

## MILITARISM; MILITARY RULE; POLITICAL VIOLENCE; REVOLUTION.)

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**CRISIS.** International crises punctuated the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet- and American-led blocs. Crises such as the Berlin blockade (1948), the outbreak of war in Korea (1950), the struggles over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu (1958), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the uprising in Czechoslovakia (1968), and the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007 (1983) represented flashpoints that underscored the recurrent danger in that era of escalation to major—perhaps nuclear—war. Even though the world has evolved beyond that superpower struggle, some fundamental qualities of crisis remain constant.

The term "crisis" comes from the Greek *krinein*, meaning to separate. In a critical medical condition a crisis is a turning point separating recovery from death. In an analogous manner crises in international politics are sometimes viewed as the turning point in a dispute leading either to peaceful resolution or escalation to war.

Scholarship on world politics has stipulated more specific meanings for crisis. Three alternative conceptualizations deserve attention. They represent not only definitional distinctions but also different levels of analysis and alternative theoretical and practical concerns. Important differences exist among systemic crises, confrontation crises, and decision-making crises.

\*International systems consist of actors regularly interacting according to some structure that is maintained by norms, laws, or the distribution of capabilities. From the systemic perspective, a crisis is a powerful shock to the structure that holds the system together. Thus a systemic crisis threatens the stability of the international system and creates the possibility of destruction or a transformation. For example, the bipolar international system led by the opposing superpowers that prevailed after World War II experienced the shocks that led to the breakup of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In effect, these crises terminated the existing bipolar international system.

When does a crisis lead to the destabilization of the international system? Some analysts suggest one kind of international system (e.g., multipolar vs. bipolar) is more susceptible to crises and the conditions under which they destabilize the system. Typically the conditions that trigger system crises have been wars or \*revolutions that dramatically alter the power distribution among actors in international politics. In today's increasingly economically interdependent international system, other types of events (e.g., currency collapse or hyperinflation in key nations) may more frequently ignite future systemic crises. Because the financial and economic systems have become so interdependent, serious disruptions in a few countries have the potential of spreading throughout the entire global system. The financial crisis in Asia in the late

1990s posed exactly such a danger. In 1995, American policy makers anticipated that the debt crisis in Mexico could become contagious and therefore they provided substantial loans to reduce the difficulties in Mexico and to suppress its spread elsewhere.

Not all systemic crises need be dysfunctional for a system, particularly if leaders have the capacity to adapt and learn from the shocks. Leaders in systems or subsystems may actually use crises as a means of forcing member governments to take initiatives they otherwise might not take. The leadership of the European Union has repeatedly used deadline crises as a means of forcing member governments to take further integrative steps or risk collapse of that valued regional system, which produces beneficial results no party wishes to forgo. Thus the \*Maastricht Treaty (1991) set deadlines by which participating countries had to fulfill requirements needed to adopt the common currency, the euro.

A second type of international crisis involves direct confrontation typically between two opposing parties. Whereas systemic crises concern the fate of the system as whole, crises between actors focus only on the consequences for the specific entities confronting one another. Confrontational crises are triggered when one actor initiates a major challenge to the position of another. After one party's challenge and the defiant response by the other, the fundamental dynamic involves bargaining—either directly or by tacit signaling. In the absence of successful negotiations, violent conflict follows. The 1982 Argentine challenge to British control of the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic was immediately rejected by the Thatcher government. Negotiations failed and the brief Malvinas/Falklands War ensued. In the past, international confrontational crises involved opposing states, like Britain and Argentina. The post-Cold War era may witness greater diversity in the kind of parties engaged. Given the rising importance of nonstate actors in world affairs, the likelihood has increased that such crises might involve, for example, terrorists or multinational entities (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund) or global corporations.

Specialists examining the confrontational crises frequently rely on one of two methods of inquiry—the theory of games or comparative case studies. Researchers applying \*game theory generally address the conditions under which a stable solution to the crisis can be found. Case studies have focused on issues such as types of strategy, third-party intervention, and the conditions governing escalation. Regardless of the method, scholars and practitioners alike ask the same basic question: What bargaining strategies produce a successful outcome without escalation to greater violence or war?

In the third kind of crisis, the focus is within a single country or other political unit. Governmental or decision-making crises involve an event or other stimulus that poses a severe problem for the policy makers and possibly their constituents. Definitions of decision-making crises emphasize properties of the situation facing the policy makers. For example, a crisis can be viewed as the combination of high threat to basic goals of the policy makers, short time before the situation evolves in a manner undesired by them, and appearance as a surprise (i.e., a lack of expectation that the situation would occur). The attempted coup against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union (1991) came as a complete surprise, posed an enormous threat to his

government, and offered only a short time before the plotters would be able to consolidate their control of the country if they were not stopped.

A basic question posed from the decision-making perspective is: What effects does a crisis have on the quality of decisions? What are the properties of government agencies or the characteristics of individual policy makers that enable them to manage crisis more or less effectively? Prescriptive studies seek to advance means to avoid crises or to manage them without severe consequences. Crisis management research establishes a standard for the quality of decisions (e.g., rationality, adaptation, avoidance of war) and then identifies circumstances in policy making that tend to deviate from that standard. Proposals for avoiding these crisis-induced difficulties are then recommended. For example, Irving Janis (*Victims of Groupthink*, Boston, 1972) contends that decision groups in crisis tend to engage in excessive concurrence seeking which erodes the quality of decisions. He proposes steps to reduce this concurrence-seeking behavior.

Occasionally, a crisis can evolve from one type to another. In October 1962, when the United States discovered that the Soviet Union was secretly placing nuclear missiles in Cuba, it was a decision-making crisis for the American government. Faced with extremely high threat, short time (before the missiles became operational), and surprise, could the American policy makers choose a wise course of action? Once the United States announced its intention to blockade Cuba in an attempt to force the withdrawal of the missiles, the crisis became a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Could the parties negotiate a solution without war? Then as the world learned of the missile crisis and the threat of war, the danger to the entire global system became apparent.

Although the threat of military crises remains, the contemporary interdependent world faces equally potentially dangerous crises from other directions such as economic instability or the rapid epidemic of a fatal disease.

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**CROATIA.** An ancient South Slavic kingdom, sovereign from the ninth century to 1102, thereafter in dynastic union with Hungary (until 1918), ruled from 1527 to 1918 by the Austrian Habsburgs, modern Croatia—consisting of Croatia proper, Medjmurje, and most of Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Istria—was territorially fixed within the People's (later Socialist) Republic of Croatia, a federal republic of \*Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1991. After losing all attributes of statehood and autonomy in the royal Yugoslav state (1918), Croatia became an autonomous banate of Yugoslavia (1939-1941) and then an Axis dependency (Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945), but with significantly different borders.

In 1991, after a referendum on independence, the Republic of Croatia fought against the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and indigenous Serb militias, sponsored by the Milošević re-

gime in Serbia, to assert its newly proclaimed sovereignty, which was internationally recognized in 1992. Its population in 1991 was 4,784,265, of which Croats constituted 78 percent, Serbs 12.16 percent, and Yugoslavs 2.22 percent. The two main religious communities in 1991 were Catholics (76.5 percent) and Serbian Orthodox (11.1 percent). Meanwhile, the Serb population was significantly reduced, especially as a result of mass exodus and repression that accompanied the reconquest of Serb-controlled areas of northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, and western Slavonia (Krajina in Serb usage) by the Croatian army (HV) in 1995; and the transfer, by the UN authorities, of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Sirmium to Croatia in 1997. Similarly, Croat percentages were increased by the influx of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and rump Yugoslavia (\*Serbia and Montenegro). At the end of the 1990s Croatia was more nationally homogeneous than ever in its history.

Throughout the Yugoslav period Croatia was the bastion of opposition to centralism and Serbian hegemony. During the interwar period its politics were dominated by the Croat Peasant Party (HSS), which succeeded in effecting significant autonomy. The policies of the Axis-installed Ustaša (Insurgent) movement, besides its unconvincing show of independence and emulation of fascist models, were directed to anti-Serb violence, creating new obstacles to Croat-Serb coexistence. This led to Communist-led insurgency in which the Serbs massively participated. By 1945 Partisan operational units of Croatia numbered 100,740 fighters, of which Croats constituted 60.26 percent and Serbs 24.35 percent. The overrepresentation of Serbs in the Communist insurgency was translated into postwar influence, which, in turn, provoked Croat resentment and opposition, both inside and outside the ruling Communist Party (SKH).

In 1971, the movement for the affirmation of Croatia's statehood and financial independence, but also of limited political \*pluralism and civil liberties, led by the reform wing of the SKH, the Matica Hrvatska cultural society, and the student movement at the University of Zagreb, was forcibly halted by \*Tito. Most of the principals were expelled from the party and retired, but some, notably non-Communists, were tried and imprisoned. The consequences of 1971, especially the virtual criminalization of various aspects of Croat identity, hastened the collapse of political Yugoslavism. After the rise of Milošević's nationalist movement in Serbia and the East European "refolution," Croat Communists were obliged to agree to multiparty elections. Held in March and April of 1990, they were won by the populist party-movement Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), led by Franjo Tudjman, a former JNA general, dissident historian, and political prisoner.

The HDZ and Tudjman personally shaped Croatia's course throughout the 1990s. They led Croatia from federal status to independence; established a strongly centralized political system in which the bicameral parliament (Sabor), the government, and the judiciary play secondary roles to the dominant presidential office; involved Croatia in the \*Bosnian war and in attempts to carve up \*Bosnia and Herzegovina (in agreement with Serbia), thereby courting international isolation; limited equal access to the public media; and carried out a kleptocratic privatization of state property. The authoritarian and nationalist regime, however, increasingly was challenged

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