generally, prior affect is viewed as a motivation for action. The




Fig. 1. Schematic of the situational model illustrated with problem posed to Zambia by UDI. The situational model seeks to explain what the actor's behavior will be in response to a problem using information on the actor's relationship to the other entities occupying roles in a type of situation defined by the problem.

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history of friendship, hostility, or neutrality suggests whether the actor will be disposed to get involved and, if so, in support of which other role occupant. Thus, for example, the negative affective ties between the Zambian government and the illegal white Rhodesian rulers, on the one hand, and positive ones with the black Rhodesian majority population on the other, left no doubt as to which side Zambia preferred.



frontation; that is, someone challenges the actor directly. It can be summarized as follows:

<i>ACTOR</i>	<i>SOURCE</i>	<i>SUBJECT</i>
Nation A	Nation X (or if subject is "X" then source is Nation A)	Nation A (or if source is "A" then subject is Nation X)

It should be evident that our UDI case exemplifies a Confrontation Situation. As shown in Fig. 1, the Zambian government is the actor and, along with the black majority of Rhodesia, it is also the subject. The source of the problem is Rhodesia's white regime.

4.2. Intervention

Separate entities occupy each of the three basic roles in Intervention Situations. The actor, as a third party, observes that some external entity has created a problem for another external entity. The issue for the actor is whether to become involved. Thus, we can diagram an Intervention Situation as follows:

<i>ACTOR</i>	<i>SOURCE</i>	<i>SUBJECT</i>
Nation A	Nation X	Nation Y

4.3. Assistance

Actually two subtypes of role configurations occur in this category. We have grouped them together because they share a concern with assistance or support. In one situation the actor is also the source and the subject; that is, it has created its own problem and seeks a solution. In identifying the source of the problem as being the actor we are including as potential creators of a problem both natural or societal conditions within the actor's country (e.g. drought or poverty) as well as human behavior. For example, a nation

with a no-growth economy would be assumed to fit this category. When such situations result from human behavior, it is analogous to an individual deciding how to treat his own injury after shooting himself in the foot. This international equivalent of "shooting oneself in the foot" would not be a foreign policy situation unless there was an outside entity in another role (presumably a Potential Facilitator) who could help. This subtype can be diagrammed as follows:

ASSISTANCE REQUEST

<i>ACTOR</i>	<i>SOURCE</i>	<i>SUBJECT</i>	<i>POTENTIAL FACILITATOR</i>
Nation A	Nation A	Nation A	Nation X

In the second subtype of assistance situations someone appeals to the actor for help. A nation, other than the actor, is both the source and the subject of the problem. It turns to the actor for assistance as diagrammed below:

ASSISTANCE RESPONSE

<i>ACTOR</i>	<i>SOURCE</i>	<i>SUBJECT</i>
Nation A	Nation X	Nation X

4.4. Collaboration

In this situation the actor shares both other basic roles with another entity. The actor and one or more other entities acknowledge they are both the source and subject of a problem about which they negotiate. The outcome of the situation might be a communiqué or a treaty. The diagram for this situation would be:

<i>ACTOR</i>	<i>SOURCE</i>	<i>SUBJECT</i>
Nation A	Nations A & Y	Nations A & Y

Several additional points concerning these configurations of situations should



be noted. First, the other roles do not have to be nation-states; they can be any type of international entity. Second, more than one entity can assume the roles we have illustrated with nations X and Y. For example, a problem could result from the behaviors of multiple nations acting separately or in concert or, as in the example of the subject in the UDI case, a combination of a country (Zambia) and a subnational group (Rhodesian blacks). Third, we have not introduced the roles of facilitator or potential facilitator in the presentation of the four situations, except for Assistance Request, because they do not alter the logic that underlies each basic configuration.

These then are the three sets of explanatory variables used in the model (i.e. roles, role relationships, and types of situations). Through the model they determine selected properties of foreign policy behavior. The key properties of the actor's behavior, which comprise the dependent variables, will be briefly introduced before describing the model's operation.

##### 5. PROPERTIES OF BEHAVIOR TO BE EXPLAINED

We all define foreign policy behavior as attempts to influence others and, as such, these behaviors are one kind of communication. As a form of communication foreign policy behavior can be divided into the attributes of any communicative act — who, does what, to whom, and how.

For the moment, we regard the actor (i.e. the "who") as a given because we specify what national government or ruling political party will be the actor. Four behavior properties account for the remaining attributes of communication: (1) The *recipient* indicates the type of entity(ies) the actor will address and answers the question "to whom?". (2) *Affect* consists of the manifest feelings

of approval or disapproval that the actor expresses and answers the question "does or expresses what?". (3) *Commitment* establishes the degree of the actor's resolve or the degree to which the actor binds itself to future behavior and also answers "does what?". (4) *Instruments* comprise the skills and resources of statecraft that the actor uses to answer the question "how?". Each of these four behavior properties is elaborated in Callahan et al. (1982) and Hermann & Dixon (1982).

These measurable properties are common to all foreign policy behavior. If we are able to understand why they are likely to assume certain values under certain conditions, then we will have gained much that is of practical and theoretical worth in understanding foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> It is these foreign policy behavior properties that the situational model seeks to explain. In Zambia's confrontation with Rhodesia over UDI, we want to know whom Zambia will address, with what kind of affect and level of commitment, and by what instruments of statecraft. Fig. 1 also displays these behavioral components of the model that we specify as the dependent variables.

##### 6. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING FOR ASSEMBLING MODEL COMPONENTS

Having introduced the components of the model, a brief review and introduction of the next steps may be helpful. Our task is to explain an actor's response (i.e. the behavior attributes of recipient, affect, commitment and instrument) to a problem based on the type of situation and the role relationships (i.e. prior affect, salience, and relative capabilities) between the actor and the entities in the situation perceived as the source and subject of the problem. To do this we need to consider the theoretical logic to be used

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in combining these elements. To that end, we introduce some ideas about action based on motivation and capabilities. We also identify the modeling process (a rule-based production system) that will serve as the actual operating procedure. Finally, we present the rules themselves that are based on the action theory and are applied in the model.

6.1. *A Theoretical Perspective on Action*

Why do governments act? We conceive action as a function of motivation and capability or as the will to act combined with the ability to act. No novelty is claimed for such a formulation since it has been similarly stated by many others.<sup>5</sup> In accordance with this perspective, the model must account for the interplay of both motivation and capability.

As represented in the model an actor's motivation flows from three sources: (a) the actor's recognition of a problem, (b) the actor's pattern of friendships and antagonisms for those involved in the situation, and (c) the actor's autonomy (i.e. the absence of any necessary relationship with the desired object of action that might constrain the will to act). Motivation begins with a recognition of the existence of a discrepancy between a present or anticipated condition and that which the actor would prefer; that is, the perception of a problem. Depending upon the situation, friendship may activate the desire to support, conciliate, or forebear, whereas antagonisms may trigger the desire for opposition, resistance, or intolerance. Motivations that might be triggered by friendship or antagonism can be severely curbed, however, if the actor's own well-being is understood to depend on the continuance of some relationship with the intended object of action. Autonomy or its absence becomes the third component of motivation.

Capabilities make possible the realiz-

ation or actualization of motivation. As portrayed in the model, they include (a) the actor's own resources relative to others, (b) the resources of those aligned with the actor or other role occupants, and (c) the possibility of engaging the resources of presently uncommitted others. Because the actions of concern in foreign policy are influence attempts, the requirement is not absolute capability, but rather the actor's capability relative to those who are the object of its attempted influence. Thus, when a domain of capabilities (e.g. military, diplomatic, economic) becomes salient for influencing a problem, it is the actor's capabilities in that domain relative to those of the entity it is motivated to influence that become important. The alignment of others with or against the actor augments or reduces the actor's own relative capability. Furthermore, if there are others with relevant capabilities that are not aligned with anyone in the situation, they may be the object of an appeal to alter a capabilities balance that otherwise would constrain the actor's ability to act.

6.2. *A Rule-Based Production System*

It is these described elements of motivation and capability that must be represented in the model. The model proposed here uses a computational modeling approach in that it can be viewed as a rule-based production system. (For example, see Alker et al. 1972, as well as Thorson & Sylvan 1982.) Among the merits in the present circumstances of this approach are the ability to handle non-numerical data and the facility for the representation of complex combinations of variables. The decision rules represent the penultimate step in a four-tiered design. First, we establish a set of definitions and assumptions. Second, using these definitions and assumptions we construct sets of propositions that relate key

operating variables to behavior in each type of situation. Third, we generate decision rules that establish specific expectations regarding the value of a behavior property for each applicable explanatory motivation and capability variable in all types of situations. Fourth, these individual effects are combined in interactive hypotheses that take into account the combined consequences of the explanatory variables.

The model involves a series of assumptions. They have been introduced at previous points in this essay, but the most important can now be summarized:

1. An actor initiates foreign policy behavior only in response to a perceived problem.
2. The definition of the problem varies with the perceived type of international situation. The problem for each type of situation posed in the form of a question, can be stated as follows:
  - a. Confrontation: How can we (the actor) reduce the adverse effects that the other entity in the problem creates for us?
  - b. Intervention: Should we (the actor) intervene in this problem on one side or the other and, if so, in what manner?
  - c. Assistance Request: Who can give us (the actor) assistance in reducing the adverse effects of the problem we are experiencing?
  - d. Assistance Response: Should we (the actor) provide assistance to those who are experiencing the adverse effects of the problem?
  - e. Collaboration: Can we (the actor) reach a substantive agreement with those with whom we share this problem?
3. In a given type of situation, an actor's response will be shaped by the interaction of his motivation and capability.

### 6.3. Decision Rules

To operate the model we need a set of rules that take the theoretical insights about action and apply them in specific types of situations. Table 1 displays the first step in that process. It presents the theoretical propositions generated from the examination of motivation and capabilities and suggests how our key explanatory variables operate in the five types of situations. These are propositions about the general effects of each of the role relationships (i.e. prior affect, salience, and relative capabilities) on foreign policy behavior attributes in each of the five types of situations. Because two non-required roles (facilitator and potential facilitator) may also be present in any situation, additional propositions are required to indicate how the situation may be altered by their presence.

As an illustration, consider again our example of the Zambian response to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia. As indicated earlier in the paper, we know this is a Confrontation Situation for Zambia's policy-makers because Zambia is both the actor and one of the subjects. As a result when referring to Table 1, we need to consult the section on Confrontation Situations. In that section, the first proposition (concerning prior affect) suggests that when prior affect has been negative — as Zambia's had been toward Rhodesia — the actor will tend to respond without regard to protecting the relationship. The second proposition indicates the influence of the variable, salience, on the actor. We find in Table 1 that when the source is salient for the actor, as Rhodesia was for Zambia, then it constrains the actor's behavior. The inferior position of Zambia with respect to relative capabilities also is hypothesized to constrain Zambia (proposition 3). The reader will note that the propositions in Table 1 describe the gen-

Table 1. Decision prop

I. Confrontation Situ	
1. Prior Affect:	T disposed the ac of altering the responsive in c relationship ha
2. Salience:	The n (regardless of is to respond t the opposite h
3. Relative Capal	then the actor as not to trigge relevant capat
4. Facilitators:	If other entities, relevant capal its allies.
5. Potential Faci	than those of other, then th third parties i
II. Intervention Situ	
1. Prior Affect	
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2. Salience	
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Table 1. *Decision propositions for five situations.*

I. *Confrontation Situations*

1. *Prior Affect*: The more positive the actor's prior relationship with another, the more disposed the actor is to respond to the immediate problem in a way that minimizes risk of altering the favorable relationship and with the expectation that the other(s) will be responsive in obtaining a resolution to the problem; the opposite holds when the prior relationship has been negative.
2. *Salience*: The more important to the well-being of the actor is the relationship to another (regardless of whether prior relations have been friendly), the more disposed the actor is to respond to the immediate problem so as to minimize disrupting the relationship; the opposite holds the less important the relationship is to the actor.
3. *Relative Capabilities*: If the actor does not have more relevant capabilities than another, then the actor will be more disposed to respond to the immediate situation in a way so as not to trigger harmful retaliation from the other; and conversely, if the actor has more relevant capabilities.
4. *Facilitators*: If the actor or the relevant others in the situation are strongly supported by other entities, then the relative capabilities estimation is assessed on the basis of the relevant capabilities of the actor and its allies in comparison to those of the other and its allies.
5. *Potential Facilitators*: If the relevant capabilities of the actor and any supporters are less than those of the other and any of its supporters or if the actor lacks autonomy from the other, then the actor is more likely to seek the assistance of any uninvolved, non-hostile third parties in addressing the problem.

II. *Intervention Situations*

1. *Prior Affect*
  - A. The greater the actor's differentiation between role occupants in terms of previous friendship and hostility, the more motivated the actor is to intervene to assist that entity with which it is more friendly and against the entity with which it has been hostile.
  - B. If the actor has previous friendship with all the role occupants, then the actor is motivated to intervene to mediate their dispute.
  - C. If the actor lacks a previous friendship with any of the role occupants, then the actor is motivated to remain uninvolved in their dispute.
2. *Salience*
  - A. When one role occupant is salient to the actor and the other is not, the actor is more likely to intervene in support of the salient entity to preserve the necessary relationship.
  - B. When both role occupants are salient to the actor, then the actor will likely intervene to encourage mediation, but without alienating either party.
  - C. When neither role occupants are salient to the actor, then that actor is unlikely to intervene for lack of interests and to preserve its future discretion.
3. *Relative Capabilities*
  - A. When the actor's relative capabilities are greater than those of the other role occupants, then the actor is more likely to intervene vigorously either for mediation or in support of its preferred party depending on its prior friendship with the parties.
  - B. When the actor's relative capabilities are less than those of all other role occupants, then the actor is less likely to intervene with other than verbal assessments.
  - C. When the actor's relative capabilities provide a preferred side with supplemental resources that would appear to give it equal or greater capabilities than the other

Table 1 - cont.

role occupant (and that balance or advantage would not exist in the absence of the actor's support), then the actor is likely to intervene in support of the preferred side. If the actor's capabilities are unlikely to alter the perceived balance, then its intervention is likely to be limited to verbal assessments. Similarly, abstention is likely if the actor has no preferred side.

4. *Facilitators*: If either of the other role occupants is aligned with outside entities whose capabilities would alter the capabilities balance between the role occupants, then the actor will re-assess its intervention posture and act as it would if the relative capabilities were possessed by the role occupants directly. (See proposition on relative capabilities).
5. *Potential Facilitators*: An actor will attempt to mobilize potential facilitators as mediators or as supporters of its friends and will warn against intervention by supporters of its adversaries.

II. *Assistance Request Situations*

1. *Prior Affect*: An actor is more likely to appeal for assistance and make a larger request to an entity with which it has positive prior affect than to one with which it has neutral or mixed prior affect; and it is more likely to appeal strongly to an entity with which it has neutral or mixed prior affect than to one with which its prior affect has been negative.
2. *Salience*: The more important the relevant other is to the actor, the more cautious and constrained will be the actor's request to that other; and conversely, the less important this relevant other is to the actor, the less hesitant and larger its request for assistance will be.
3. *Relative Capabilities*: If the actor has greater relative capabilities in the area of the problem than the relevant other\*, then its request will be modest; if the actor has less relative capabilities than the relevant others in the area of the problem, its request will be greater; if the actor has less applicable capabilities in the area of the immediate problem, but more in some area, it will propose a reciprocal exchange arrangement.
4. *Facilitators*: If the relevant other is aligned with additional entities that increase significantly its relative capabilities in the area of the problem, then the actor will make a substantially larger request for assistance.
5. *Potential Facilitators*: The actor will always address a potential facilitator in assistance requesting situations and in selecting a recipient will approach the most friendly entity that has substantially greater resources than itself.

IV. *Assistance Response Situations*

1. *Prior Affect*: The greater the existing friendship between the actor and the entity making the request, the more likely is the actor to attempt to supply assistance and in greater amounts; conversely, the more hostile the existing relationship, the less likely is the actor to supply any assistance.
2. *Salience*: The more important the source of the request is to the actor, the more likely is the actor to attempt to supply assistance and in greater amounts; conversely, the less important the source of the request to the actor, the less likely is it to supply any assistance.

\* In Assistance Request Situations typically the only other entity involved is the potential facilitator since the actor assumes both the source and the subject roles. However, it is possible to have a facilitator as well as a potential facilitator, in which case both become the "relevant others".

Table 1 - cont.

3. *Relative Capabilities*: If the actor's capabilities are unlikely to alter the perceived balance, then its intervention is likely to be limited to verbal assessments. Similarly, abstention is likely if the actor has no preferred side.
4. *Facilitators*: If either of the other role occupants is aligned with outside entities whose capabilities would alter the capabilities balance between the role occupants, then the actor will re-assess its intervention posture and act as it would if the relative capabilities were possessed by the role occupants directly. (See proposition on relative capabilities).
5. *Potential Facilitators*: An actor will attempt to mobilize potential facilitators as mediators or as supporters of its friends and will warn against intervention by supporters of its adversaries.

V. *Collaboration Situations*

1. *Prior Affect*: An actor is more likely to appeal for assistance and make a larger request to an entity with which it has positive prior affect than to one with which it has neutral or mixed prior affect; and it is more likely to appeal strongly to an entity with which it has neutral or mixed prior affect than to one with which its prior affect has been negative.
2. *Salience*: The more important the relevant other is to the actor, the more cautious and constrained will be the actor's request to that other; and conversely, the less important this relevant other is to the actor, the less hesitant and larger its request for assistance will be.
3. *Relative Capabilities*: If the actor has greater relative capabilities in the area of the problem than the relevant other\*, then its request will be modest; if the actor has less relative capabilities than the relevant others in the area of the problem, its request will be greater; if the actor has less applicable capabilities in the area of the immediate problem, but more in some area, it will propose a reciprocal exchange arrangement.
4. *Facilitators*: If the relevant other is aligned with additional entities that increase significantly its relative capabilities in the area of the problem, then the actor will make a substantially larger request for assistance.
5. *Potential Facilitators*: The actor will always address a potential facilitator in assistance requesting situations and in selecting a recipient will approach the most friendly entity that has substantially greater resources than itself.

eral theoretical variables. We ne translates these more specific bel is the function c sented in Table Table 2 speci each of the five l on one or more butes in a C Recall that the t variables in a gi relationships (i

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Table 1 - cont.

3. *Relative Capabilities*: If the actor's relevant capabilities are greater than the source of the request, the actor is more likely to supply assistance and in greater amounts; conversely, if the actor's relevant resources are not greater, it is less likely to supply assistance.
4. *Facilitators*: If the actor or the source of the request is aligned with others that alter the balance in their relative capabilities, then the calculation of the power base will be determined on each party's extended resource base (i.e., including resources of allies), and if the source of the request in combination with its allies has greater relevant capabilities, the actor will first ask that they assist.
5. *Potential Facilitators*: If there exists an uninvolved third party that is not hostile to the source of the request and which has relevant capabilities at least as great as those of the actor, then the actor will ask it to assist.

V. *Collaboration Situations*

1. *Prior Affect*: The more positive the prior affect between the actor and the relevant others in a negotiation, the more readily will the actor be prepared to make concessions and compromises in order to reach an agreement; the opposite holds when the prior relationship has been negative.
2. *Salience*: The more important the relevant other is to the well-being of an actor, the more disposed is the actor to make concessions and compromises even if it does not perceive its concessions are fairly balanced by offers of the relevant other; the opposite holds when the actor is autonomous.
3. *Relative Capabilities*: If the actor's relevant capabilities are not greater than the relevant others, then the actor is more disposed to make concessions and compromises to reach an agreement even if its offers are not fully reciprocated by the other; the opposite is true if the actor has greater capabilities.
4. *Facilitators*: If the actor or relevant others in the situation are aligned with other entities not immediately involved in the situation, then the relative capability estimation is assessed on the basis of the relative capabilities of the actor and its allies in comparison to the relevant other and its allies.
5. *Potential Facilitators*: If any uninvolved third party — not hostile to any of the immediate role occupants in the situation — has greater relative capabilities than the actor and relevant others, then they will jointly appeal to the outside entity for help.

eral theoretical relationship among the variables. We need an additional step that translates these general tendencies into more specific behavior expectations. That is the function of the decision rules presented in Table 2.

Table 2 specifies the consequences of each of the five key explanatory variables on one or more of the behavioral attributes in a Confrontation Situation.<sup>6</sup> Recall that the three primary explanatory variables in a given situation are the role relationships (i.e. prior affect, salience,

and relative capabilities). To these three we add the two optional roles (i.e. facilitator and potential facilitator) that if present can alter the primary role relationships between the actor and the source and the subject.

We can again illustrate the information presented in Table 2 with the Zambian reaction to UDI. From historical analysis of the Zambian—Rhodesian relationship prior to UDI, we know that the affect of Zambia's policy-makers toward the white regime in Rhodesia was negative. From

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Table 2. Decision rules relating values of explanatory variables to behavior properties in confrontation situations.

*Prior Affect*

1. Prior Affect (4 values) influence on *Affect*. The basic disposition of the actor is to express low negative affect toward the source (subject) of its problem, but the disposition is altered when prior affect is . . .
  - A. *Negative*. An established adversarial relationship reinforces the basic disposition to produce *high negative affect*.
  - B. *None/Neutral*. The absence of any significant prior relationship neither tempers nor reinforces the basic disposition, hence it produces *low negative affect*.
  - C. *Mixed*. The existence of some satisfactory aspects of the relationship (even though co-existing with negative ones) serves to temper but not eliminate the expression of displeasure, hence it produces *low negative affect*.
  - D. *Positive*. The presence of a generally satisfactory relationship which the actor wishes to retain together with the expectation that the other is a friend who will be willing to cooperate in reducing the problem produces *neutral affect*.
  
2. Prior Affect (4 values) influence on *Commitment*. The basic disposition of the actor is to warn the source of the problem that the deprivation cannot be tolerated and such a warning results in low commitment, but this disposition is altered when the prior affect has been . . .
  - A. *Negative*. An established hostile, adversarial relationship reinforces the basic disposition and results in *moderate commitment*.
  - B. *None/Neutral*. The absence of any significant prior relationship neither tempers nor reinforces the basic disposition, hence the result is *low commitment*.
  - C. *Mixed*. The existence of some satisfactory aspects of the relationship is offset by some displeasing ones so the basic disposition is not changed and the result is *low commitment*.
  - D. *Positive*. The existence of a generally friendly relationship which the actor can be assumed to wish to continue together with the expectation that the other is a friend who will be willing to cooperate in reducing the problem produces *minimal commitment*.
  
3. Prior Affect (4 values) influence on *Instrument*. The basic disposition of the actor is to use diplomatic instruments to protest the problem, but it will be altered if the prior affect is . . .
  - A. *Negative*. The existence of an adversarial and hostile relationship disposes the actor to wish to back his protest with the use of resources that underscore its aggravation and intolerance, hence the instrument is likely to combine *diplomacy with appropriate other instruments* determined by the problem domain (i.e., economic, military, etc.).
  - B. *None/Neutral; Mixed; or Positive*. In each of these conditions the actor has no reason to believe that the other will not respond to a diplomatic appeal for redress of grievances, hence the instrument will be *diplomacy only*.

*Salience*

4. Salience (3 values) influence on *Affect*. The basic disposition of the actor is to express negative affect toward the source (subject) of its problem, but this disposition is altered when the other's salience for the actor is . . .
  - A. *Salient* (non-adversarial). When the source of the problem is important to the well-being of the actor for other than adversarial reasons, then the actor's reduced autonomy curbs its tendency to express displeasure over its grievance and results in *neutral affect*.
  - B. *Salient* (traditional enemy). When the source of the problem is important to the actor because it is a traditional enemy, then the actor's disposition to express negative affect is reinforced and the result is *high negative affect*.

Table 2 - cont.

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Table 2 - cont.

- C. *Non-Salient*. When the source of the problem is not of special importance to the actor, then salience does not alter the basic disposition and the result is *low negative affect*.
5. Salience (3 values) influence on *Commitment*. The disposition of the actor is to warn the source of the problem that the deprivation cannot be tolerated and such a warning results in low commitment, but this disposition is altered when the other's salience for the actor is . . .
- A. *Salient* (non-adversarial). When the source of the problem is important to the continued well-being of the actor for other than adversarial reasons, then the actor's reduced autonomy curbs its tendency to demonstrate resolve with the result of *minimal commitment*.
- B. *Salient* (traditional enemy). When the source of the problem is important to the actor because it is a traditional enemy, then the actor's disposition to demonstrate its resolve to seek redress of its grievance is reinforced and the result is *moderate commitment*.
- C. *Non-Salient*. When the source of the problem is not of special importance to the actor, then salience does not alter the basic disposition and the result is *low negative affect*.

*Relative Capabilities*

6. Relative Capabilities (2 values) influence on *Affect*. The basic disposition of the actor is to express negative affect toward the source (subject) of its problem, but the disposition is altered when the relative capabilities are . . .
- A. *Actor has Greater Relative Capabilities*. When the actor's capabilities in the area of the problem are greater than those of the source (subject) of the problem, then the actor's confidence that it can insist on some redress of its grievances is reinforced with the resulting expression of *high negative affect*.
- B. *Actor has Equal or Less Relative Capabilities*. When the actor's capabilities in the area of the problem are no greater or even less than those of the source (subject) of the problem, then the actor's confidence that it can avoid harmful retaliation if the other entity elects to escalate, results in a tempering of the basic disposition with the resulting expression of *low negative affect*.
7. Relative Capabilities (2 values) influence on *Recipient*. The basic disposition of the actor when another entity creates a problem for it is to address that source (subject) directly, but the disposition is altered when the relative capabilities are . . .
- A. *Actor has Greater Relative Capabilities*. When the actor's capabilities in the area of the problem are greater than those of the source (subject) of the problem, then the actor's confidence that it can insist on some redress of its grievances is reinforced with the result that it has no hesitation in *addressing the source* (subject) as the recipient.
- B. *Actor has Equal or Less Relative Capabilities*. When the actor's capabilities in the area of the problem are no greater or even less than those of the source (subject) of the problem, then the actor's confidence that it can avoid harmful retaliation if the other entity elects to escalate, results in a tempering of the basic disposition with the resulting tendency to seek support from others by appeals for assistance and support to *third parties as recipients*.
8. Relative Capabilities (2 values) influence on *Instrument*. The basic disposition of the actor is to use diplomatic instruments to protest the problem, but it will be altered if the relative capabilities are . . .
- A. *Actor has Greater Relative Capabilities*. When the actor's capabilities in the area of the problem are greater than those of the source (subject) of the problem, then the actor's confidence that it can insist on some redress of its grievances is reinforced and it underscores its dominance by combining *diplomacy with appropriate other instruments* determined by the problem domain (i.e., economic, military, etc.).

ation and conflict.



Table 2 - cont.

- B. *Actor has Equal or Less Relative Capabilities.* When the actor's capabilities in the area of the problem are no greater or even less than those of the source (subject) of the problem, then the actor's confidence that it can avoid harmful retaliation if the other entity elects to escalate, results in a reinforcement of the basic disposition to use *diplomacy alone* as the instrument.

*Facilitator*

9. Facilitator (4 values) influences on *affect, instrument, and recipient.* The basic disposition of an actor with respect to facilitators supporting itself or the relevant other is to recalculate the relative capabilities as if the facilitator's capabilities were combined with those of the entity it supports. If either or both the actor and the relevant other have facilitators whose relevant capabilities, when combined with those of the entity it supports, alter the estimate as to whether or not the actor has greater relevant capabilities, then the relative capabilities decision rules must be reassessed. Specifically, if the actor with its facilitator(s) now has . . .

- A. *Greater Capabilities* than the relevant other with its facilitator(s), then with respect to the estimate of affect, use rule 6A; with respect to recipient, use rule 7A; and with respect to instrument, use rule 8A.
- B. *Equal or Less Capabilities* than the relevant other with its facilitator(s), then with respect to the capabilities estimate of affect, use rule 6B; with respect to recipient use rule 7B; and with respect to instrument, use rule 8B.

*Potential Facilitator*

10. Potential Facilitator (5 values) influence on *affect, commitment, recipient, and instrument.* The basic disposition of the actor depends upon the status of the actor's relative capabilities after including the consequences of any facilitators. If the actor's combined relative capabilities are . . .

- A. *Greater* than those of the relevant other, then the basic disposition is to deal with the source of the problem directly while warning potential aggravators to keep out. The effects depend upon whether the potential facilitators are . . .
  - (1) *Both* (Potential Facilitator and Aggravator). Then the actor's disposition is to *address neither.*
  - (2) *Potential Aggravators.* Then the actor addresses the source, but also separately *addresses the potential aggravator* with a warning not to interfere using a *diplomatic instrument* conveying *low negative affect* and *low commitment.*
  - (3-4) *I.O. or Non-I.O. Potential Facilitators.* Because the actor does not require assistance, it will *address neither.*
  - (5) *Neither.* (No behavior rule applicable.)
- B. *Equal or less* than those of the relevant other, then the basic disposition of the actor is to search for help rather than address the source of the problem. The specific effects depend on whether the potential facilitators are . . .
  - (1) *Both* (Potential Facilitator and Aggravator). The actor will ignore the potential aggravator and source of the problem and *address the potential facilitator* as recipient with a *diplomatic instrument, low commitment, and high positive affect.*
  - (2) *Potential Aggravators.* The actor will ignore the potential aggravator and *address the source* of the problem.
  - (3) *Non-I.O. Potential Aggravators.* The actor will ignore the source of the problem and *address an appeal* for assistance to the *Potential Facilitator* involving a *diplomatic instrument, low commitment, and high positive affect.*

Table 2 - cont.

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- (4) *I.O. Potential Facilitators.* The actor will ignore the source of the problem and address an appeal for assistance to the *I.O. Potential Facilitator* involving a *diplomatic instrument, low commitment, and low positive affect* (the affect reflecting less certainty of support).
- (5) *Neither?* (No behavior rule applicable.)

Table 1 we know in general how negative prior affect influences behavior. Using the first section of Table 2 (dealing with prior affect) we can identify the decision rules that establish the particular values of the behavioral attributes associated with negative prior affect in Confrontation Situations. Section 1A of Table 2 indicates Zambia should express high negative affect, section 2A indicates the behavior should involve moderate levels of commitment, and section 3A reveals that a continuation of diplomacy plus other instruments of coercion will be applied. (There is a fourth behavioral attribute in the model — the target or recipient of behavior — but the explanatory variable of prior affect is not used to determine it.)

Notice that we have reviewed the hypothesized effects of only one of the five explanatory variables (prior affect) operating in Confrontation Situations such as Zambia's response to UDI. Table 2 also provides the decision rules for the four other variables. With certain values of some variables, the expected influence on behavior may be opposite that predicted from other variables. In the Zambian case such conflicting expectations arise for commitment and instruments. Based on Zambia's negative prior affect, we would expect moderate commitment and use of instruments of coercion. Zambia's relative weakness in applicable capabilities, however, leads to expectations of low commitment and exclusive dependency on diplomacy.

In order to resolve potentially conflicting expectations among the effects of

different explanatory variables, the authors have devised a set of overarching decision rules to provide one set of integrated expectations.<sup>7</sup> With these synthesizing rules the model is complete.

For application of the model to actual decision situations, we have constructed a set of decision trees. There is a separate tree for each of the five types of situations. In each tree the five key explanatory variables (i.e. prior affect, salience, relative capabilities, facilitator and potential facilitator) serve as the basic choice points with a different branch established for each value of every variable. Together the five trees have 221 branches or paths leading to different outcomes.<sup>8</sup> The end of each path through the tree reveals the particular set of behavioral attributes that theoretical analysis indicates should be associated with that particular set of values for the explanatory variables.

We recognize that the procedures described in this essay may appear complex and cumbersome on first encounter. It is important, therefore, to be clear about the purpose and anticipated capabilities of the model that may justify the effort to comprehend it. Our intention is to establish a model that will allow us to forecast the expected behavioral attributes of any actor's response to any of a number of different types of international situations. By determining the value of key variables in the emerging situation, we propose to indicate the likely attributes of a government's response to the problem. Although we cannot here demonstrate the operation of the model in a

forecasting mode, we can illustrate how it would work by using postdiction to interpret another historical case. We conclude the essay with such an application.

### 7. THE US DECISION TO INTERVENE IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR, 1982

The conflict leading to war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands (referred to as the Malvinas by the Argentines) provides a good illustration of the logic and decision rules associated with the Intervention Situations when examined from the perspective of the United States as the actor. On 19 March 1982 a party of Argentines (the source of the problem for the US) landed on South Georgia, one of 200 islands that form the Falkland archipelago, a British crown colony. After refusing a British (the subject of the problem) request to remove its citizens, the Argentine government headed by Leopold Galtieri indicated it would provide its citizens with the necessary protection for their maintenance. Thus, after 150 years of contention concerning sovereignty of the islands, the government of Argentina had precipitated a confrontation with the British over control of the archipelago.

Nine days later the British Ambassador to the United States, Nicholas Henderson, hand delivered a note from British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, to US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. In essence, the note indicated that unless a solution to the situation was found, Carrington "feared the gravest of consequences" (Haig 1984). Two days later, on 30 March, the US picked up signs of increased force readiness in Argentina, and on the night of 1-2 April an assault force of about 300 Argentine marines landed near Port Stanley, the capital of the Falklands. The United States, now fully apprised of the situation, had to

decide whether or not to intervene, and if so on whose behalf. In Fig. 2 a selected portion of a decision tree enables one to determine the actor's (in this case the US) response.

As the model frames the interpretation of the problem from the perspective of the acting nation, the type of behavior engaged by the actor will depend upon its motivation (prior affect), autonomy (salience), and power base (relative capabilities). In this case the nature of prior affect between the US and Britain and the US and Argentina, the degree of salience they hold for the US and the US capabilities relative to the two nations. The first question in Fig. 2 concerns prior affect. The historical record suggests that the US, particularly during the Reagan Administration, has maintained friendly and warm relations with both nations. With regard to Argentina, as Brown (1983) states, Reagan perceived the "authoritarian" military junta as an ally of the US in its campaign to counter the efforts of Marxist-Leninist "totalitarians" to take over Latin America. As for Britain, its leader Margaret Thatcher was undoubtedly Reagan's closest ally in Europe. As a consequence the US had to decide how to intervene in a confrontation between two allies. As indicated in Table 1 (proposition II1B) there is an impulse to mediate a dispute between two friends. Returning to Fig. 2, we must determine the salience of each. The degree of salience between the US and Britain and between the US and Argentina is different. Britain is salient by virtue of its highly interdependent economic relationship and its strategic military/diplomatic ties with the US, whereas Argentina does not have such a relationship with the US. This reduced incentive to mediate (Table 1, proposition II2A) is offset by both prior affect and capabilities. The US had greater relevant capabilities than both sides thus contributing to the desire to



Fig. 2. Branch of the decision tree that reveals the actor's response. It concludes that attributes will influence diplomatic instrument of commitment,

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


Fig. 2. Branch of the intervention decision tree when a power mediates between the sides.

mediate the dispute (proposition II3A). Fig. 2 reveals the outcome for the decision tree branch that ends after establishing the actor has superior capabilities in comparison to both the source and the subject. It concludes that the expected behavioral attributes will involve exclusive use of diplomatic instruments, moderate levels of commitment, low positive affect, and

efforts addressed to both sides. As the following account reveals, these properties characterize America's response. As events unfolded in early April 1982, it became clear that the US sought to defuse the crisis via its good offices with both governments. By the time American Secretary of State Alexander Haig arrived in London on 8 April the Argentine mili-

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tary had dispatched more troops to the islands. Meanwhile Britain broke diplomatic relations with Argentina, and imposed a complete economic embargo, urging its partners in the European Economic Community to follow suit. Haig (1984) characterizes his meeting with Thatcher and her cabinet as forceful. The British would not reward aggression (going so far as to suggest this was a test similar to Munich in 1938), and insisted upon a return to the status quo ante before resuming negotiations with Argentina. Armed with that message, as well as the understanding of British resolve, Haig flew to Argentina after a short debriefing with President Reagan.

In Buenos Aires, Haig was met by Foreign Minister Costa Mendez and taken to the Casa Rosada to meet with General Galtieri and his military colleagues. Haig sought to convey to the General his impression of British resolve and the urgency of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. It became apparent to Haig that despite Galtieri's personal predilections, he was not able to dictate a change in course:

On at least three occasions Galtieri prevented offensive operations from taking place, and there is reason to speculate that when the invasion was finally put to train, in deepest secrecy and employing only naval forces, the air force and perhaps the army, may not have known exactly what was happening until it was too late to stop it (1984:277).

Against this backdrop Haig received conflicting signals from the Argentines at every turn. It became clear to him that the prospects for a peaceful solution were slim. The Argentines insisted upon Argentine sovereignty as a precondition and then offered to compromise. Haig was prepared to work around the compromise, provided the Argentines agreed to a withdrawal as a precondition to nego-

tiation. After several protracted and frustrating negotiating sessions with the Argentine junta, Haig became convinced that war was inevitable. In the course of shuttling back and forth from London to Buenos Aires a second time (13-18 April), Haig concluded that the military junta was both unable and incapable of bargaining. What was agreed upon one moment was rescinded the next:

Once again, in an exercise of bad faith that is unique in my experience as a negotiator, the Argentineans had gone back on their word and returned to their original impossible terms: the British must either give Argentina sovereignty over the Falklands, or approve an arrangement for governing the island that amounted to *de facto* Argentinean sovereignty (1984:290).

The US, unable to use its good offices to mediate the dispute, made one last attempt to resolve the crisis. With President Reagan's approval, Secretary of State Haig presented an American proposal to Argentina and Britain. The US proposal called for the eventual "transfer of sovereignty but presented the basic British position by providing for free choice by the islanders as to whether they would be associated with one or the other of the parties, opt for independence, or even accept compensation for leaving the Falklands" (1984:290).

As the British fleet steamed toward its destination in the South Atlantic time was running out. Between 23 April and 30 April, Haig conducted a series of discussions with both parties, but to no avail. Britain declared a total air and sea blockade effective at 7.30 a.m. on 30 April.

That same day Secretary of State Haig announced a breakdown in negotiations. That changed the basic situation and required us to review anew the Intervention Situation decision tree. Fig. 3 offers the pathway for this alternative branch of the decision tree. Essentially in




Fig. 3. Branch of the intervention a

the course of the negotiator change had taken place in the US with Argentina. As a result of of negotiations Haig (1984) char the junta at various times as i. unyielding, and acting in bad fai the prior affect toward Britain positive, it had become mixed fc tina. As shown in Fig. 3, salie

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


Fig. 3. Branch of the intervention decision tree when a power favors one side.

the course of the negotiations a key change had taken place in the US relations with Argentina. As a result of a month of negotiations Haig (1984) characterized the junta at various times as irrational, unyielding, and acting in bad faith. While the prior affect toward Britain remained positive, it had become mixed for Argentina. As shown in Fig. 3, salience and

relative capabilities remain unchanged, but the difference in prior affect leads to a different outcome. Now the actor addresses only the recipient toward which it has positive affect — in this case Britain — and its level of effort (commitment) declines somewhat. In fact, on 30 April the United States announced its support for Britain.

The Falklands provides a useful illustration of the operation of the model. Not only can one assess the interaction of the decision rules, but also the dynamic character of the model. As a consequence of a change in US perception of the situation, the US motivation to mediate the dispute altered.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS

Optimally the situational model described in this essay should not operate in a vacuum. Information regarding the characteristics and processes of the nation-states involved must always take primacy in explanations of foreign policy behavior. This having been said, we contend that the situational predisposition model provides two invaluable services for those interested in constructing comprehensive cross-national models of foreign policy behavior.

First, it lays bare the contextual requirements that shape and constrain the actor's behavior. The situation may at times even create a situational *imperative* that the actor ignores at the cost of its own power and so strong that regardless of all domestic considerations, the situational explanatory variables will override all other determining factors. In such cases, policy-makers resist the consequences of situational characteristics at the risk of their power and status.

Second, the model introduces a method of making forecasts about real time, discrete decision-making problems. It offers a very explicit procedure for testing its own validity. Forecasts can be made of emerging situations with the model and its expectations can then be compared with actual results. It is imaginable that more advanced versions of such a model, which include domestic considerations as well as situational properties, can be used as an adjunct tool in foreign policy decision-making.

In summary, then, what the present situational predisposition model demonstrates is that, in any more comprehensive explanatory undertaking, a component based on the configuration of situations and associated roles will be an essential and powerful contributor. Inclusion of a situational perspective seems imperative for a comprehensive explanation of foreign policy behavior.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> We emphasize that coping with the problem does not mean that it will be solved. It should be noted that the "problem" can concern great issues of war and peace, but it also can concern a sightseeing tour for the ambassador's wife or ways to enhance the foreign minister's prestige with the cabinet.

<sup>2</sup> Elaborations of the developments described in this section appear in Anglin & Shaw (1979) and Tordoff (1974).

<sup>3</sup> These basic values are drawn from a more comprehensive set proposed by Lasswell (1971). The authors used, with some combination, those values we judged to be common in international affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Of the numerous possible ways of conceptualizing the elements of foreign policy behavior, we believe a strong case can be made for the merits of a scheme that (1) can be observed in a reliable fashion, (2) can be found in all instances of the foreign policy activity of any actor, and (3) can describe behavior in terms of widely recognized features of communication including target (recipient), disposition (affect), determination (commitment), and means (instrument).

<sup>5</sup> One such similar conceptualization in international relations appears in Singer (1962:72). Although he examines "threat perception" rather than action, the basic idea remains the same. Singer proposes a quasi-mathematical formula: Threat perception = Estimated Capabilities × Estimated Intent. In our context motivation can be seen as parallel to estimated intent. When intent or motivation cannot be established in international relations, analysts occasionally apply the

"worst case analysis" in which the actor will do the most harmful with its existing capabilities. Such motivation can lead to serious

<sup>6</sup> Sets of decision rules compared in Table 2 have been prepared for four types of situations and are the authors.

<sup>7</sup> When values are different, in one direction, we use an additive rule where each expected value equal weight constitute points on an interval to determine the mean. In other situations, we invoke a rule of averaging. This frequently arises when multiple variables generate conflicting expectations. In power base variables, the issue is that power base rules prevail over other action expected by decision-makers unless capabilities prevail.

<sup>8</sup> Branches for all the decisions are in Hudson (1988).

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"worst case analysis" in which they assume the actor will do the most harmful thing possible with its existing capabilities. Such neglect of motivation can lead to serious errors.

<sup>6</sup> Sets of decision rules comparable to those in Table 2 have been prepared for the other four types of situations and are available from the authors.

<sup>7</sup> When values are different, but in the same direction, we use an additive rule. We assign each expected value equal weight, assume they constitute points on an interval scale, and determine the mean. In other cases a logic is invoked in which one value overrides others. This frequently arises when motivation variables generate conflicting expectations in comparison to power base variables. Here the rule is that power base rules prevail on the assumption that action expected by desire cannot be pursued unless capabilities permit its actualization.

<sup>8</sup> Branches for all the decision trees appear in Hudson (1988).

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